Some Legal Considerations for E.U. Based MNEs Contemplating High-Risk Foreign Direct Investments in the Energy Sector After \u3ci\u3eKiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum\u3c/i\u3e and \u3ci\u3eChevron Corporation v. Naranjo\u3c/i\u3e by Van Detta, Jeffrey A.
South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business
Volume 9
Issue 2 Spring Article 4
2013
Some Legal Considerations for E.U. Based MNEs
Contemplating High-Risk Foreign Direct
Investments in the Energy Sector After Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum and Chevron Corporation v.
Naranjo
Jeffrey A. Van Detta
John Marshall Law School
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/scjilb
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in South Carolina Journal of
International Law and Business by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Van Detta, Jeffrey A. (2013) "Some Legal Considerations for E.U. Based MNEs Contemplating High-Risk Foreign Direct Investments
in the Energy Sector After Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum and Chevron Corporation v. Naranjo," South Carolina Journal of International
Law and Business: Vol. 9 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/scjilb/vol9/iss2/4
SOME LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR E.U.-
BASED MNES CONTEMPLATING HIGH-
RISK FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN 
THE ENERGY SECTOR AFTER KIOBEL V.
ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM AND
CHEVRON CORPORATION V. NARANJO 
Jeffrey A. Van Detta*
INTRODUCTION
In a two-year span, two major multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
in the energy-sector—Chevron and Royal Dutch Petroleum—have 
experienced the opposite ends of a similar problem:  The impact of 
civil litigation risks on foreign direct investments.1
   For Chevron, it was the denouement of a two-decade effort to 
defeat a corporate campaign that Ecuadorian residents of a polluted 
oil-exploration region waged against it since 1993 and its 
predecessor, Texaco, first in the U.S. federal courts, then in the 
Ecuadorian courts.2  After putting all of its litigation resources into 
ousting the jurisdiction of U.S. courts through a forum non 
                                                          
 *  Professor of Law & Associate Dean for Scholarship, Atlanta’s John 
Marshall Law School (AJMLS), Atlanta, Georgia.  Associate Dean Van 
Detta teaches courses in both International Business Transactions and 
International Civil Litigation.  He expresses his appreciation to the Miami 
Business Law Review for permission to adapt for this article portions of his 
article, Politics and Legal Regulation in the International Business 
Environment: An FDI Case Study of Alstom, S.A., in Israel, 21 MIAMI BUS.
L. REV. 1 (2013).  He also expresses his appreciation to the incredibly 
talented Michael Lynch, Mary Wilson, Mark Durbin, Morteza Parvin, and 
Susan Risher of the Michael J. Lynch Library at AJMLS, whose tireless 
reference, acquisition, and inter-library loan assistance to faculty is 
invaluable.  The author dedicates this article to the memory of the late Dean 
John E. Ryan (1937–2008). 
1 See, e.g., Christopher A. Whytock, The Chevron-Ecuador Case: 
Three Dimensions of Complexity in Transnational Dispute Resolution, 106 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 425 (2012). 
2   Judith Kimberling, Indigenous Peoples and the Oil Frontier in 
Amazonia: The Case of Ecuador, Chevron-Texaco, and Aguinda v. Texaco, 
38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 413 (2006). 
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conveniens dismissal conditioned on Chevron submitting to litigation 
in Ecuador, 3  Chevron’s odyssey through the Ecuadorian court 
system resulted in a $19 billion judgment, 4  which Chevron has 
fought as hard against in the Southern District of New York as it 
once did in that same court to get into Ecuador5—only to have the 
Second Circuit rebuff Chevron’s effort to use New York’s enactment 
of the Uniform Foreign Money Judgment Recognition Act 
(UFMJRA)6 as a sword rather than a shield and the U.S. Supreme 
Court decline to take up the case.7
                                                          
3  Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Justice Restored: Using a Preservation-of-
Court-Access Approach to Replace Forum Non Conveniens in Five 
International Product-Injury Cases, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 53, 96–98 
(2003); Jennifer K. Rankin, Note, U.S. Laws in the Rainforest: Can a U.S. 
Court Find Liability for Extraterritorial Pollution Caused by a U.S. 
Corporation? An Analysis of Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 18 B.C. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 221, 223–24 (1995).  As another commentator described the 
impact of oil exploration and exploitation: 
The boom of the petroleum industry was also not without 
environmental and human costs, which have led to the 
instant lawsuit.  Estimates place pipeline spills at 16.8 
million gallons of crude oil emptying into the Amazon 
River Basin.  Additionally, almost 30 billion gallons of 
toxic by-products of the petroleum extraction were 
released into the environment. 
Lisa Lambert, Case Note, At the Crossroads of Environmental and Human 
Rights Standards: Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. Using the Alien Tort Claims Act 
to Hold Multinational Corporate Violators of International Laws 
Accountable in U.S. Courts, 10 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 109, 113 (2000) 
(footnotes omitted) (noting that “an unpublished study's preliminary findings 
state the overall rate of cancer in the Oriente [where oil exploration and 
exploitation occurred] is 2.3 times higher than residents of Ecuador's capital, 
Quito”). 
4  Charles N. Brower & Diane Brown, From Pinochet in The House of 
Lords to the Chevron/Ecuador Lago Agrio Dispute: The Hottest Topics in 
International Dispute Resolution, 26 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV.
L.J. 1, 27–31 (2013). 
5 Compare Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998), and
Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994), with Chevron 
Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d sub nom.,
and Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 423 (2012). 
6   N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5301–5309.  While New York’s law is an 
enactment of the Uniform Foreign Money Judgment Recognition Act 
(UFMJRA), promulgated by the Uniform Law Commissioners in 1962, the 
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For Royal Dutch Petroleum, a litigation odyssey started after 
victims and families of victims of torture, extrajudicial—and even 
judicially-sanctioned—killing in the Niger delta filed lawsuits in the 
U.S. federal courts.   It all but came to an end—simply awaiting 
transmission of the appellate mandate—after the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled that 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (the Alien Tort Statute) did not apply 
extraterritorially to alleged torts “in violation of the law of nations” 
that are alleged to have transpired “outside the United States.”8
These cases hold lessons for both outside and in-house corporate 
counsel, yet they also deserve further scrutiny and integration into 
the business decision-making process that underlies foreign direct 
investments.  This is particularly true for companies located in the 
euro zone today, which are challenged truly to “think outside of the 
box” 9 —and outside of the European Union 10 —in structuring 
                                                                                                                
New York Legislature in 1970 denominated the law as the “Uniform Foreign 
Country Money-Judgment Recognition Act,” which is in fact the title of a 
new 2005 uniform law that New York has yet to adopt.  Compare Uniform 
Law Commission, Foreign-Country Money Judgments 
Recognition Act, available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.asp
x?title=Foreign-Country%20Money%20Judgments%20Recogniti 
on%20Act, with Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 234, 239–40 and N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5301 
(captioned “Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgments”), § 5309  
(“This article may be cited as the “Uniform Foreign Country Money-
Judgments Recognition Act.”).  Unfortunately, the usually astute Professor 
David Siegel did not comment upon this anomaly in his PRACTICE 
COMMENTARIES, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5301, C53101:1 (2013), and even the 
astute Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals has not picked up on 
the anomaly.  See Galliano, S.A. v. Stallion, Inc., 15 N.Y.3d 75, 79–80, 904 
N.Y.S.2d 683, 930 N.E.2d 756 (2010). 
7  Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012). 
8  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1660 (2013). 
9 See Patrick R. Hugg, Redefining the European Union's Position in the 
Emerging Multipolar World: Strong Global Leadership Potential, 
Restrained by Asymmetry of Power and Dissonant Voices, 20 TUL. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 145 (2011); Inese Vaidere, The Impact of Regional and Cohesion 
Policy on the Economic Development of the EU, ISSN 1822–8402 European 
Integration Studies, No. 5 (2011), available at http://www.eis.ktu.lt/ 
index.php/EIS/article/view/1092/1168; Daniel Daianu, Euro Zone Crisis and 
EU Governance: Tackling a Flawed Design and Inadequate Policy 
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international growth from a now suddenly unstable home base.11
Thus, the time is ripe to re-consider how E.U.-based multinationals 
might modify their decision-making templates for identifying and 
undertaking opportunities for foreign direct investment (FDI), 12
while tempering that perspective with an analysis of the potential for 
litigation over certain kinds of FDI—whether in the courts of the 
United States or in tribunals elsewhere.  
Effective evaluation of FDI requires more than the application of 
business modeling and economic theory. 13   It requires critical 
evaluation of legal issues raised not only under the regulatory 
environment of the host state, but also under the legal system of the 
FDI investor’s home state, and third-states to which the FDI investor 
has substantial connections.  This inquiry is both inductive and 
                                                                                                                
Arrangements, CASE Network Studies and Analyses No. 433 (2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1991162; Stefano Micossi, Misguided 
Policies Risk Breaking up the Eurozone and the EU (Centre for European 
Policy Working Paper No. 260, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1996457.
10 See Hugg, supra note 9; see also Vaidere, supra note 9; Daianu, 
supra note 9; Micossi, supra note 9. 
11   See, e.g., Alfredo Jimenez & Juan Bautista Delgado-Garcia, 
Proactive Management of Political Risk and Corporate Performance: The 
Case of Spanish Multinational Enterprises, 21 INT’L BUS. REV. 1029 (2012), 
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2011.11.008 (noting that 
Spanish MNEs have displayed “a proactive use of political risk in the 
internationalization strategy . . . by taking advantage of their political 
capabilities in certain locations”). 
12  For examples of how the EU has benefitted from foreign trade even 
in the face of the Euro Zone crisis, see Rajnish Tiwari, Bilateral Business 
Defies Financial Crisis and Economic Slowdown, INDO-GERMAN ECON., 
May 2012, at 19–21, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2083082; Julien 
Chaisse, Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union Policy on Foreign 
Investment—How Will the New EU Competence on FDI Affect the Emerging 
Global Regime?, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 51, 52 (footnotes omitted), available at
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/content/15/1/51. 
13 See JOHN W. HEAD, GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW: THE BUSINESS AND 
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE AND INVESTMENT 384 (Carolina 
Academic Press 2d ed. 2007).  For an examination of the importance of FDI 
within a broader legal environment, see Kenneth C. Randall & John E. 
Norris, A New Paradigm For International Business Transactions, 71 WASH.
U. L.Q. 599 (1993). 
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deductive. 14   It must also encompass the vantage points that the 
divergent experiences of the Chevron-Ecuador and Royal Dutch 
Shell-United States litigations—each having arisen from FDI 
projects—embrace.
To demonstrate critical evaluation of FDI-generated legal issues, 
we hypothesize for study in that one of the world’s largest MNEs, 
France’s Alstom, S.A., is considering an FDI in Israel’s Golan 
Heights for one of Alstom’s leading businesses: the manufacture, 
installation, and operation of wind-powered generation of 
electricity.15  In Part I, this article explores some of the legal risks 
MNEs face from FDI-related issues, particularly litigation under 
municipal human rights-related laws of various jurisdictions, as 
related laws in France and the United States illustrate.16  Political 
risks of Alstom’s hypothesized Golan Heights wind project, and the 
availability of insurance against those risks, are also discussed in Part 
I.  In Parts II and III, we examine the divergent experiences of the 
fourth and second largest energy companies in the world—Royal 
Dutch Shell and Chevron—as defendants in precedent-changing 
litigation under America’s Alien Tort Statute (Shell’s Nigerian FDI) 
and under the civil-law legal tradition in Ecuador (Texaco’s FDI in 
Ecuador before its Chevron merger).  In that discussion, we will 
examine two of the most recent developments in attempted FDI 
litigation-risk management.  We will contrast Royal Dutch Shell’s 
(surprisingly) successful defense of ATS litigation that has resulted 
in a landmark Supreme Court precedent that will effectuate a major 
                                                          
14   There are, of course, even more detailed ways to express this 
paradigm.  See, e.g., Conceptual Outline And Checklist Of Foreign Direct 
Investment Issues, in DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES & MATERIALS,
446–47 (Aspen 2d ed. 2010). 
15  This hypothetical, and the business reasoning behind it, are fully 
discussed in Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Politics And Legal Regulation in the 
International Business Environment:  An FDI Case Study of Alstom, S.A., in 
Israel, 21 MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 11–36 (2013). 
16  One of the most notable expressions of business community angst is 
GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING 
MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 (Policy Analysis No. 70, Inst. 
for Int’l Econ., 2003) (note especially Ch. 1, entitled “Nightmare Scenario”). 
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curtailment of ATS suits against MNEs in the U.S. courts, with 
Chevron’s unsuccessful initial effort to defeat enforcement of the 
huge environmental tort judgment rendered against it by Ecuador’s 
Lago Agrio court—and Chevron’s current efforts to defeat 
enforcement of that judgment by U.S. federal court litigation against 
the Ecuadorian plaintiff’s American lawyer.17
I. CRITICAL EVALUATION OF LEGAL ISSUES
A. THE ROLE OF LITIGATION RISK IN FDI DECISIONS—WITH A 
PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON MUNICIPAL COURTS AND CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IMPLICATIONS
Litigation is a tool of strategic business management, capable of 
deployment as a tool by which private parties or organizations use 
the municipal courts of various countries to control the activities of 
MNEs, including hobbling or even stopping particular FDI projects.  
This has certainly proven to be the case with FDIs in the Occupied 
Territories of Israel.18  Such litigation is often viewed as a peculiarly 
American phenomenon; but other nations and their court systems are 
now among the forums hosting such disputes.19
In the following subsections, litigation in municipal courts of 
France and the United States arising from MNE activity, including 
                                                          
17 See, e.g., Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal Of Fortune: A Crusading 
Lawyer Helped Ecuadorians Secure A Huge Environmental Judgment 
Against Chevron.  But Did He Go Too Far?, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 9, 2012, 
available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/01/09/120109fa_ 
fact_keefe. 
18 See, e.g., Yishai Blank, Legalizing The Barrier: The Legality and 
Materiality of the Israel/Palestine Separation Barrier, 46 TEX. INT'L L.J. 
309, 311 & n.8 (2011) (analyzing the “legal campaign against” the wall 
erected in the Occupied Territories).   
19  Indeed, a court in the Netherlands recently exercised what amounts 
to universal jurisdiction of the kind sought by foreign plaintiffs in American 
court cases.  See Dutch Courts Compensate Palestinian For Libya Jail, BBC
NEWS, Mar. 28, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
17537597. 
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FDIs, in other nations is examined, and the impact of such lawsuits 
on Alstom’s hypothesized FDI in the Golan Heights is assessed.20
1. ALSTOM’S VULNERABILITY TO SUITS AT HOME OVER ITS FDI IN 
ISRAEL
An FDI factor that may not immediately come to mind is 
lawsuits in the home state(s) of an MNE.  For an MNE that has the 
span of Alstom, this translates into legal entanglements in countries 
other than the host state.  These entanglements portend both prolixity 
and costliness.  The costs include not only the potential litigation, but 
also the difficulties that such lawsuits create for the MNE with 
investors and the public at-large, not to mention politicians in the 
home states who may seek to use the stage created by litigation 
against the MNE to pursue legislative or regulatory investigations. 
Alstom’s exposure to such suits is worth considering, 
particularly in light of a case brought in France against Alstom for 
alleged violations in Alstom’s participation in the Jerusalem Light 
Rail Project.21  The Association France Palestine Solidarité (AFPS) 
and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) sued Alstom and 
Veolia Transport, another contractor working on the Jerusalem Light 
Rail Project, in the French Courts, contending that they were 
collaborating, in violation of international law, through their work on 
building a tramway through the occupied territories in Israel.22  The 
papers initiating the legal action in the French Court of Grand 
                                                          
20  For an examination of this hypothesized MNE from the perspective 
of possible litigation in Québec Province, Canada, see Van Detta, supra note 
15.
21 See, e.g., Wolfgang Kaleck, From Pinochet To Rumsfeld: Universal 
Jurisdiction in Europe 1998–2008, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 927, 972 & n.307 
(2009).  The railway opened in August 2011.  See Harriet Sherwood, 
Jerusalem’s Long-Awaited Light Railway Splits Opinion, THE GUARDIAN,
Aug. 17, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/17/jerusalem-
light-railway-opinion?INTCMP=SRCH.
22   Kaleck, supra note 21, at 972 n.307; see also Aurine Crémieu, 
Rubrique “En Mouvement” Israel et Territoires Occupes,
LA CHRONIQUE, Mar. 1, 2006, http://www.amnesty.fr/index.php/amnesty/s_i
nformer/la_chronique/mars_2006_sommaire/israel_et_territoires_occup. 
168                          SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF             [Vol. 9.2 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS
Instance at Nanterre sought “to cancel the Israeli contract given to 
Alstom, which will provide the train carriages, and to Veolia 
Transport, the public transport operator.”23  The French appeals court 
(cour d’appel) affirmed an interlocutory decision of the Nanterre 
court that the courts of France had subject matter jurisdiction over 
the claims asserting violation of international law, as well as over the 
claims asserted under France’s Civil Code;24 that in and of itself is 
quite an important ruling, for it opens the French courts to future 
cases filed against Alstom and other MNEs alleging violations (or 
complicity in violating) international legal norms.  
The litigation before the Nanterre court went on for four years, 
and while the court ultimately ruled that “neither the signature of the 
concession agreement by these companies and their subsidiaries, nor 
the route and operating conditions of the light rail system constituted 
a fault under Article 1382 of the French Civil Code,”25 the significant 
fact is that the court viewed that it had jurisdiction over the case.26
                                                          
23  Rory McCarthy & Angelique Chrisafis, PLO Disputes Jerusalem 
Rail Plan, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 23, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/2007/oct/26/france.israel?INTCMP=SRCH. 
24 See French Appeals Court Confirms Jurisdiction over Alstom Case,
BDS MOVEMENT (Dec. 29, 2009), http://www.bdsmovement.net/2009/fr 
ench-appeals-court-confirms-jurisdiction-over-alstom-case-617.  
25 August & Debouzy Advise Veolia Transport on the Lawsuit Between 
Veolia, Alstom and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, AUGUST &
DEBOUZY AVOCATES, http://www.august-debouzy.com/en/495/august-
debouzy-advise-veolia-transport-lawsuit-between-veolia-alstom-and-
palestine-liberation-or (last visited Feb. 22, 2013). 
26  In March 2013, the Cour d'appel de Versailles affirmed this ruling of 
the Nanterre court.  See Eugene Kontorovich, Landmark French Ruling on 
West Bank Construction and International Law, OPINIO JURIS (May 1, 2013, 
10:30 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/05/01/guest-post-landmark-french-
ruling-on-west-bank-construction-and-international-law/.  Some scholars 
have read the decision—currently available only in its original French—as 
holding “that construction of a light rail system in the Israeli-controlled West 
Bank by a French company does not violate international law” and “that only 
the Government of Israel, and not private parties, can violate the relevant 
provisions of the Geneva Convention.”  Id.  Other commentators read the 
decision more narrowly—“as international law orthodoxy a la Oppenheim—
‘states only and exclusively are subjects of international law.’”  Id.  Among 
those commentators, some see the ruling as technical, as well as narrow: 
[V]arious French and Israeli companies formed an Israeli 
corporation, which won a bid to build the light rail. 
There were thus two layers of contracts: the concession 
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contract between the State of Israel and the Israeli 
corporation (Citypass), and the agreements that existed 
between the Israeli corporation and the Israeli and 
French companies as shareholders in Citypass.  The 
action in this case was brought against the French 
corporate shareholders.  Very importantly, this was NOT 
a case of damages alleging the French shareholders’ 
secondary liability for acts undertaken by Israel.  Rather, 
this was a case to annul the contracts.  Under French law, 
a contract can be annulled if its “cause” is illicit. 
 According to the French court, the primary 
prohibition of non-transfer applies to the occupying 
power.  Thus, even assuming that the cause was illicit, it 
could only annul the concession contract between the 
State of Israel and the Israeli corporation.  The Court 
refused to pierce the corporate veil and rule that that the 
shareholders agreements were invalid by 
“contamination.” 
 Thus, this case is interesting for its refusal to pierce 
the corporate veil.  It does not, however, have any 
relevance to the issue of whether natural or legal persons 
can be secondarily liable for acts of occupation.  Given 
that the claim concerned the annulment of contract, the 
issue of secondary liability simply wasn’t before the 
Court. 
Id.  In accord, another commentator has observed that the Cour d’appel
“determined that because the State of Israel was not a party to the present 
litigation, the Court had to limit itself to the examination of contracts signed 
by Alstom itself (the construction contracts) and could not rule on the 
legality of the concession contract to which Israel was a party,” and thus the 
Cour d’appel “refused to comment on the alleged illicit contractual purpose 
(the illegal occupation and ‘colonization’ of the West Bank), imputed to 
Israel by the plaintiffs.”  Milena Sterio, French Companies May Build in the 
West Bank—An Assessment of the Versailles Court of Appeals Case, OPINIO 
JURIS (May 8, 2013, 4:39 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/05/08/guest-post-
french-companies-may-build-in-the-west-bank-an-assessment-of-the-
versailles-court-of-appeals-case/.  That commentator also noted that the Cour 
d’appel “analyzed the plaintiffs’ argument that, under customary law, multi-
national corporations should be held liable for violations of human rights,” 
and “referred to American Alien Tort Claims Act litigation, and specified 
that these cases were not relevant for the purposes of the French case as they 
discuss the application of American, domestic law, and because some of 
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However, activists against Alstom still celebrated because the 
Jerusalem FDI recently claimed that the publicity and debate 
generated by their opposition were the cause of a failed Alstom bid to 
“build a high-speed railway on the Muslim pilgrim[age] route 
between Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia,” a project claimed to be 
worth $10 billion.27
2. ALSTOM’S VULNERABILITY TO INTERNATIONAL CIVIL 
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN COURTS
 Alstom’s greatest American litigation is an opaque and long-
obscure law originating in the Judiciary Act of 1789 that established 
the federal court system.  The law, now codified and known 
colloquially as the “Alien Tort Statute” (ATS), tersely provides that
“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.”28  The ATS has become a 
rallying point for anti-corporate activists seeking a forum for 
litigation against MNEs in U.S. federal courts, 29  and a bane of 
business organizations, who see the law being used as a stage upon 
which activists wage costly and protracted public relations 
campaigns against MNEs.  These campaigns have created “a new 
                                                                                                                
them have ‘penal’ aspects.”  Id.  Obviously, more work remains for scholars 
seeking to understand the Cour d’appel’s decision within the context of the 
French civil-law tradition and present-day legal system. 
27  BDS Claims Victory After Alstom Project Derails, MA’AN NEWS 
AGENCY (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.maannews.net/eng/viewdetails.asp 
x?id=433036.  The activists also claim “Alstom suffered blows when a 
Swedish pension fund excluded it from its investment portfolio, as did the 
Dutch ASN Bank, due to involvement in Israel’s occupation of Palestinian 
land.”  Id. 
28  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (captioned “Alien’s Action for Tort).  The 
U.S. Supreme Court has consistently appellated the statute “the Alien Tort 
Statute,” beginning with Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping 
Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 436 (1989), and continuing with Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).  See Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 
979 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007). 
29 Part II: The ATS In The Modern Era—Corporate Accountability For 
Aiding And Abetting, THE CENTER FOR JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY,
http://www.cja.org/article.php?id=435 (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
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form of political risk” 30  to enterprises such as Alstom’s East 
Jerusalem Light-Rail Project, as well as our hypothetical Golan 
Heights wind farm project.  “As a practical matter, plaintiffs choose 
to sue under the ATS to forum shop their way into a U.S. court in 
hopes of finding a more favorable forum in which to litigate their 
case,”31 even if the litigation serves only to generate publicity.32  For 
example, in Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc.,33 bulldozer sales to Israel 
were attacked under the ATS as allegedly aiding and abetting alleged 
human rights violations in the Occupied Territories when the 
bulldozers were used in constructing and expanding settlements.34
While the courts ultimately dismissed the complaint against 
Caterpillar, they did not find (1) that corporations were inappropriate 
ATS defendants; (2) that the FDI of Caterpillar in Israel was outside 
of the ATS; or (3) that the ATS is inapplicable to extraterritorial 
conduct.  Instead, solely because the U.S. government actually paid 
for Caterpillar’s sale of equipment to Israel, the federal court 
concluded that it could not “intrude into our government's decision to 
grant military assistance to Israel, even indirectly by deciding this 
challenge to a defense contractor's sales.”35 Corrie, therefore, offers 
                                                          
30  Geoffrey Jones, Multinational Strategies and Developing Countries 
in Historical Perspective 34–35 (HARVARD BUS. SCHOOL, Working Paper 
No. 10-076, 2010), available at www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/10-076.pdf 
(noting that “[t]he Act lay dormant for almost two hundred years, until in 
1979 it was used against a Paraguayan police inspector living in the United 
States, who was accused of torturing and killing the son of a Paraguayan 
dissident in Paraguay,” to win “a $10 million judgment, which was never 
paid”). 
31  Donald Earl Childress, III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and 
the Next Wave of Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 723 (2012). 
32  Id. at 725; see, e.g., Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler, 644 F.3d 909 (9th 
Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied by a divided court, 676 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 
2011) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), petition 
for cert. filed sub nom. DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman, 80 U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. 
Feb. 06, 2012) (No. 11-965). 
33  503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007). 
34 Id. at 1023–24. 
35  Id. at 983 (citations and footnotes omitted).   
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little comfort to Alstom.36  A lawsuit challenging a Golan Heights 
wind farm project might well get more traction under the ATS, and 
subject Alstom to the considerable transactional costs attendant to 
American-style discovery and civil practice, the generation of 
negative public opinion and negative opinion among investors and 
analysts, and the costs of settlement—which corporate ATS 
defendants have incurred in more than a few cases—just to bring the 
legal proceedings to a definitive close.37  Some U.S. courts have 
expressed concern that such use of ATS litigation “coerce[s] the 
payment of tens of millions of dollars in settlement, even where a 
plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits is zero,” and “[c]ourts 
should take care that they do not become instruments of abuse and 
extortion.”38
Indeed, the objective, it seems, of more than a few ATS suits 
filed against MNEs is to reset the context and terms of activism 
against the FDIs of those MNEs.39  The effect of the ATS-litigation 
                                                          
36  Indeed, the Corrie family then unsuccessfully sued the state of Israel 
in the courts of that country.  See, e.g., Harriet Sherwood, Rachel Corrie's 
Death Was An Accident, Israeli Judge Rules—Judge Finds No Fault In 
Military Investigation That Cleared Defence Force Of Responsibility For 
Protester Being Killed By Bulldozer, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 28, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/28/rachelcorrie-verdict-accident-
judge. 
37  And, as Professor Childress has noted recently, there have been ATS 
cases against corporations that have been tried to plaintiff’s verdicts.  See
Childress, supra note 31, at 713 n.25. 
38  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 
2011) (Jacobs, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing); accord, Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 116 (“Such civil lawsuits, 
alleging heinous crimes condemned by customary international law, often 
involve a variety of issues unique to ATS litigation, not least the fact that the 
events took place abroad and in troubled or chaotic circumstances.  The 
resulting complexity and uncertainty—combined with the fact that juries 
hearing ATS claims are capable of awarding multibillion-dollar verdicts—
has led many defendants to settle ATS claims prior to trial.”)  Only a few 
ATS cases against corporations have been tried to plaintiff’s verdicts.  
Childress, supra note 31, at 713 n.25. 
39  Childress, supra note 31, at 725–26 (noting “the signaling value that 
is offered when bringing suit against a corporation for alleged violations of 
international law” because “no corporation wishes to be known as a human-
rights abuser or violator of international law”); see also Julian Ku, D’Amato 
Sues Hungarian Railways for Holocaust-Era Complicity, OPINIO JURIS BLOG,
(Feb, 17, 2010, 3:24 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/02/17/damato-sues-
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risk on MNEs—whether U.S.-based40 or foreign-based—is more than 
de minimis, and creates considerable problems for the United States, 
as well as for the MNEs.41
Thus, the Corrie case does not by any means preclude viable 
ATS lawsuits against other corporations, such as Alstom, which are 
working on projects sited in the Occupied Territories. 42   To the 
contrary, we need to place that case within a context that provides a 
perspective from which to assess the litany of claims that plaintiffs 
and their lawyers, along with persons and groups who advocate for 
human rights and environmental causes, and legal academics, have 
imagined in the thirty-three words of the ATS.  Indeed, a 
commentator noted, “in the past [twenty] years, there have been 150 
[ATS] lawsuits filed against corporations over their activities in 
about [sixty] countries.”43  Examining just a small sampling of these 
suits shows just how attenuated they are, particularly in comparison 
to the increasingly scarce judicial resources available to handle those 
cases in either our federal or state courts, both systems overflowing 
with burgeoning civil, and constitutionally prioritized criminal, 
domestic dockets: 
                                                                                                                
hungarian-railways-for-holocaust-era-complicity/ (with link to the 
complaint); cf. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
368 F. Supp. 1098, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
40  Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, Commentary, Lex Loci Delictus 
and Global Economic Welfare: Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 120 HARV.
L. REV. 1137, 1137 (2007); see also Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 
F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that the place of a foreign tort, not a 
U.S. courtroom, “is the place that has the greatest interest in striking a 
reasonable balance among safety, cost, and other factors pertinent to the 
design and administration of a system of tort law”). 
41  Kiobel, 642 F.3d at 270. 
42 See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en 
banc), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Rio Tinto PLC v. Sarei, No. 
11-649, 2013 WL 1704704 (Apr. 22, 2013).   
43   Lawrence Hurley, Supreme Court May Consider Whether 
Companies Can Be Sued Over Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/08/11/11greenwire-supreme-court-
may-consider-whether-companies-c-23629.html. 
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(1)  Burmese villagers sued over various human 
rights violations arising from the construction of 
the Yadana gas pipeline project in Myanmar;44
(2) Nigerian domiciliaries sued over events that 
occurred on a Chevron offshore drilling platform in 
1998, when Nigerian soldiers suppressed a protest 
against Chevron's environmental and business 
practices;45
(3) Nigerian relatives of poet and activist Ken 
Wiwa sued Royal Dutch Petroleum over his arrest, 
prosecution, show trial, and execution in the wake 
of his opposition to Shell’s oil exploration 
activities in the Niger Delta;46
(4) Sudanese citizens’ made allegations against a 
Canadian oil company concerning its purported 
assistance to the government in Sudan in the forced 
movement of civilians residing near oil facilities;47
(5) Papua New Guinea residents sued an Anglo-
Australian mining conglomerate over a 1988 revolt 
on the island of Bougainville in which Rio Tinto 
allegedly provided helicopters and vehicles to the 
                                                          
44  Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (denying 
motion to dismiss ATS claims against Unocal), aff’d in part & rev’d in part,
395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 
2003), appeal dismissed upon settlement, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005), 
vacating, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (which had granted 
summary judgment to Unocal on plaintiffs’ ATS and RICO claims). 
45  Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming 
defense judgment upon jury verdict finding no liability on ATS and other 
claims).  Bowoto is the rare instance of an ATS case making it to trial. 
46 See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 
2000).  Wiwa is notable for almost making it to trial; the lawyers settled the 
case on the eve of a jury trial in the Southern District of New York.  See Jad 
Mouawad, Shell to Pay $15.5 Million to Settle Nigerian Case, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 2009, at B1; Jad Mouawad, Oil Industry Braces for Trial on Rights 
Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2009, at B1. 
47  Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 
244 (2d Cir. 2009).   
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Government, which is alleged to have killed 15,000 
people;48
(6) Peruvian residents and representatives of 
deceased residents sued an American mining 
company alleging that pollution from mining 
company's Peruvian operations had caused severe 
lung disease;49
(7) Columbian citizens, the family members of 
trade unionists, banana-plantation workers, 
political organizers, social activists, and others 
tortured and killed by paramilitary organizations 
operating in Colombia, sued an American MNE for 
made-payments to Colombian terrorist 
organization in exchange for protection of workers, 
thereby providing the terrorist organization with 
weapons, ammunition, and other supplies;50
(8) Relatives of alleged victims of extrajudicial 
killings in Sri Lanka brought action against sitting 
President of Sri Lanka;51
(9) Victims and families of victims of terrorist 
attacks committed in Israel sued a Jordanian bank 
for allegedly providing financial services to 
terrorist organizations;52
(10)Mexican citizens sued MNEs over workplace 
safety violations arising from methane explosion at 
                                                          
48  Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), 
vacated and remanded on other grounds, Rio Tinto PLC v. Sarei, No. 11-
649, 2013 WL 1704704 (Apr. 22, 2013).   
49  Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003).   
50  In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute and Shareholder 
Derivative Litigation, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
51  Manoharan v. Rajapaksa, 711 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  Although 
brought under TVPA, rather than ATS, the allegations here are like those 
brought in ATS cases involving sitting members of foreign governments. 
52  Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 706 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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Pasta de Conchos mine in the State of Coahuila, 
Mexico;53
(11)Holocaust survivors and heirs of other 
Holocaust victims sued banks alleging that the 
banks participated in expropriating property from 
Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust;54
(12)Holocaust survivors and heirs of other 
Holocaust victims sued Hungarian National 
Railways alleging that Railways participated in 
expropriating property from Hungarian Jews 
during the Holocaust;55
(13)Widows of former Presidents of Rwanda and 
Burundi, who were killed during their presidencies 
when surface-to-air missiles brought down aircraft 
carrying them over Rwandan capital, sued the 
President of Rwanda, seeking to hold him liable;56
(14)Columbian citizens sued Coca-Cola 
Corporation alleging Coca-Cola bottlers in 
Colombia collaborated with Colombian 
paramilitary forces in "the systematic intimidation, 
kidnapping, detention, torture, and murder of 
Colombian trade unionists";57
(15)Allegations by family, formerly citizens of 
Egypt and now emigrated to Canada, that Coca-
Cola had been making millions of dollars annually 
in profits by exploiting, through "Coca-Cola 
Egypt," property that Coca-Cola had, before 1965, 
leased from the Bigio family, at which time the 
property was confiscated by the Egyptian 
government in Nasser's anti-Jewish program of 
                                                          
53  Diaz v. Grupo Mexico Inc., 487 Fed. Appx. 366 (9th Cir. 2012); see 
also Brief of Appellants, Diaz v. Grupo Mexico Inc., 487 Fed. Appx. 366 
(9th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-15848), 2011 WL 3019825. 
54  Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2012). 
55  Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2012). 
56  Habyarimana v. Kagame, 696 F.3d 1029 (10th Cir. 2012).   
57   Sinaltrainal v. Coca–Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009), 
abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S.Ct. 
1702, 1706 & n.2 (2012).   
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religious persecution, used by a government-owned 
company called ENBC that purportedly leased it 
from a government-owned insurance company, 
and, in 1994, placed under Coca-Cola’s control 
when Coca-Cola purchased a substantial interest in 
ENBC and promptly renamed it, "Coca-Cola 
Egypt";58
(16)Citizens of South Africa sued multinational 
corporations that purportedly collaborated with the 
government of South Africa in maintaining 
apartheid, including claims filed against the three 
automakers—Daimler, Ford, and GM—alleging 
that they aided the apartheid regime by selling 
armored military vehicles that the Apartheid 
government used to violently suppress and 
terrorize South Africa’s black population.  
Furthermore, the citizens claim that the 
corporations collaborated with South African 
security forces, providing information that was 
used to facilitate arrests, harassment, and torture of 
employees who were active in the struggle against 
apartheid and claim that IBM provided the 
Apartheid government with the equipment to 
generate race-based identity documents that 
stripped black South Africans of their nationality 
and citizenship;59
(17)Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia 
Tymoshenko and political allies sued a Swiss 
corporation which allegedly—as retribution for 
Tymoshenko’s eliminating the corporation from 
the Ukrainian natural gas trade—paid illegal 
kickbacks to the Yanukovich government in 
Ukraine to file criminal charges against 
                                                          
58  Bigio v. Coca–Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Bigio 
v. Coca–Cola Co., 448 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2006); Bigio v. Coca–Cola Co., 675 
F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2012). 
59  Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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Tymoshenko and other former government 
officials, to subject her to a politically-motivated 
“show trial” in Ukraine, and to incarcerate her in 
Ukraine since August 2011;60
(18)A Chinese dissent sued the Communist Party 
of China, People's Republic of China, and 
individual Chinese officials, claiming injury “with 
regard to the Tiananmen Square massacre, 
Defendants' policies towards overseas dissidents, . . 
. the alleged repressions of Wang Bingzhang and 
Yang Gianli,” the “abridgement of his ‘free 
association’ right with Wang, who is imprisoned,” 
and “allegations of harassment, violation of his 
free-speech rights, and interference with his family 
relationships.”61
Commentators have expressed even more ambitious plans for 
using the ATS in ways that are even further afield—as the basis for 
internationalizing environmental law;62 as a basis for transnational 
                                                          
60   Tymoshenko v. Firtash, No. 11–CV–2794 (KMW), 2013 WL 
1234943 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2013); see also Tymoshenko v. Firtash, No. 11–
CV–2794 (KMW), 2013 WL 1234821 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013); 
Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd., 588 F. Supp. 2d 375 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008).  In Chowdhury, the individual plaintiff and his corporate 
employer, and its corporate shareholder, all citizens of Bangladesh, allege 
that the defendants—a Mauritius corporation and an individual U.S. citizen 
“with a role in [the Mauritius corporation] that he has variously described as 
chairman of the board, owner, or representative”—“to gain an advantage in a 
business dispute between the parties, made a false complaint of criminal 
conduct by plaintiffs to the Bangladeshi police,” as a result of which the 
individual plaintiff was arrested, incarcerated, and tortured by Bangladeshi 
police authorities in Bangladesh.  Id. at 377–78.  
61  Yaodi Hu v. Communist Party of China, No. 1:12–CV–1213, 2013 
WL 634719 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 20, 2013), adopting report & 
recommendation of magistrate judge reported at 2012 WL 7160373 (W.D. 
Mich. Nov. 20, 2012). 
62 See Sarah M. Morris, The Intersection of Equal and Environmental 
Protection: A New Direction for Environmental Alien Tort Claims after 
Sarei and Sosa, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 275, 275 (2009); Xiuli Han, 
ATCA As An Avenue Of Overseas Environmental Protection And Its 
Implication To China’s Overseas Investors, 6(2) FRONTIERS OF LAW IN 
CHINA 219 (June 2011). 
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product liability law;63 as a means of creating a transnational civil 
cause of action that parallels the criminal sanction of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practice Act; 64  as a vehicle for bringing claims against 
religious institutions (such as the Roman Catholic Church by persons 
claiming to be aggrieved by sacerdotal sexual abuse allegedly 
tolerated by the Church) 65  or against secular institutions over 
religious issues66 (such as claims by Guantanamo detainees that they 
have been subjected to religious harassment while in custody);67 as a 
platform for child-soldiers in foreign conflicts to sue arms 
manufacturers, 68  for Korean and other Asian women forced into 
sexual slavery by the occupying Japanese Imperial Army during 
World War II, 69  for foreign workers in “sweatshops” located in 
foreign countries,70 and for Iraqis to sue  the U.S. government and 
private contractors in Iraq for denying “Iraqis the same freedom of 
                                                          
63 See Joel Slawotsky, International Product Liability Claims under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 157 (2007); Joel 
Slawotsky, Liability For Defective Chinese Products Under The Alien Tort 
Claims Act, 7 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 519 (2008). 
64  Matt A. Vega, Balancing Judicial Cognizance and Caution: Whether 
Transnational Corporations Are Liable for Foreign Bribery Under the Alien 
Tort Statute, 31MICH. J. INT’L L. 385 (2010). 
65  Rodriguez v. Mahony, No. CV 10–02902–JST (JEMx), 2012 WL 
1057428 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012). 
66 See, e.g., Chad G. Marzen, Religion and the Alien Tort Statute, 1 
CREIGHTON INT’L & COMP. L.J. 55 (2011).   
67 See Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
68 See Nancy Morisseau, Note, Seen But Not Heard: Child Soldiers 
Suing Gun Manufacturers Under The Alien Tort Claims Act, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 1263 (2004). 
69 See Susan Jenkins Vanderweert, Comment, Seeking Justice For 
“Comfort” Women: Without An International Criminal Court, Suits Brought 
By World War II Sex Slaves Of The Japanese Army May Find Their Best 
Hope Of Success In U.S. Federal Courts, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
141 (2001). 
70 See Debra Cohen Maryanov, Note & Comment, Sweatshop Liability: 
Corporate Codes Of Conduct And The Governance Of Labor Standards In 
The International Supply Chain, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 397 (2010). 
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the press that their American counterparts enjoy;”71  as a tool for 
addressing “egregious international corporate fraud,” 72  “financial 
crime,”73 and violations of “labor rights;”74 as a vehicle for claims of 
harm from air pollution,75 global warming,76 and rising sea levels;77
and as a platform to assert claims against the U.S. Navy and U.S. 
government for alleged sonar-caused harm to whales and other sea 
mammals.78
                                                          
71  Brenner A. Allen, Comment, A Cause Of Action Against Private 
Contractors And The U.S. Government For Freedom Of Speech Violations In 
Iraq, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 535, 536–37, 559–73 (2005). 
72 See Joel Slawotsky, The New Global Financial Landscape: Why 
Egregious International Corporate Fraud Should Be Cognizable under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 131 (2006); see also 
Joel Slawotsky. Are Financial Institutions Liable For Financial Crime 
Under The Alien Tort Statute?  (2013), ExpressO, [hereinafter Are Financial 
Institutions Liable?], available at http://works.bepress.com/joel_slawotsky/1 
(article currently unavailable for download). 
73 See Are Financial Institutions Liable?, supra note 72. 
74 See Wesley V. Carrington, Note, Corporate Liability for Violations 
of Labor Rights under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1381 
(2009); Grace C. Spencer, Her Body Is a Battlefield: The Applicability of the 
Alien Tort Statute to Corporate Human Rights Abuses in Juarez, Mexico, 40 
GONZ. L. REV. 503 (2004–2005); Sarah J. Adams Lien, Employer Beware?  
Enforcing Transnational Labor Standards In The United States Under The 
Alien Tort Claims Act, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 311 (2002). 
75 See Ajmel Quereshi, The Search For An Environmental Filartiga: 
Trans-Boundary Harm And The Future Of International Environmental 
Litigation, 56 HOW. L.J. 131, 157–63 (2012). 
76 See Mini Kaur, Global Warming Litigation Under The Alien Tort 
Claims Act: What Sosa v. Alvarez Machain And Its Progeny Mean For 
Indigenous Arctic Communities, 13 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.
155 (2006).
77 See RoseMary Reed, Rising Seas and Disappearing Islands: Can 
Island Inhabitants Seek Redress Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 11 PAC.
RIM L. & POL'Y J. 399, 427 (2002); Jon M. Van Dyke et al., Whales, 
Submarines, and Active Sonar, 18 OCEAN YEARBOOK 330, 359–63 (2004), 
available at www.mmc.gov/sound/internationalwrkshp/pdf/vandykeetal.pdf 
(suggesting the plausibility of Alien Tort Statute claims for harming marine 
mammals with active sonar). 
78 See Daniel Inkelas, Security, Sound, And Cetaceans: Legal 
Challenges To Low Frequency Active Sonar Under U.S. and International 
Environmental Law, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 207, 247 n.254 (2005); 
Van Dyke et al., supra note 77. 
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In the face of such cases that do not come close even to 
satisfying “six degrees of Kevin Bacon,” it is no small irony that in 
cases where individual aliens within U.S. territory claimed that state-
level officials committed torts against them by detaining them 
without being informed of the requirement of consular notification 
and access under Article 36(1)(b)(3) of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations, the federal courts have rejected those claims—
which would seem at the historic core of the ATS, on the grounds the 
norm at issue—one that prohibits the detention of a foreign national 
with informing them of rights to consular notice and access—was 
insufficiently universal to support a claim under the ATS.79
However, as discussed below, the U.S. Supreme Court in April 
2013 issued its second major ATS decision, and one that will have a 
very substantial impact on the assessment of future litigation risks 
arising from ATS litigation.  We examine that decision, and assess 
the new risk landscape in Part III, infra.
B. LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE POLITICAL RISK INHERENT IN ALSTOM’S
CHOICE OF A GOLAN HEIGHTS FDI
1. SYRIA’S CLAIMS TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS
The politics of the Golan Heights creates practical legal 
problems that Alstom cannot ignore.  Israel wrestled the Golan 
Heights territory from Syria in the course of 1967’s Six-Day War.80
After the subsequent, and brief, 1973 conflict between Syria and 
Israel and a 1974 “disengagement agreement,” or cease-fire, the 
Golan Heights (except 100 square kilometers ceded back in 1974) 
remained in a legal limbo but a practical stasis.81  The Golan Heights 
Law, enacted by Israel’s Parliament in 1981, changed that status by 
applying Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration to the Golan 
                                                          
79 See, e.g., Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2008); Karboau 
v. City of Portland, 498 Fed. Appx. 747, (9th Cir. 2012). 
80 Preface to On The Legal Status Of The Golan Heights: Application 
Of Israeli Law Or Annexation?, 20 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 331 (1994). 
81 See Muhammad Muslih, The Golan: Israel, Syria, and Strategic 
Calculations, 47 MIDDLE EAST J. 611, 621, 625–27 (1993). 
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Heights, which Syria complained to the U.N. Security Council 
constituted annexation in violation of international law, and the U.N. 
Security Council and General Assembly rebuked.82  However, the 
actions and reactions at that point were more symbolic than 
substantive, and a new stasis emerged.83
Since the early 1980s, the dispute over Israel’s development of 
the Golan Heights has not been as “hot” as the disputes over the 
development of Jerusalem and the West Bank.  Syria did not concede 
its claims, and remained concerned about the commanding vista the 
Heights have over Damascus; Israel did not budge on its insistence 
that the return of any portion of the Golan Heights must be met by 
Syrian recognition of Israel and accession to Israeli-security 
demands. 84   During stirrings of a possible land-for-peace-and-
recognition deal in the early 1990s, the United States attempted to 
facilitate dialogue between Hafez al-Assad (Syria’s President 1971–
2000), and Yitzhak Rabin (Israel’s Prime Minister 1992–1995).85
However, now that the “Arab Spring,” which swept from Libya to 
Egypt, created civil war in Syria,86 the stasis that has remained in 
effect since 1973 is entering uncharted territory.  It is difficult to 
predict whether—and if so, to what degree—the post-Assad Syria 
that emerges from the current civil war will be a military threat to 
Israel or to its occupation of the Golan Heights.87
While the Druze populace left behind in the Golan Heights 
under the authority of Israel largely continues to identify with both 
                                                          
82 Id. at 624; see also Asher Maoz, The Application of Israeli Law to 
the Golan Heights is Annexation, 20 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 355, 386–88 (1994); 
Leon Sheleff, The Application of Israeli Law to the Golan Heights is not 
Annexation, 20 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 333 (1994). 
83 See, e.g., Sheleff, supra note 82 at 337–38. 
84 See Muslih, supra note 81; Maoz, supra note 82; Sheleff, supra note 
82. 
85 See Muslih, supra note 81; Maoz, supra note 82; Sheleff, supra note 
82; see also Clyde Haberman, Rabin Hints Peace Could Cost Golan, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/22/world/rabin-
hints-peace-could-cost-golan.html. 
86 Towards The Endgame: The World Should Start Preparing For What 
Comes After Syria’s President Bashar Assad, THE ECONOMIST, July 21, 
2012, at 9. 
87  Isabel Kershner, Buqata Journal: Echoes of Syria’s War In The 
Golan Heights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2012, at A6. 
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Syria and the Assad family,88 how they will react to these changes in 
the long run is unclear, because pronounced divisions have arisen 
within the Druze community. 89   Viewing the situation more 
holistically, it remains equally unclear whether a breakdown in the 
Assad autocracy will result in problems of sabotage, terrorism, and 
other destabilization along the buffer that the Golan Heights provides 
between Syria and Israel.90  These worries include the possibility of 
fleeing Syrian refugees trying to enter the Golan Heights, and 
Assad's missile and chemical weapons arsenal falling into the wrong 
hands.91
While Israel has made it plain that it does not want to ignite a 
regional war by unilateral intervention, and that it prefers coordinated 
international action, the Israeli government has not sought to secret 
the fact that it has contingency plans for military strikes against 
Syria’s chemical weapons storehouses and military convoys 
suspected of transporting chemical weapons from those 
storehouses.92  Though the Golan Heights is quiet today—and the 
blades of wind-turbines may turn unimpeded in the winds of the 
Heights—the situation in Syria grows more volatile with each 
passing day, and the risk to people and property in the Golan 
Heights, as in other border areas with Syria, grows proportionately.93
Even if the conflict is contained and the fears of terrorist or 
                                                          
88 Golan Druse start to turn against Syria's Assad, FOX NEWS (Jul. 28, 
2012), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/07/28/golan-druse-start-to-turn-
against-syria-assad/.   
89 Id.; see also Kershner, supra note 87, at A6; David Greenfield, Will 
Assad’s Fall Secure Israel’s Golan Heights?, FRONTPAGE MAG, Oct. 6, 
2012, http://frontpagemag.com/2012/dgreenfield/will-assads-fall-secure-isr 
aels-golan-heights/. 
90   Yolande Knell, Syria crisis felt in Israel and occupied Golan 
Heights, BBC NEWS—MIDDLE EAST, Aug. 2, 2012, http://www.bbc.c 
o.uk/news/world-middle-east-19017502. 
91 See id. (describing Israeli concerns as of August 2012). 
92 Id.  For an excellent, regularly updated summary on the events in 
Syria surrounding the end of the Assad regime and the 
escalation of an internal civil war, see Times Topics: Bashar al-Assad, http:// 
topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people /a/bashar_al_assad/Ind 
ex.html. 
93  See Times Topics, supra note 92. 
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insurrectionist infiltration along with the nightmares of chemical and 
biological weapons falling into their hands are abated, MNEs with 
the kinds of FDIs in the Golan Heights as Alstom is considering in 
our hypothetical FDI problem still must worry about the status of the 
investment in the wake of a new government that may, once it is on 
its feet, take up the return of the Golan Heights as a central theme.94
If the Golan Heights were turned over to a future Syrian 
government, the question for Alstom might well become whether 
their FDIs in the Heights—such as the wind-turbine farm that is the 
hypothesis of this article—will remain in the MNEs’ possession and 
control, or whether the entire investment would be expropriated.   
In addition, Alstom’s ties to the United States in our hypothetical 
FDI might prove to be disadvantageous if the Golan Heights were to 
revert to Syrian control, even in the absence of an expropriation.  
Because the U.S. government designated Syria as a state sponsor of 
terrorism, Syria has been subject to the U.S. Department of 
Commerce’s Export Administration Regulations (EAR) for over 
thirty years. 95   U.S. businesses find that FDIs in Syria are 
impracticable, due to the EAR prohibitions on the export of almost 
all U.S. products to Syria, and due to other restrictions, such as the 
Grassley Amendment’s prohibitions on taking tax credits for taxes 
paid in Syria and the Syria Accountability Act (SAA) of 2004’s 
authorization of the President to prohibit, under authority of the 
SAA, all U.S. business and investment activity in Syria at any time.96
As serious as the risks from Syrian civil war and an 
unpredictable aftermath may be, 97  another shadow looms over a 
wind-power FDI in Israel:  the palpable potential for an armed 
                                                          
94 See, e.g., Fred Kaplan, The Syrian Endgame: There Are No 
Guarantees. But In Almost Every Scenario, The Violence Will 
Persist, SLATE, July 20, 2012, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politi
cs/war_stories/2012/07/whether_bashar_al_assad_falls_or_not_the_fighting_
in_syria_is_likely_to_persist_for_a_long_time_.html. 
95  U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State, 
Doing business in Syria: 2010 country commercial guide for U.S. 
companies, Chapter 6, § 1, Investment Climate—Openness To Foreign 
Investment, p. 26., available at http://photos.state.gov/libraries/syria/32 
8666/trade_commerce/ccg-syria-2010.pdf. 
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., David D. Kilpatrick, Egyptian President Warns Assad That 
“Your Time Won’t Be Long”, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2012, at A1. 
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conflict involving Israel and Iran.  This set of risks is discussed in the 
next section, along with the ameliorative impact of political-risk 
insurance. 
2. THE IMPACT OF AN ISRAEL–IRAN ARMED CONFLICT ON FDI IN 
ISRAEL—AND THE ROLE OF POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE
Any FDI in Israel—not just in the volatile Occupied 
Territories—carries with it a particular set of risks created by an arms 
race between Israel and Iran in the midst of what has been called “an 
Arab Cold War.”98  While Iran was the second Middle-Eastern nation 
to recognize Israel in the 1950s and maintained cooperative relations 
during the reign of Reza Pahlavi99 since 1979, Iran has been in a state 
of total hostility toward an Israel that Iran no longer recognizes and 
Iranian leaders have repeatedly vowed to destroy.100  Such threats 
assumed a new urgency when it became clear that the production of 
nuclear fuel in Iran had proceeded to the point where uranium could 
be enriched to “weapons-grade” levels,101 and, concomitantly, that 
                                                          
98  Curtis Ryan, The New Arab Cold War And The Struggle For Syria,
42 MIDDLE E. REP. (Spring 2012), available at http://www.merip.org 
/mer/mer262. 
99  See SOHRAB SOBHANI, THE PRAGMATIC ENTENTE: ISRAELI–IRANIAN 
RELATIONS, 1948–1988, at 4–8 
(Praeger Publishers 1989). 
100  Quinton Cannon Farrar, U.S. Energy Sanctions And The Race To 
Prevent Iran From Acquiring Weapons Of Mass Destruction, 79 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2347, 2350–51 & n.18–23 (2011). 
101 Id.; see, e.g., David E. Sanger, Harder Push To Stop Iran from 
Making Nuclear Fuel, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2010, at A6; Cody Coombs, 
Blue Morning-Glories In The Sky: Correcting Sanctions To Enforce Nuclear 
Nonproliferation In Iran, 19 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 419 (2009); Press 
Release, IAEA Statement After Iran Meeting (June 8, 2012), available at
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/2012/prn201216.html 
(statement by IAEA Deputy Director General Herman Nackaerts); Mehrzad 
Boroujerdi & Todd Fine, Symposium, A Nuclear Iran: The Legal 
Implications of a Preemptive National Security Strategy, 57 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 619, 628 (2007) (arguing that “the course of the nuclear crisis does not 
necessarily indicate that Iran is inherently untrustworthy” but rather “is 
186                          SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF             [Vol. 9.2 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS
the Iranian military had successfully tested missiles that might be 
used to deliver a nuclear payload to Israel and other nations.  Most 
alarming to an MNE considering any new FDI in Israel—previous 
suggestions102 of a “pre-emptive” military strike of some sort have 
resurfaced103—includes public statements by Israel’s Prime Minister 
and Defense Minster that Israel is prepared to take unilateral military 
action to thwart Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons.104
The implications of armed conflict for FDIs in a conflict zone 
are obviously not propitious.  Perhaps that is why there appears to be 
no studies published in English exploring the impact of an Israel–Iran 
conflict on FDI in Israel.105  However, recent studies have focused on 
the negative impact the present conflicts and regional instability are 
having on foreign FDI in Middle Eastern nations.106  The impact of 
                                                                                                                
attempting to achieve what it can within the rules of a game that is stacked 
against it”). 
102 See, e.g., Gregory Koblentz, Coercive Nonproliferation: Israel's 
Use of Coercive Diplomacy to Prevent the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, AM. POLITICAL SCI. ASS’N (2011), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1900518. 
103 See David Isenberg, Israeli Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Facilities 
Easier Said than Done, ASIA TIMES, Feb. 15, 2012, available at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/NB16Ak01.html. 
104 See, e.g., Matthew Kroenig, Essay, Time to Attack Iran: Why a 
Strike is the Least Bad Option, 91 FOREIGN AFF. 78 (2012).  But see Colin 
H. Kahl, Essay, Not Time to Attack Iran: Why War Should Be a Last Resort,
91 FOREIGN AFF. 16 (2012).  
105   There have been recent studies, however, of the economic 
consequences of the “cold war” between Iran, Israel, and other Middle 
Eastern nations.  See Mohammed Nuruzzaman, Conflicts Between Iran and 
the Gulf Arab States: An Economic Evaluation, 36 STRATEGIC AFF. 542 
(2012); Ariel Cohen & Kevin DeCorla-Souza, Eurasian Energy and Israel’s 
Choices, 88 BAR-ILAN U.: MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUD. 1, 32–34 
(2011) (observing that “[s]urrounded by unfriendly and unreliable neighbors, 
Israel is an energy island,” and suggesting strategy for maintaining viability 
of energy infrastructures “to help Israel navigate . . . constantly shifting 
politics and security” issues).  The general media have only recently started 
to run features considering the impact of an Israel–Iran armed conflict on the 
economy of Israel.  See, e.g., Jean-Luc Renaudie, Is Israeli Economy Under 
Threat in Case of Iran War?, MIDDLE E. ONLINE (Israel), Aug. 16, 2012, 
available at http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=53931. 
106  Wesam Sedik & Hussien Seoudy, The Impact of Country Risk and 
New Institutional Economics on Foreign Direct Investment: A Panel Data 
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open warfare would be almost unimaginably devastating, especially 
to energy infrastructure targets such as windmill farms, solar energy 
arrays, and conventional power plants.107  Various armed conflicts in 
the Middle East, Asia, and Africa over the last fifty years have 
demonstrated the extent of devastation to populations, as well as 
FDIs, that can occur when armed conflict destroys energy 
infrastructures.108
Some investment advisors have warned investors to “probably 
think twice before investing in the Israeli economy until the rhetoric 
between Israel and Iran cools.”109  Israeli press coverage has included 
socio-economists who warn that the cost of war would be massive 
and that the damage from an Iranian counterstrike inestimable, versus 
those who contend that “credit default swaps on Israeli bonds—‘a 
classic measurement of the risk the market assigns to a state’—have 
not risen,” that “the possibility of Israel attacking Iran does not affect 
                                                                                                                
Analysis for Middle East and North Africa Region (1999–2010), 16 INT’L
SOC’Y FOR NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 1 (2012). 
107  Alexander E. Farrell et al., Energy Infrastructure And Security, 29 
ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 421 (2004); Karen Smith Stegen et al., 
Terrorists Versus the Sun: Desertec in North Africa as a Case Study for 
Assessing Risks to Energy Infrastructure, 14 RISK MGMT. 3 (2012); Ali 
Khajavi, Op-Ed., A Realistic Outlook for Iraq’s Oil Production in 2030,
MIDDLE E. ECON. SURV. (July 3, 2012), available at http://www.mees 
.com/en/articles/1874-a-realistic-outlok-for-iraqs-oil-production-in-2030 
(detailing damage to Iraq’s energy infrastructure in the wake of Desert Storm 
II); see also Brett van Niekerk & Manoj S. Maharaj, Relevance Of 
Information Warfare Models To Critical Infrastructure Protection, [39 No. 
2] SCIENTIA MILITARIA: S. AFR. J. MILITARY STUD. 99 (2012); Jennifer 
Giroux & Caroline Hilpert, The Relationship Between Energy Infrastructure 
Attacksand Crude Oil Prices, J. ENERGY SECURITY, Oct. 2009, available at
http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=216
:the-relationship-between-energy-infrastructure-attacks-and-crude-oil-
prices&catid=100:issuecontent& Itemid=352. 
108  Jenny Sin-hang Ngai, Energy as a Human Right in Armed Conflict: 
A Question or Universal Need, Survival, and Human Dignity, 37 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 579 (2011–2012). 
109   Sean Geary, How Conflict with Iran Would Affect the Israeli 
Economy, EMERGING MONEY (Aug. 16, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://em 
ergingmoney.com/technology/iran-israeli-economy-eis-teva-mlnx/. 
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whether foreigners invest in the country,” and that “a brief, 
successful Israeli strike could benefit the local economy.” 110
Whether Alstom would—or should—share such a sanguine view is a 
difficult question to answer without a good deal more reliable 
data.111   
However, part of any answer that involves an Alstom FDI in 
Israel needs to include the availability of insurance protection against 
the risk of losses on a wind-energy FDI in the event of an Israeli–
Iranian armed conflict.112  Indeed, it has aptly been observed that “[a] 
company's ability to procure PRI is often crucial to its continuing 
investment in developing countries.”113  Private-market insurance for 
war and other force majeure kinds of investment risks exist, but may 
be prohibitively expensive.114  As one commentator observed when 
surveying the availability of private sector political risk insurance in 
1996, “[t]he private insurance industry has been called a boutique 
provider of specialized political risk products as opposed to the more 
substantial and uniform government programs” because, for 
                                                          
110  Moti Bassok & Hagai Amit, Lengthy Iran Conflict Likely to Cost 
Israeli Economy Billions of Shekels: Former Finance Ministry Director 
General Says Nuclear Iran Involves Considerable Economic Cost to Israel, 
Adds that War with Iran Would Be Much More Expensive than Second 
Lebanon War, HAARETZ (Aug. 14, 2012, 4:59 AM), http://www.haaretz.c 
om/business/lengthy-iran-conflict-likely-to-cost-israeli-economy-billions-of-
shekels-1.458060. 
111  Despite persistent tensions, there have been some hopeful signs for 
peace rather than war.  See David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, To Calm Israel, 
U.S. Offers Ways To Restrain Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2012, at A1.  
However, the volatility of the region keeps predictions on day-to-day 
tenterhooks.  See, e,g., Anne Barnard, Michael R. Gordon & Jodi Rudoren, 
Israel Targeted Iranian Missiles in Syria Attack, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2013, 
at A1; David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, Iran Is Seen Advancing Nuclear 
Bid, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2013, at A10. 
112 See Erik J. Woodhouse, The Obsolescing Bargain Redux? Foreign 
Investment in the Electric Power Sector in Developing Countries, 38 N.Y.U.
J. INT’L L. & POL. 121 (2006) (discussing the kinds of risks inherent to 
energy FDIs and strategies that have been developed to address those risks). 
113  Jennifer M. DeLeonardo, Note, Are Public And Private Political 
Risk Insurance Two Of A Kind? Suggestions for a New Direction for 
Government Coverage, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 737, 739 (2005). 
114 See Maura B. Perry, A Model for Efficient Foreign Aid: The Case 
for the Political Risk Insurance Activities of the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 511, 545–46 (1996) (discussing the 
daunting challenges facing private-market FDI insurers). 
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example, they “individually apprais[e] risks on a commercial basis, 
which is subject to supply and demand considerations as well as 
particular risk characteristics” instead of using “standardized rating 
schedules”; thus, the private sector “has never been a particularly 
robust or stable source of political insurance.”115  That is not to say, 
however, that there is any shortage of insurers and insurance 
syndicates who offer some form of political risk coverage; but it is 
not always easy to estimate what kinds of coverage limits and 
premiums will attend to a political risk insurance issued in the private 
sector.116  Indeed, when the “Arab Spring” came to Egypt in 2011, 
premiums for political risk insurance for projects in Egypt quickly 
rose 12%–15%.117   
For American businesses, the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) has provided insurance of FDI in countries 
specifically listed by Congress in the acts authorizing OPIC as “an 
insurer ‘of last resort’” rather than a competitor of private finance 
and political risk insurance. 118   While OPIC insurance has 
                                                          
115 Id. at 536. 
116 See, e.g., Lijana Baublyte et al., Risk Selection in the London 
Political Risk Insurance Market: The Role of Tacit Knowledge, Trust and 
Heuristics, [15 No. 9] J. RISK RES. 1101, 1101 (2012) (demonstrating that 
“the basis of decision-making and risk selection in the London Political Risk 
Insurance (PRI) market is a combination of Art and Science with such factors 
as trust and reputation playing an important role . . . . and examining 
different methods and strategies of political risk underwriting employed in 
the insurance market, which does not rely on statistical tools as seen in more 
traditional insurance types”); Lloyd’s Risk Locator: Political Risks 
Insurance, LLOYD’S, http://www.lloyds.com/Redirect-pages/Risk_loc 
ator/Political_risks_insurance (last visited Mar. 31, 2013) (discussing 
differences in location of risk, and thus ranges of premiums, for “political 
risks insurance,” including “trade-related cover”; “other asset cover”; 
“insurance of assets against political violence”; and “global contract”). 
117  Cyril Tuohy, Egypt Causes Price Spike for Political Risk Insurance: 
Expert Sees a "Pause" in the Marketplace for Political Risk Insurance as 
Carriers Scramble to Reassess Middle East Exposures, RISK & INS. (Feb. 7, 
2011), http://www.riskandinsurance.com/story.jsp?storyId=533329908. 
118   Perry, supra note 114, at 514; see Pablo M. Zylberglait, Note, 
OPIC's Investment Insurance: The Platypus of Governmental Programs and 
Its Jurisprudence, 25 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 359 (1993). 
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traditionally provided ten times the coverage limits for nearly seven 
times the policy duration limits for a wider range of risks than 
political risk insurance offered in the private insurance markets,119
eligibility is limited to insureds having a substantial nexus to the 
United States and essentially under American control. 120   Since 
neither Alstom nor its American subsidiary meets these definitions,
121 OPIC cannot insure a Golan Heights FDI, despite the substantial 
involvement of Alstom’s Texas-based nacelle production facility in 
such an undertaking.  However, Alstom has at least two other sources 
of government-backed FDI political risk insurance programs offered 
through the World Bank and its home state, France. 
 Indeed, it is precisely because many “national insurance 
programs”—such as OPIC—“due to their respective national 
objectives, often contain strict eligibility requirements that exclude 
many investors and investments” 122  that the World Bank Group 
                                                          
119   Perry, supra note 114, at 534–36; Ashton B. Inniss, Note, 
Rethinking Political Risk Insurance: Incentives for Investor Risk Mitigation,
16 SW. J. INT’L L. 477, 488–90 (2010). 
120  Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephen Kinsella, Reducing Political Risk in 
Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Stabilization Clauses, 
and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 1, 36 (1994). 
121 See, e.g., Kathryn Gordon, Investment Guarantees and Political 
Risk Insurance: Institutions, Incentives, and Development 8 (Org. Econ. Co-
operation & Dev.: Investment Division, Working Paper No. 1, 2009) (noting 
that only “[s]even PRI providers offer coverage for foreign corporations with 
domestic presence (Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Turkey 
and the United Kingdom)”), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so 
l3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1718484.  The Amarillo, Texas Alstom facility is 
owned by an entity loosely referred to as “Alstom Wind, North America” 
(AWNA) (http://www.ryancompanies.com/projects/Alstom-Wind-North-
America/), but which appears to in fact be a limited-liability corporation 
called Alstom Wind Texas LLC, which is a Delaware corporation 
headquartered in Connecticut.  Alstom’s Amarillo facility is one of thirty-
seven it maintains in the U.S., divided among Grid, Transport, Power, and 
Corporate Headquarters segments of Alstom’s businesses, which employ 
“10,000 employees in locations that span 47 states and the District of 
Columbia.”  U.S. Locations, ALSTOM, http://www.alstom.com/us/locations/ 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
122   INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE MINERAL LAW AND POLICY:
TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 325 (Elizabeth Bastida et al. eds., 2005). 
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created the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),123 an 
international financial institution offering political risk insurance 
guarantees for FDIs in developing countries,124 to “overcom[e] some 
of these shortcomings and hel[p] to fill the gaps.”125  MIGA political 
risk insurance is structured and operated similarly to OPIC political 
risk insurance; however, MIGA operates with a number of broad 
policy objectives beyond those that animate OPIC’s activities. 126
MIGA is, however, somewhat of an enigma.  Since its inception, 175 
nations have acceded to the MIGA Treaty, and MIGA has insured 
some 600 projects in an aggregate amount exceeding “$21 billion of 
guarantees.”127  “To date, MIGA has only paid out three claims,” 
while negotiating a resolution in “fifty disputes over its guaranteed 
investments to prevent claims filings.”128
France also has its own national insurer of French firms seeking 
protection of their FDI, in an agency called Compagnie Française 
d'Assurance Pour Le Commerce Extérieur (COFACE).129  Founded 
                                                          
123 See Malcolm D. Rowat, Multilateral Approaches to Improving the 
Investment Climate of Developing Countries: The Cases Of ICSID and 
MIGA, 33 HARV. INT’L L.J. 103, 105 & n.9, 126–34 (1992) (describing how 
MIGA was actually the product of the World Bank-sponsored Convention 
Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, which opened 
for states’ signatures in October 1985 and entered into force April 1988). 
124  Miriam Mafessanti, Corporate Misbehavior & International Law: 
Are There Alternatives to “Complicity”?, 6 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 167, 222–
24 & nn.382–87, 229, n.427 (2010) (footnotes omitted) (providing that 
MIGA “has developed Environmental and Social Review Procedures and 
Safeguard Policies, modeled on the Performance Standards of the 
[International Finance Corporation], which bind its private sector clients”). 
125  Comeaux & Kinsella, supra note 120 at 40–45. 
126  Inniss, supra note 119, at 490–92; see also Lisa J. Laplante & 
Suzanne A. Spears, Out of the Conflict Zone: The Case for Community 
Consent Processes in the Extractive Sector, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV.
L.J. 69, 78–79 & nn.50–55 (2008). 
127  Sam Foster Halabi, Efficient Contracting Between Foreign Investors 
and Host States: Evidence from Stabilization Clauses, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 261, 275 (2011). 
128 Id. at 274–75. 
129 Who We Are, COFACE, http://www.coface.com/CofacePortal/CO 
M_en_EN/pages/home/Who_we_are (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
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in 1946 as a French governmental agency and privatized in 1990, 
COFACE is an example of an export credit agency (ECA), which 
many countries have created 130  in the last sixty years to insure 
foreign sales transactions and longer-term FDI projects undertaken 
by home-state businesses.131  COFACE offers political risk insurance 
along the general outlines of OPIC’s program, but for which Alstom 
qualifies.132  Political risk can be insured for periods of five to fifteen 
years, at premiums ranging from 0.7% to 1% of the total value of the 
investment.133  How COFACE might go about assessing the risks 
posed by Alstom’s hypothesized Golan Heights FDI is unknown; 
COFACE “has a proprietary risk evaluation system.”134
Similarly to COFACE, but in contrast to OPIC, Lloyd’s of 
London, the world’s most famous private insurance market, provides 
little transparency into premiums of the political risk insurance it 
offers, the methodology for calculating premiums, the limits of 
financial exposure Lloyd’s syndicates are willing to assume, or how 
those limits are determined.135  In 2012, one of the Lloyd’s brokers, 
                                                          
130 See Janet Koven Levit, The Dynamics of International Trade 
Finance Regulation: The Arrangement on Officially Supported Export 
Credits, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 65, 142–50 & nn.345–78 (2004) (describing 
the listings and details for numerous ECAs). 
131 See id.; see also About Political Risk Insurance, MULTILATERAL 
INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY, http://www.miga.org/resources/index.cf 
m?stid=1870#nav (last visited May 21, 2013) (“Most public providers are 
national export credit agencies (ECAs), which may cover both export 
credit/trade transactions, as well as longer-term investments. ECAs usually 
support investors and lenders from their home country going into developing 
countries, and may also have mandates to support development and be self-
sustaining.”). 
132   Sidney Posel, Factoring Accounts Receivable in France: Some 
Legal Aspects and American Comparisons, 57 TUL. L. REV. 292, 326 n.124 
(1982) (noting that COFACE offers credit insurance against “political risks” 
for foreign investors). 
133  Perry, supra note 114, at app. M. 
134  Gordon, supra note 121, at app. tbl.8. 
135  LLOYD’S, supra note 116.  Sagicor, one of the Lloyd’s syndicates, 
states that its “program line” limit for political risk insurance is $7.5 million.  
Political Risk, Credit, Surety and Terrorism, SAGICOR, http://www.sagi 
coratlloyds.com/sagicor-lloyds/pecuniary-lines (last visited Mar. 31, 2013); 
see also Nathan Jensen, Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign 
Direct Investment, 70 J. POL. 1040, 1043 & n.36 (2008) (noting that “much 
of the political risk insurance coverage is essentially the same product used 
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RFIB Group, noted that the private market for political risk insurance 
is centered in London, where ten corporate entities—of which 
Chartis, Sovereign, and Zurich are dubbed “the ‘big three’”—and 
twenty-five syndicates on Lloyd’s market are involved in negotiating 
and issuing political risk insurance.136  Fifteen London-based brokers 
interact with these insurers to create the bulk of the private pool of 
insurance contracts to cover credit and political risks.137  The private-
market political risk policies are limited in duration as well as in 
coverage limits: most fall within the range of two to three years, and 
as the tenor is lengthened, the number of insurers with the capacity to 
insure decreases.138  The outermost private-market limits are fifteen 
years, which are available from only a few of the private-market 
insurers.139
From this general information about political risk insurance and 
insurance markets, several observations can be made in the case of 
Alstom and a hypothesized Golan Heights investment.  First, it is 
likely that Alstom can find political risk insurance coverage for its 
Golan Heights FDI from a number of different sources, both public 
and private.  Second, Alstom must scrupulously avoid bribery of any 
government official, or even the arguable appearance of bribery; not 
only because of anti-bribery laws such as the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act140 and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,141 but also 
                                                                                                                
50 years ago and . . . doesn’t appropriately cover a number of important risks 
faced by multinationals”). 
136  TOBY HEPPEL, RFIB GRP. LTD., THE PRIVATE INSURANCE MARKET 
FOR CREDIT AND POLITICAL RISKS 4 (Apr. 2012), available at
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Docume 
nts/Toby%20Heppel%20Presentation.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
137 Id. at 5.  Chubb Insurance Group withdrew from the credit and 
political risks market in May 2010.  Id. at 8. 
138 Id. at 9; Jensen, supra note 135, at 1042–43 & nn.32–36. 
139  Jensen, supra note 135, at 1042–43 & nn.32–36. 
140  15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (2006). Recent U.S. enforcement efforts have 
focused on foreign MNEs.  See Leslie Wayne, Foreign Firms Most Affected 
by a U.S. Law Barring Bribes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2012, at B1; Claudio 
Gatti, Alstom at Center of Web of Bribery Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/business/global/30alstom.html.  
However, Alstom, S.A., may no longer be directly subject to the Act 
because, inter alia, its shares are no longer traded on U.S. stock exchanges, 
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because an allegation of bribery in connection with the FDI typically 
is itself grounds for retroactive cancellation of the political risk 
insurance policy and denial of any coverage for an occurrence.142
Third, Alstom must take heed of the moral-hazard clauses in FDI 
insurance that “exclude coverage of events that the insured entity 
might reasonably have been expected to avoid” 143 —such as 
undertaking an investment in areas during a time when armed 
conflict may, from a post hoc perspective, have seemed imminent.  
Fourth, finding political risk insurance meeting the extent of 
coverage needed should war break out between Israel and one of its 
neighbors may be difficult, given the relatively modest coverage 
limits available in private markets.  Even the higher limits available 
through an export credit agency such as COFACE (or OPIC, if an 
Alstom subsidiary were to qualify) may be taxed to compensate 
                                                                                                                
one of the bases for jurisdiction, and are now exclusively traded on the Paris 
Stock Exchange.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a); see also News Releases, NYSE
EURONEXT (Aug. 13, 2004), http://www.nyse.com/press/1092392 
705795.html (announcing suspension of Alston shares from trading on the 
NYSE). 
141 See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in International Business Transactions, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.
(2011) (hereinafter OECD Convention), available at http://www.oec 
d.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/38028044.pdf.  Both France 
and the United States have ratified the Convention and enacted implementing 
legislation.  Id.  Prior to implementing the OECD Convention, France 
seemed to treat bribery of foreign officials as cost of doing business.  See, 
e.g., Scott D. Syfert, Capitalism or Corruption? Corporate Structure, 
Western Investment and Commercial Crime in the Russian Federation, 18 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 357, 403 (1999) (observing that at the 
time, “payments in most of the world [we]re considered a routine cost of 
business,” and citing the example of COFACE, which at the time “over[ed] 
foreign bribery as export risk”); Christopher F. Dugan & Vladimir 
Lechtman, The FCPA in Russia and Other Former Communist Countries, 91 
AM. J. INT’L L. 378, 379 (1997). 
142 See Gordon, supra note 121, at 9 (noting presence of such clauses in 
COFACE insurance contracts).  The World Bank recently debarred two 
Alstom subsidiaries because their employees allegedly offered bribes to 
Zambian government officials in the early 2000s to win a contract for power 
plant construction.  See Dionne Searcey & David Crawford, World Bank 
PunishesUnits of Alstom SA for Bribery, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2012, http://o
nline.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203918304577238943984834040.
html. 
143  Gordon, supra note 121, at 3. 
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Alstom in the event war or terrorism destroys the hypothesized Golan 
Heights wind farm.  Alstom’s comparable wind-farm projects in 
other areas of the world are valued at least ten times greater than 
even the most generous coverage limit ($20 million) provided by 
OPIC. 144   Like many FDI projects, this one risks being 
                                                          
144  Multimatrix aspires to build 160 wind turbines on the eighteen-acre 
area, and generate 450 MW of power.  Ari 
Rabinovitch, Israel Uses Golan to Build Wind Energy Industry, REUTERS, A
pr. 29, 2010, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/04/29/us-israel-energy-wind-
idUKTRE63S37320100429.  Comparable, recent Alstom projects provide a 
good gauge by which to measure the magnitude of the FDI value for 
comparison to political risk coverage limits.  See, e.g., Press Release, 
Whitelee Onshore Wind Farm, ALSTOM (Sept. 2010), 
http://www.alstom.com/uk/projects/power/whitelee/ (describing $250 
million (€200 million) project for “Scottish Power Renewables . . . to build a 
217 MW extension to the Whitelee wind farm in Scotland” of some seventy-
five wind turbines under a contract including “supply, transportation, 
installation, commissioning, and operation [and] maintenance”); Press 
Release, Alstom Will Supply Equipment to Four Wind Farms in Brazil,
ALSTOM (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.alstom.com/press-centre/2012/4/85822/ 
(describing the contract valued at $165 million (€130 million) in which, “[i]n 
addition to the [supply and installation of 40] wind turbines, Alstom will be 
responsible for the supply and installation of electrical systems and 
substations throughout the complex” located in the Brazilian State of Rio 
Grande do Sul).  Even very modest wind-farm projects, such as Alstom’s in 
Ethiopa, would appear to exceed even OPIC coverage limits.  See Press 
Release, Alstom Grid Wins Subcontract with CYMI For Around €17 Million 
Project to Supply Equipment for Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation,
ALSTOM (June 12, 2012), http://www.alstom.com/press-
centre/2012/6/alstom-grid-wins-subcontract-with-cymi-for-around-17-
million-project-to-supply-equipment-for-ethiopian-electric-power-
corporation/ (“Alstom has signed a subcontract with Spanish company 
CYMI (ACS Group), to supply and manufacture equipment for the Ethiopian 
Utility (EEPCO) as part of the Electricity Transmission System 
Improvement Project (ETSIP) in Ethiopia.”); see also Following a Planning 
Hitch, Ethiopia’s First Wind Farm Is Back on Track, RENEW 
ABLES INT’L: THE MAG. (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.renewablesinternational
.net/following-a-planning-hitch-ethiopias-first-wind-farm-is-back-on-
track/150/505/30897/ (noting Alstom’s supply of fifty-four turbines as part 
of a €283 million project). 
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underinsured.145  This presents a challenge for Alstom in protecting 
its FDI.146  Of course, Alstom might seek to deal with these limits by 
taking out multiple policies147 of political risk insurance,148 and by 
seeking a definition of insurable “occurrence” or “loss” that would 
cover to policy limits the sub-units of the project, such as each wind 
turbine, rather than merely the project in its entirety.149
Thus, Alstom will have to make, as it and other MNEs that work 
in politically volatile regions must do before each FDI, a careful cost-
benefit analysis.150  What makes Alstom’s hypothesized FDI in Israel 
more complex and challenging is that it is not the host country’s 
actions toward Alstom that pose the significant risks.  Rather, the 
                                                          
145  Alex Khachaturian, “Are We in Good Hands?” The Adequacy of 
American and Multilateral Political Risk Insurance Programs in Fostering 
International Development, 38 CONN. L. REV. 1041, 1044, 1054–55, 1057–
58, 1059–62 (2006) (noting gaps in political risk insurance coverage 
policies). 
146  Scott G. Johnson, Ten Years After 9/11: Property Insurance Lessons 
Learned, 46 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 685, 687 (2011) (“[W]here the 
per occurrence limit of insurance does not fully compensate the insured for 
its loss, whether a loss constitutes one occurrence or multiple occurrences 
can be a significant issue.”). 
147   Given Alstom’s resources and ability to obtain the attention of 
government officials, it might be in a position to persuade public political 
risk insurers (such as OPIC and MIGA) to partner with private political risk 
insurers as co-insurers to increase coverage amounts, encourage more 
insurers to have confidence in insuring a particular risk, and to put their “real 
informational advantage” to work in “act[ing] as a superior sorter of risk.”  
DeLeonardo, supra note 113, at 781–89. 
148  Insurance against terrorism risks will be required as well, and the 
insurability of those risks in the wake of highly organized terror-attacks 
against public infrastructure targets has tightened the market.  See Andrew 
Gerrish, Note, Terror CATs: TRIA’s Failure to Encourage a Private Market 
for Terrorism Insurance and How Federal Securitization of Terrorism Risk 
May Be a Viable Alternative, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1825 (2011). 
149  An analogous issue was presented concerning property insurance on 
the World Trade Center towers, which were destroyed on September 11, 
2001.  See Michael Murray, Note, The Law of Describing Accidents: A New 
Proposal for Determining the Number of Occurrences in Insurance, 118 
YALE L.J. 1484 (2009). 
150  Randel R. Young & Richard Devine, Managing Risk in Emerging 
Market Hydrocarbon Development Projects, 55 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
30-1, § 30.07[5] (2009). 
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risks emanate from actions that Israel and the neighboring states of 
Syria and Iran may take against each other. 
At the time this article went to print, those risks have been 
significantly heightened by the continuing escalation of the Syrian 
conflict, and the very real potential for that conflict to become a 
proxy conflict between Israel and Iran.  As the New York Times
recently reported, “[e]lite infantry and reconnaissance units have 
been moved into the long-quiet Golan Heights this spring” as “the 
concern in Israel runs deeper along what was for decades one border 
it did not have to worry much about” and “Israel’s military 
leadership now views southern Syria as an ‘ungoverned area’ that 
poses imminent danger.”151  The situation has escalated even further, 
demonstrating the ways in which Syria may become the focal point 
of a proxy conflict between Iran and Israel.  The front-page news on 
May 6, 2013, proclaimed that “[t]he Syrian government publicly 
condemned Israel for a powerful air assault on military targets near 
Damascus early Sunday, saying it ‘opened the door to all 
possibilities,’ as fear spread throughout the region that the country’s 
civil war could expand beyond its borders,” and prompted “[s]ome 
analysts” to observe that “Israel may have been sending a message to 
its main rival, Iran, that despite recent gains by Mr. Assad’s forces, 
the alliance between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah has waning power to 
check Israeli action.”152
These events are going to have an immediate—and quite 
palpable—impact on the availability and cost of PRI153 for projects, 
like that hypothesized for Alstom, in the region.  Two months before 
                                                          
151  Jodi Rudoren, Israel Tightens Border Defense As Syria Erupts, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 2013, at A1. 
152  Anne Barnard, Syria Condemns Israeli Assault Near Damascus,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2013, at A1; see Jodi Rudoren & Isabel Kershner, 
Airstrikes Into Syria A Message To Iranians, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2013, at 
A8 (“The twin airstrikes in Damascus on Friday and Sunday attributed to 
Israel appear to be more about Jerusalem’s broad, mostly covert battle with 
Iran and Hezbollah than about the bloody civil war raging in Syria.”). 
153   World Bank Group, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 
Survey of Political Risk Insurance Providers, PERSPECTIVES (Jan. 2008), 
available at www.pri-center.com/documents/south_south/survey_provider. 
pdf. 
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these events transpired, analysts in the PRI market were already 
seeing an increase in demand for PRI and related coverages for 
Middle-Eastern FDI projects,154 which will only drive up insurance 
                                                          
154 See, e.g., WILLIS, POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE: MIND THE GAP (April 
2011), at 2, available at http://www.willis.com/Documents/P ublications 
/Services/Political_Risk/Willis_Political_Risk_Report_April_2011.pdf.  As 
the authors observe, “[i]nsurers too will be looking at their own exposures 
and aggregations and as a result will be seeking to impose tighter wordings 
and rate increases and even, in some cases, withdrawing from certain areas 
and lines of business.”  Id.  The authors also explain that “[t]here are three 
main types of coverage that companies concerned with political unrest could 
consider: Strikes, Riots and Civil Commotions (SRCC) insurance, Terrorism 
cover (known as the Lloyd’s Sabotage & Terrorism Only Form) and full 
Political Violence cover.”  Id. at 3; see also Taking a Multi-Country 
Approach to Political Risk and Trade Credit Insurance, MARSH (Mar. 1, 
2013), http://usa.marsh.com/NewsInsights/ThoughtLeadership/Artic 
les/ID/29546/Taking-a-Multi-Country-Approach-to-Political-Risk-and-
Trade-Credit-Insurance.aspx.  As Marsh notes, 
[m]any multinationals have since discovered 
that this country-by-country approach may 
leave them vulnerable to unexpected events. In 
recent years, many businesses have recognized 
the unpredictability of global risk and have 
increasingly turned to a broader approach to 
political and trade credit risk management 
through the purchase of multi-country 
insurance policies. 
 A multi-country policy enables businesses 
to take a more holistic approach to managing 
risk.  Instead of attempting to cover 
unpredictable risks through a patchwork of 
policies for individual nations, a multi-country 
policy typically covers 15 to 20 countries, but 
potentially more.  These policies can be 
customized to cover a single region—for 
example, the Middle East and North Africa—
or include countries worldwide. 
 Underwriters often prefer this multi-
country approach as it allows them to spread 
their political and trade credit risks across 
several countries.  Because of this, the terms 
available in such policies can often be more 
favorable than single-country policies.  For 
example, policies may have higher limits 
available; provide coverage for countries that 
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premiums,155 increase the overhead that MNEs will face with their 
Middle-Eastern FDIs,156 and constrict the scope of the imminent risks 
that many insurers will be willing to underwrite.157
                                                                                                                
are typically difficult to insure, such as Egypt; 
and/or offer more attractive pricing. 
 Companies purchasing political risk 
insurance on foreign investments and assets are 
also seeking to insure a broader range of risks, 
rather than focusing on what they perceive to 
be the most likely events to occur.  Some of 
these risks include expropriation, forced 
divestiture, political violence (including forced 
abandonment), business interruption and 
contingent business interruption, contract 
frustration, and trade disruption. 
Id.
155 See, e.g., KIT BROWNLEES, GALLAGHER LONDON, TURNING TIDES—
THE GLOBALISATION OF POLITICAL RISK (2012), available at
http://www.ajginternational.com/assets/Uploads/Publications/TurningTides
WhitePaperJuly2012.pdf. 
156 See, e.g., Stuart Collins, Political Risk Industry Grows As Threat 
Climbs Firms’ Agenda, COMMERCIAL RISK EUROPE (Apr. 8, 2013), available 
at http://www.commercialriskafrica.com/cre/2153/134/Political-risk-indust  
ry-grows-as-threat-climbs-firms-agenda/. 
157 See, e.g., Sarah Vesey, Middle East Unrest Puts Political Risk 
Insurance In Spotlight: Marsh, BUSINESS INSURANCE (Feb. 13, 2013, 9:31 
AM), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20130213/NEWS04/130
219930 (citing and quoting from MARSH, NAVIGATING CREEPING POLITICAL 
RISKS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS (Dec. 2012), available at
http://uk.marsh.com/Portals/18/Documents/12-1171-MRMR%20Briefin 
g%20-%20Infrastructure_v5.pdf; see also Kristen David, A Political Risk 
Insurance Lesson from the Arab Spring: The Importance of Early Notice,
POLICYHOLDER INFORMER (May 3, 2013), http://www.policyholderi 
nformer.com/2013/05/03/a-political-risk-insurance-lesson-from-the-arab-
spring-the-importance-of-early-notice/; Political Risks Rise In Middle East 
And North Africa, BUSINESS INSURANCE (Apr. 11, 2013, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20130411/NEWS09/130419963 
(noting that “[s]everal of Lloyd’s syndicates and new entrants are expected 
to begin underwriting political risk in 2013”); Political-Risk Insurance: Of 
Coups And Coverage—Political Turmoil Is Costly. Unless You Are Fully 
Insured., THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 4, 2007, available at http://www 
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II. TOWARD THE RESTORATION OF THE 1789 LEGISLATIVE 
BOUNDARIES OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT’S 2013 DECISION IN KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH 
PETROLEUM CO. AND WHAT KIOBEL AUGURS FOR THE 
FUTURE OF ATS SUITS AS FDI RISKS
The litany of other kinds of ATS cases—or proposals for cases 
to be asserted under the ATS—discussed in Part I.A, above are 
serious matters for any corporation planning an FDI that might find 
itself within a U.S. federal court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.  
The absurd consequences of embroiling the judicial branch of the 
U.S. government into many of the cases, examples of which are 
listed below, is apparent; some might yet find a hold in the U.S. 
courts under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA),158 but if so, 
that is a choice that Congress made in enacting the TVPA.  Surely, 
however, neither the Congress of 1789, nor any other Congress since, 
would seek to extend its legislative jurisdiction (let alone common-
law expansion of a 235-year-old statute) to produce the kind of result 
that Seventh Circuit U.S. Appeals Court Chief Judge Hamilton 
foresaw in soberly considering the effects of purported ATS 
litigation filed against the Hungarian State Railways: 
[W]e cannot overlook the comity and reciprocity 
between sovereign nations that dominate 
international law. The plaintiffs suing the railway 
seek a judgment from a U.S. court ordering the 
national railway to pay plaintiffs as much as $1.25 
billion.  The plaintiffs suing the bank seek as much 
as $75 billion.  The sum of damages sought by 
plaintiffs would amount to nearly 40 percent of 
Hungary's annual gross domestic product in 2011.
                                                                                                                
.economist.com/node/8967224.  For regular updates in the PRI area, see, 
e.g., MIGA:  Political Risks And Emerging Markets—Insuring Investments, 
Ensuring Opportunities, BLOGS.WORLDBANK.ORG, http://blogs.worldban 
k.org/miga/ (last visited May 17, 2013). 
158  Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).  For a 
discussion of the relationship between the TVPA and the ATS, out of which 
the TVPA grew, see, e.g., Philip Mariani, Note, Assessing the Proper 
Relationship between the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim 
Protection Act, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (2008); Kathryn L. Pryor, Does the 
Torture Victim Protection Act Signal the Imminent Demise of the Alien Tort 
Claims Act?, 29 VA. J. INT’L L. 969 (1988–1989). 
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Divided among Hungary's current population of 10 
million people, that is more than $7500 per person.  
We should consider how the United States would 
react if a foreign court ordered the U.S. Treasury 
or the Federal Reserve Bank to pay a group of 
plaintiffs 40 percent of U.S. annual gross domestic 
product, which would be roughly $6 trillion, or 
$20,000 for every resident in the United States.  
And consider further the reaction if such an order 
were based on events that happened generations 
ago in the United States itself, without any effort to 
secure just compensation through U.S. courts.  If 
U.S. courts are ready to exercise jurisdiction to 
right wrongs all over the world, including those of 
past generations, we should not complain if other 
countries' courts decide to do the same.159
It is for such cases—the vast bulk of contemporary ATS 
filings—that the Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co. 160  has brought to an end the strange internationalist career 
devised for the ATS since 1980.  After granting certiorari in Kiobel 
to consider whether an ATS claim lay against a corporation161—a 
point on which, as almost every other aspect of the ATS, the federal 
circuits differ—concern quickly shifted in the February 28, 2012 oral 
argument162 to whether the ATS should ever apply to conduct outside 
of the United States. 163   Subsequently, the Court ordered 
                                                          
159  Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 682 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(emphasis added) (dismissing on grounds that plaintiffs must first exhaust 
available remedies in Hungary’s courts, before seeking remedies in 
American courts). 
160  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), aff’g 
on other grounds 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). 
161  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). 
162 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (Feb. 28, 2012) (No. 10-1491). 
163   The conduct at issue in Kiobel—as well as in its celebrated 
predecessor, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000)—
is amply narrated in Larisa Wick, Human Rights Violations In Nigeria: 
Corporate Malpractice And State Acquiescence In The Oil Producing Deltas 
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supplemental briefing followed by a new oral argument on October 
1, 2012, 164  in which the Court’s desire to limit the ATS’s 
extraterritorial reach was palpable.165
When Chief Justice Roberts began announcing the Court’s 
opinion in Kiobel on April 17, 2013, few expected that the Court 
would find unanimity on anything.166  Yet it did.  The Court defied 
predictions, and defied the expectation of a splintering along the lines 
as seen in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.167  Rather, the differences in 
                                                                                                                
Of Nigeria, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 63 (2003).  See generally James 
Donnelly-Saalfield, Irreparable Harms: How the Devastating Effects of Oil 
Extraction in Nigeria Have Not Been Remedied by Nigerian Courts, the 
African Commission, or U.S. Courts, 15 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVT’L L. &
POL’Y 371 (2009); James Goodwin & Armin Rosencranz, Holding Oil 
Companies Liable For Human Rights Violations In A Post-Sosa World, 42 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 701 (2008). 
164 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (Oct. 1, 2012) (No. 10-1491). 
165 See, e.g., John W. Bellinger, Oral Argument in Kiobel: Justices 
Seem Inclined to Shut ATS Door Further, But Will It Remain Ajar?,
LAWFARE BLOG (Oct. 2, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://www.lawfareblo 
g.com/2012/10/oral-argument-in-kiobel-justices-seem-inclined-to-shut-ats-
door-further-but-will-it-remain-ajar/. 
166  Typical of the expectations expressed by commentators is that of 
Julian Ku, (More) Spiking the Football on Kiobel, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 23, 
2013, 9:06 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/23/more-spiking-the-
football-on-kiobel/ (“‘Nearly everyone anticipating the Kiobel decision 
(including myself) predicted a Supreme Court vote starkly divided on 
ideological lines.’”) (quoting Eugene Kontorovich, Opinion, A Supreme 
Rebuke To Global Forum-Shopping:  The Justices Say No To Those Who 
Want To Make U.S. Courts The Venue For All The World's Torts, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 22, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873244937 
04578430592807923134.html.  Previously, commentators had perceived an 
interesting—and at face value, unexpected—differentiation of how 
administrations of the two dominant American political parties have viewed 
the ATS.  See Jide Nzelibe, Contesting Adjudication: The Partisan Divide 
over Alien Tort Statute Litigation (Northwestern Public Law Research Paper 
No. 12-31, Nov. 30, 2012), available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2183943 
(Article to be published in forthcoming issue of the NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.).
167   Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Eugene 
Kontorovich, Kiobel And Academic Fallability, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Apr. 17, 2013, 12:54 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/04/17/kiobel-and-
academic-fallability/.  See generally Keith A. Petty, Who Watches the 
Watchmen: Vigilant Doorkeeping, the Alien Tort Statute, and Possible 
Reform, 31 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 183 (2009); Pamela J. 
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viewpoint among the Court’s opinions boil down as to the reasons 
why an ATS lawsuit will not lie for Nigerian plaintiffs to sue an 
Anglo-Dutch corporation over alleged torts in violation of the law of 
nations that transpired in Nigeria. 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion, which 
grounded its ruling “on a canon of statutory interpretation known as 
the presumption against extraterritorial application,” which, 
“provides that ‘[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an 
extraterritorial application, it has none.’” 168   After discussing the 
international relations rationale for the presumption, Chief Justice 
Roberts observed: 
Indeed, the danger of unwarranted judicial 
interference in the conduct of foreign policy is 
magnified in the context of the ATS, because the 
question is not what Congress has done but instead 
what courts may do.  This Court in Sosa repeatedly 
stressed the need for judicial caution in considering 
which claims could be brought under the ATS, in 
light of foreign policy concerns.  As the Court 
explained, “the potential [foreign policy] 
implications . . . of recognizing. . . . causes [under 
the ATS] should make courts particularly wary of 
impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and 
Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.”  
These concerns, which are implicated in any case 
arising under the ATS, are all the more pressing 
when the question is whether a cause of action 
                                                                                                                
Stephens, Spinning Sosa: Federal Common Law, the Alien Tort Statute and 
Judicial Restraint, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1 (2007); Tim Kline, Door Ajar Or A 
Floodgate: Corporate Liability After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 94 KY. L.J. 
691 (2005–2006); Gerald Weber, The Long Road Ahead: Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain and Clearly Established International Tort Law, 9 EMORY INT’L L.
REV. 129 (2005). 
168  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1661 (2013) 
(quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 
(2010)). 
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under the ATS reaches conduct within the territory 
of another sovereign.169
Examining the historical setting of the ATS within the context of 
the early Republic (from the Marbois incident through the 1795 
Attorney General Opinion discussing the British demand for redress 
against American citizens who had aided a French raid upon 
Freetown in the Sierra Leone Colony),170 the Chief Justice saw no 
reasonable basis on which the presumption against extraterritoriality 
might be rebutted in the case of the ATS—indeed, quite the contrary: 
Nothing about this historical context suggests that 
Congress also intended federal common law under 
the ATS to provide a cause of action for conduct 
occurring in the territory of another sovereign. 
Indeed, far from avoiding diplomatic strife, 
providing such a cause of action could have 
generated it.  Recent experience bears this out.  See 
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 77–78 
(C.A.D.C. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting in part) 
(listing recent objections to extraterritorial 
applications of the ATS by Canada, Germany, 
Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, South Africa, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom).  Moreover, 
accepting petitioners’ view would imply that other 
nations, also applying the law of nations, could 
hale our citizens into their courts for alleged 
violations of the law of nations occurring in the 
United States, or anywhere else in the world.  The 
presumption against extraterritoriality guards 
against our courts triggering such serious foreign 
policy consequences, and instead defers such 
decisions, quite appropriately, to the political 
branches. 
                                                          
169  Id. at 1664 (citing and quoting Sosa, 542 U.S., at 727–28, 124 S. 
Ct., at 2739) (“Since many attempts by federal courts to craft remedies for 
the violation of new norms of international law would raise risks of adverse 
foreign policy consequences, they should be undertaken, if at all, with great 
caution”; and “[t]]he possible collateral consequences of making 
international rules privately actionable argue for judicial caution.”). 
170  Id. at 1666–68. 
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We therefore conclude that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, 
and that nothing in the statute rebuts that 
presumption.  “[T]here is no clear indication of 
extraterritoriality here,” and petitioners’ case 
seeking relief for violations of the law of nations 
occurring outside the United States is barred.171
The Chief Justice might also have made another point here, one that 
the author believes is obvious when one steps back from the thicket 
of ratiocinations about the ATS and instead looks intelligently at the 
historical setting of the 1789 Judiciary Act within the context of the 
early Republic.  That point is that a comprehensive subject matter 
jurisdiction of the federal courts over matters involving aliens is 
neatly provided between Section 11 172  of the 1789 Judiciary Act 
(what we’ve come to know as “diversity of citizenship” subject 
matter jurisdiction) and Section 9 (what we’ve come to know as the 
                                                          
171 Id. at 1668–69 (citing Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883).  Chief Justice 
Roberts also invoked the hoary aura of Justice Joseph Story: 
Finally, there is no indication that the ATS was 
passed to make the United States a uniquely hospitable 
forum for the enforcement of international norms.  As 
Justice Story put it, ‘No nation has ever yet pretended to 
be the custos morum of the whole world. . . .’  It is 
implausible to suppose that the First Congress wanted 
their fledgling Republic—struggling to receive 
international recognition—to be the first.  Indeed, the 
parties offer no evidence that any nation, meek or 
mighty, presumed to do such a thing. 
Id. at 1668 (quoting U.S. v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (No. 
15,551) (C.C.Mass.1822) (Story, J.)). 
172The importance of federal court alienage subject matter jurisdiction as 
seen both to the Founders and to modern scholars is apparent when one 
considers that even those seeking to curtail substantially or abolish outright 
diversity jurisdiction recognize the vital national interests in preserving 
undisturbed the alienage provisions thereof and even suggest expanding their 
reach by requiring only “minimal” diversity of citizenship.  See, e.g.,
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side 
Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963, 966-968 & 
n. 11 (1979).   
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ATS) – and Section 9 was necessary precisely to fill the hole that 
Section 11 would leave in cases like the Marbois incident, wherein 
the litigants were both aliens, the injury occurred in the United 
States, and thus the injured alien would have no access to the federal 
courts through diversity of citizenship. 173   That Congress further 
                                                          
173 See Michael G. Collins, The Diversity Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 42 
VA. J. INT'L L. 649 (2002).  Professor Bradley has challenged this point of 
view, asserting that “[i] t has long been established that suits between aliens 
do not fall within Article III alienage diversity jurisdiction” — and although 
“Article III contains specific clauses for certain cases likely to involve law of 
nations issues, such as cases involving ambassadors and admiralty cases”—  
“outside of those contexts, it is not clear what the Article III basis for 
jurisdiction would be in an ATS case between aliens.”  Curtis A. Bradley, 
The Alien Tort Statute and Attorney General Bradford’s Opinion, 106 AM. J.
INT'L L. 509, 522 (2011)(footnotes omitted).  It appears to be Professor 
Bradley’s suggestion that taking the view espoused here by the author would 
result in an ATS that exceeded the judicial power in Article III to be 
implemented by the Congress, particularly if “the law of nations” as it was 
understood during the Founding Era was a creature of state, rather than 
federal,  law.  Id. at 522-523 & n. 23 (“Article III concerns therefore provide 
an additional reason for construing the ATS not to apply to conduct by 
foreign citizens,” since “numerous scholars have concluded …[that]… the 
law of nations was treated as general common law in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, not federal law.”).  However, given that the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 was the first attempt to reify the broad strokes of 
Article III, it would not be surprising that Oliver Ellsworth and his 
colleagues may have had no reason to limn the boundaries of the judicial 
power with either the fly-speaking of modern scholars or with complete 
success in keeping the statute within the ambit of Article III as those 
boundaries would be declared later by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Indeed, 
other provisions of the 1789 Judiciary Act either were found unconstitutional 
, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)( §13’s purported grant 
of power to the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus), or to be 
unconstitutional as commonly applied by the federal courts, see  Erie R.R. 
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-79 (1938)(overruling Justice Story’s 
construction of §34, “The Rules of Decision Act,” in Swift v. Tyson , 41 U.S. 
(16 Pet.) 1 (1842), to avoid declaring §34 unconstitutional).  The 1789 
Judiciary Act was hardly written on a Mosaic tablet, and the sui generis
nature of what Congress was trying to do in writing on this tabula rasa of a 
federal system commands our attention rather than our veneration.  See, e.g.,
William J. Wiecek, The Reconstruction Of Federal Judicial Power, 13 J.
AM. LEG. HIST. 333, 337 & n.11 (1969)(noting that “the Judiciary Act of 
1789 was a compromise measure, trimmed down considerably from the 
original draft by Oliver Ellsworth to placate opponents 
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narrowed the ATS jurisdiction provision to [a] torts that are [b] 
committed in violation of the law of nations, simply serves to 
reaffirm how strongly the 1789 Senate Judiciary Committee had 
Marbois and similar incidents in mind when providing a federal 
forum for cases such as the one that grew out of Marbois,—
Respublica v. de Longchamps174 —cases that would otherwise hang 
                                                                                                                
of the lower federal courts”); Harold M. Bowman, The Unconstitutionality 
Of The Rule In Swift v. Tyson, 18 B.U. L. REV. 659, 674- 680 (1938).  
Similarly, other provisions of the 1789 Judiciary Act, particularly Section 25, 
have raised storms of controversy strongly flavored by innuendo of 
unconstitutionality.  See, e.g., Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial 
Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States — A History of the 
Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 AM. L. REV. 1 (1913); see also
Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and 
the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1518 (1989)(“ 
When the origins of our federal court system are viewed in their context of 
social and economic history, many questions … find answers. In particular, it 
becomes clear that the system was constructed neither in the abstract nor 
within a conviction that law was separated from politics, but rather the 
contrary. The framers of the system worked within a living and unquestioned 
understanding that law was politics, that they were solving immediate and 
great political problems the best way they could.”) ; see, generally WILFRED 
J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING 
MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE (Wythe Holt &  
L.H. LaRue, Eds. 1990) 
174 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (Pa. Ct. Oyez and Terminer 1784).  The best exegesis 
of the Marbois incident and the legal and political concerns it raised comes 
from a non-legal source, G.S. Rowe & Alexander Knott, Power, Justice, and 
Foreign Relations in the Confederation Period: The Marbois-Longchamps 
Affair, 1784-1786, 104 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIO. 275 (June 1980).  See also
John C. Massaro, The Forgotten Jurisdiction, 33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 83, 90-91 
(2012).  While technically a criminal prosecution, Respublica v. de 
Longchamps has been a staple of American torts casebooks and hornbooks 
for generations, cited to illustrate the extended personality doctrine in the law 
of tortious battery.  See, e.g., DAN D. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN, & ELLEN 
BUBLICK, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 37 (7th ed. 2013).   The rationale for 
finding battery although de Longchamps struck only Marbois’ cane with his 
own is significant, for it shows how much more seriously the Founders 
would have taken the need to deal with such affronts not only by criminal 
prosecution but also by civil suit:  “`As to the assault, this is, perhaps, one … 
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in a legal limbo while leaving justice up to the vagaries of state 
benches in the parochial years of the early Republic.175
                                                                                                                
in which the insult is more to be considered than the actual damage; for, 
though no great bodily pain is suffered by a blow on the palm of the hand, or 
the skirt of the coat, yet these are clearly within the definition of assault and 
battery, and among gentlemen too often induce dueling and terminate in 
murder.’”  Respublica v. de Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 114 (Opinion of 
M’Kean, C.J.).  And Chief Justice M’Kean’s expression of concern in those 
years about affronts to dignity inducing dueling and terminating in murder 
became all-too-well exemplified some twenty years later, when Founder and 
an architect of the federal judicial power through the celebrated Federalist 
No. 78, Alexander Hamilton, was felled by the duelist’s pistol.  See Joanne 
B. Freeman, Dueling as Politics: Reinterpreting the Burr-Hamilton Duel, 53 
WM. & MARY QTRLY 289, 294-297 (Apr. 1996).  That Chief Justice M’Kean 
in de Longchamps hoped it would not become so is evidencedt by the 
breadth with which he defined battery — i.e.,  “[a]s, therefore, anything 
attached to the person, partakes of its inviolability; De Longchamps' striking 
Monsieur Marbois' cane, is a sufficient justification of that gentleman's 
subsequent conduct” in defending himself,” 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 114,  — 
which quickly inured to encouraging the civil remedy for the offended, rather 
than the resort to organized violence.  See, e.g., Hyatt v. Wood, 3 Johns. 239 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808);  James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect:  
Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 1279, 1372-1375 (2000); see also United 
States v. Little, 26 F.Cas. 936, 2 Wash.C.C. 205, No. 15,598 (C.C.D. Pa. 
1808); see generally PETER GAY, THE CULTIVATION OF HATRED: THE 
BOURGEOIS EXPERIENCE, VICTORIA TO FREUD 9-33 (1994)(discussing die 
Mensur, the culture of dueling among 19th and early 20h century German 
students). 
175William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some 
Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 687, 692 (2001-2002); 
William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A 
Response to the "Originalists", 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 
225-237 (1996).  We do well here to remember what Professor Bador called 
the compromise embodied in the 1789 Judiciary Act, “the essence of” which 
“was an agreement that the question whether access to the lower federal 
courts was necessary to assure the effectiveness of federal law should not be 
answered as a matter of constitutional principle, but rather, should be left a 
matter of political and legislative judgment, to be made from time to time in 
the light of particular circumstances,”  Paul M. Bador, Congressional Power 
Over Jurisdiction Of The Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1031 
(1981-1982), as well as Professor Holt’s admonition that understanding of 
the 1789 Judiciary Act “can be reached only when one accepts the fact that 
the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789 were products of political 
vision and political struggle, relatively temporary political solutions for 
immediate, pressing political problems.”  Wythe Holt, The Origins of 
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In a particularly enigmatic concluding section of only three 
sentences, yet bearing its own Roman numeral “IV,” Chief Justice 
Roberts left Kiobel’s version of an analogous statement in Sosa that 
has continued to haunt the federal courts with uncertainty—however 
in this case, the statement did not concern the “recognition” of causes 
of action under the ATS, but rather, the applicability of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality in cases that were not as 
remote as the “f-cubed” paradigm presented by Kiobel:
 On these facts, all the relevant conduct took 
place outside the United States.  And even where 
the claims touch and concern the territory of the 
United States, they must do so with sufficient force 
to displace the presumption against extraterritorial 
application.  Corporations are often present in 
many countries, and it would reach too far to say 
that mere corporate presence suffices.  If Congress 
were to determine otherwise, a statute more 
specific than the ATS would be required.176
For his part, Justice Kennedy, whose questioning and 
expressions of concern about extraterritorial application of the ATS 
at the first oral argument of the case in February 2012 set the wheels 
of the present decision in motion, concurred that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality applied on the facts of this case, but did not 
appear to desire a broader ruling: 
The opinion for the Court is careful to leave open a 
number of significant questions regarding the reach 
and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute.  In my 
                                                                                                                
Alienage Jurisdiction, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 547, 548 (1989).  
Furthermore, we should bear in mind Professor Holt’s observation “that a 
national court system was thought necessary on all sides because state courts, 
or at least many state courts, were not doing their jobs.”  Holt, supra, at 549; 
see also id. at 553-562 (explaining examples of state-court judicial 
xenophobia). 
176 Id. at 1669 (citing Morrison, 130 S. Ct., at 2883–88). 
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view that is a proper disposition.  Many serious 
concerns with respect to human rights abuses 
committed abroad have been addressed by 
Congress in statutes such as the Torture Victim 
Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) . . . and that class 
of cases will be determined in the future according 
to the detailed statutory scheme Congress has 
enacted.  Other cases may arise with allegations of 
serious violations of international law principles 
protecting persons, cases covered neither by the 
TVPA nor by the reasoning and holding of today's 
case; and in those disputes the proper 
implementation of the presumption against 
extraterritorial application may require some 
further elaboration and explanation.177
Justice Alito also concurred with the Chief Justice’s majority 
opinion, but he and Justice Thomas, unlike Justice Kennedy, would 
prefer an even more restrictive holding: 
I concur in the judgment and join the opinion 
of the Court as far as it goes.  Specifically, I agree 
that when Alien Tort Statute (ATS) “claims touch 
and concern the territory of the United States, they 
must do so with sufficient force to displace the 
presumption against extraterritorial application.”  
This formulation obviously leaves much 
unanswered, and perhaps there is wisdom in the 
Court's preference for this narrow approach.  I 
write separately to set out the broader178 standard 
that leads me to the conclusion that this case falls 
within the scope of the presumption. 
In Morrison we explained that “the 
presumption against extraterritorial application 
would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated 
to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is 
involved in the case.”  We also reiterated that a 
                                                          
177  Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
178 Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring).  Here, Justice Alito likely means 
“broader” in the sense of “more encompassing,” for the standard he 
articulates narrows, rather than broadens in any way, the scope of the Chief 
Justice’s proposed “touch and concern” criterion. 
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cause of action falls outside the scope of the 
presumption—and thus is not barred by the 
presumption—only if the event or relationship that 
was “the ‘focus’ of congressional concern” under 
the relevant statute takes place within the United 
States. . . . 
The Court's decision in Sosa makes clear that 
when the ATS was enacted, “congressional 
concern” was “‘focus[ed],’” on the “three principal 
offenses against the law of nations” that had been 
identified by Blackstone: violation of safe 
conducts, infringement of the rights of 
ambassadors, and piracy.  The Court therefore held 
that “federal courts should not recognize private 
claims under federal common law for violations of 
any international law norm with less definite 
content and acceptance among civilized nations 
than the historical paradigms familiar when [the 
ATS] was enacted.”  In other words, only conduct 
that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of definiteness 
and acceptance among civilized nations can be said 
to have been “the ‘focus’ of congressional 
concern,” when Congress enacted the ATS.  As a 
result, a putative ATS cause of action will fall 
within the scope of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality—and will therefore be barred—
unless the domestic conduct is sufficient to violate 
an international law norm that satisfies Sosa’s 
requirements of definiteness and acceptance among 
civilized nations.179
Unlike the extraterritoriality-presumption based rationales of the 
Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Alito, Justice Breyer, writing 
for himself and Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, would not 
rely on the extraterritoriality presumption at all.180  Rather, Justice 
                                                          
179 Id. (Alito, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
180 Id. at 1671–74 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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Breyer would focus on the context of the connections between a 
putative ATS claim and U.S. interests—a foreign relations law 
perspective: 
Unlike the Court, I would not invoke the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.  Rather, 
guided in part by principles and practices of 
foreign relations law, I would find jurisdiction 
under this statute where (1) the alleged tort occurs 
on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American 
national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct 
substantially and adversely affects an important 
American national interest, and that includes a 
distinct interest in preventing the United States 
from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well 
as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common 
enemy of mankind.181
Justice Breyer elaborated his rationale grounded in the foreign 
relations law perspective in the following terms: 
In applying the ATS to acts “occurring within 
the territory of a[nother] sovereign,” I would 
assume that Congress intended the statute’s 
jurisdictional reach to match the statute’s 
underlying substantive grasp. That grasp, defined 
by the statute’s purposes set forth in Sosa, includes 
compensation for those injured by piracy and its 
modern-day equivalents, at least where allowing 
such compensation avoids “serious” negative 
international “consequences” for the United States.  
And just as we have looked to established 
international substantive norms to help determine 
the statute’s substantive reach, so we should look 
to international jurisdictional norms to help 
determine the statute’s jurisdictional scope. 
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law is helpful.  Section 402 recognizes that, 
subject to § 403’s “reasonableness” requirement, a 
nation may apply its law (for example, federal 
common law) not only (1) to “conduct” that “takes 
                                                          
181 Id. at 1671 
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place [or to persons or things] within its territory” 
but also (2) to the “activities, interests, status, or 
relations of its nationals outside as well as within 
its territory,” (3) to “conduct outside its territory 
that has or is intended to have substantial effect 
within its territory,” and (4) to certain foreign 
“conduct outside its territory . . . that is directed 
against the security of the state or against a limited 
class of other state interests.”  In addition, § 404 of 
the Restatement explains that a “state has 
jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for 
certain offenses recognized by the community of 
nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, 
slave trade,” and analogous behavior. 
Considering these jurisdictional norms in light 
of both the ATS’s basic purpose (to provide 
compensation for those injured by today’s pirates) 
and Sosa’s basic caution (to avoid international 
friction), I believe that the statute provides 
jurisdiction where (1) the alleged tort occurs on 
American soil, (2) the defendant is an American 
national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct 
substantially and adversely affects an important 
American national interest, and that includes a 
distinct interest in preventing the United States 
from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well 
as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common 
enemy of mankind. 
I would interpret the statute as providing 
jurisdiction only where distinct American interests 
are at issue.  Doing so reflects the fact that 
Congress adopted the present statute at a time 
when, as Justice Story put it, “No nation ha[d] ever 
yet pretended to be the custos morum of the whole 
world.”  That restriction also should help to 
minimize international friction.  Further limiting 
principles such as exhaustion, forum non 
conveniens, and comity would do the same. So 
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would a practice of courts giving weight to the 
views of the Executive Branch.182
Justice Breyer then turned to the application of his foreign 
relations law-based test to the case the Kiobel plaintiffs presented to 
the Court: 
Applying these jurisdictional principles to this 
case, however, I agree with the Court that 
jurisdiction does not lie.  The defendants are two 
foreign corporations.  Their shares, like those of 
many foreign corporations, are traded on the New 
York Stock Exchange.  Their only presence in the 
United States consists of an office in New York 
City (actually owned by a separate but affiliated 
company) that helps to explain their business to 
potential investors.  The plaintiffs are not United 
States nationals but nationals of other nations.  The 
conduct at issue took place abroad.  And the 
plaintiffs allege, not that the defendants directly 
engaged in acts of torture, genocide, or the 
equivalent, but that they helped others (who are not 
American nationals) to do so. 
Under these circumstances, even if the New 
York office were a sufficient basis for asserting 
general jurisdiction, it would be farfetched to 
believe, based solely upon the defendants’ minimal 
and indirect American presence, that this legal 
action helps to vindicate a distinct American 
interest, such as in not providing a safe harbor for 
an “enemy of all mankind.”  Thus I agree with the 
Court that here it would “reach too far to say” that 
such “mere corporate presence suffices.”183
Five days later, the Court granted Rio Tinto PLC’s petition for a 
writ of certiorari in the Sarei case, vacated the Ninth Circuit’s en 
                                                          
182 Id. at 1674 (internal citations omitted). 
183 Id. at 1677–78 (internal citations omitted). 
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banc opinion, and remanded the case “for further consideration in 
light of Kiobel.”184
 Having surveyed the four opinions and two principal rationales 
of the Justices unanimous in their judgment, we next turn to consider 
matters of great import to MNEs both foreign, such as Alstom, and 
domestic, such as Chevron, in considering the risks posed by their 
FDIs:  What terrain lies ahead—both perceived and imperceptible—
in the post-Kiobel ATS landscape?
A. FUTURE ATS LITIGATION
Taken together, the U.S. Supreme Court’s major 
pronouncements in Sosa and Kiobel on the scope of the ATS answer 
some questions clearly: 
(1) While the ATS has been held to be a subject 
matter jurisdictional statute, 185  the ATS was 
not “stillborn” because it also “interact[s]” 
with “the ambient law of [its] era” such that 
“federal courts could entertain claims once the 
jurisdictional grant was on the books, because 
torts in violation of the law of nations would 
have been recognized within the common law 
of the time.”186
(2) Causes of action that violate modern 
international law can be “recognized” (as 
opposed to created) by federal district courts, 
but only when they “rest on a norm of 
international character accepted by the 
civilized world and defined with a specificity 
comparable to the features of the 18th-century 
                                                          
184  Rio Tinto PLC v. Sarei, No. 11–649, 2013 WL 1704704 (Apr. 22, 
2013). 
185  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004) (“The statute 
was intended as jurisdictional in the sense of addressing the power of the 
courts to entertain cases concerned with a certain subject.”). 
186 Id. at 714. 
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paradigms we have recognized,” i.e., 
“Blackstone's three primary offenses: violation 
of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of 
ambassadors, and piracy.”187
(3) Because the “presumption against 
extraterritoriality applies to claims under the 
ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts that 
presumption,” cases “seeking relief for 
violations of the law of nations occurring 
outside the United States” are “barred” when 
“all of the relevant conduct took place outside 
the United States.”188
(4) However, “where the claims touch and 
concern the territory of the United States,” the 
ATS may apply provided that the claims “do 
so with sufficient force to displace the 
presumption against extraterritorial 
application.”189
(5) “[M]ere corporate presence” by itself does not 
“suffic[e]” to displace the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, given that “[c]orporations 
are often present in many countries.”190
The combination of what these holdings said, what they didn’t 
say, and the many other issues on which the Supreme Court hasn’t 
spoken definitely—and, of course, on which Congress has enacted no 
legislation—leave a very vague litigation frontier that will have to be 
limned, case-by-case, through the common-law decision-making 
processes of the ninty-four federal district courts and the thirteen 
U.S. appellate courts.  One commentator has suggested that there are 
at least three categories of ATS cases whose survival after Kiobel
remains open to debate, particularly as one of “those that” some of 
the Justices see as remaining “‘unresolved’ by Kiobel:
                                                          
187 Id. at 724–25. 
188  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 10-491, slip op. at 13–14 
(U.S. Apr. 17, 2013). 
189 Id. at 14. 
190 Id.
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(1) Cases alleging Sosa-sufficient torts committed 
overseas by U.S. defendants; 
(2) Cases such as Filartiga, where a foreign 
defendant uses the U.S. as an effective “safe 
harbor,” thereby preventing other states from 
bringing him to justice; and 
(3) Cases in which the defendant is alleged to 
have engaged in conduct in the United States 
that contributed materially to the violation of a 
Sosa-sufficient law of nations norm (such as 
providing active assistance to torture), but 
where that conduct in the U.S. was not itself 
sufficient to establish the violation.  ([But 
excluding from] this category cases alleging 
aiding and abetting predicated solely on 
knowledge by a U.S. corporation of a foreign 
subsidiary’s bad acts.  Although even that case 
is not technically resolved by Kiobel, . . . it’s 
safe to predict the Court would not recognize 
such a claim, most likely on the theory that 
such general knowledge, and failure to stop the 
tort, does not satisfy the scienter requirement 
for a Sosa-qualified claim.)191
Yet, that is not all that remains unresolved, as the 
following subsections explain in detail. 
1. EXTRATERRITORIALITY REDEFINED—APPLYING THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE’S “TOUCH AND CONCERN” PHRASEOLOGY
While the Court in Kiobel clarified that the ATS does not apply 
to conduct by a foreign corporation that transpires entirely in that 
foreign country, the majority’s opinion once again, as it did in Sosa,
tantalizingly leaves “the door . . . still ajar subject to vigilant 
                                                          
191  Marty Lederman, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: What Remains of the 
ATS?, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 18, 2013, 6:40 PM), http://opiniojuris.or 
g/2013/04/18/kiobel-insta-symposium-what-remains-of-the-ats/. 
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doorkeeping.”192  That metaphorical door is represented by the Chief 
Justice’s very specific use of the “touch and concern” language to 
delineate a gray area where the ATS will not have extraterritorial 
application.  However, that is merely a presumption, and it is subject 
to rebuttal by the plaintiffs’ showing that their claims do not merely 
“touch and concern the territory of the United States,” but rather, that 
they touch and concern the territory of the United States “with 
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial 
application.”  This leaves three major sets of unresolved issues, 
which likely will present numerous sub-issues.  First, what does it 
mean to say that a claim a plaintiff seeks to assert pursuant to the 
ATS “touches and concerns the territory of the United States”?  
Second, how is it that a plaintiff can demonstrate that a claim touches 
and concerns the territory of the United States “with sufficient force” 
to rebut the presumption against extraterritorial application.  Third, 
what kind of force is being referenced, and how shall we know when 
that force is “sufficient to rebut the presumption against 
extraterritoriality”?193
Al Shimari v. CACI International, Inc.194 is a case that presents 
the kind of fact pattern that will immediately test the boundaries set 
by Kiobel.  In that case, which “concerns the well-publicized Abu 
Ghraib prison abuse scandal[,] . . . four previously detained Iraqi 
citizens [brought] claims arising under common law and the . . . 
[ATS] against military defense contractor CACI [Premier 
Technology, Inc.] for alleged abuse and torture during their detention 
in Abu Ghraib, Iraq.”195  The corporate defendant is headquartered in 
Virginia.196  The extraterritoriality issue left open by Kiobel would 
have to be faced head-on here: Does the conduct by an American 
                                                          
192  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729. 
193  Roger Alford, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: Interpreting “Touch and 
Concern”, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 19, 2013, 9:59 AM), http://opiniojuris.or 
g/2013/04/19/kiobel-insta-symposium-interpreting-touch-and-concern. 
194  Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-00827-GBL, 2013 WL 
1234177 (E.D. Va. Mar. 19, 2013); see Jonathan Kaufman, Lower Courts Set 
to Address Questions Kiobel Left Unanswered, EARTHRIGHTS INT’L (May 9, 
2013), http://www.earthrights.org/blog/lower-courts-set-address-questions-
kiobel-left-unanswered (noting that the “touch and concern” language will be 
at issue in upcoming motions in three pending cases: Samantar, the South 
African Apartheid Litigation, and the Chiquita Litigation). 
195  Al Shimari, 2013 WL 12334177, at *1. 
196  Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l Inc., 679 F.3d 205, 209 (4th Cir. 2012). 
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military contractor in running a prison in a foreign country, but under 
contract with U.S. armed forces, touch and concern the territory of 
the United States with sufficient force so as to “rebut the 
extraterritoriality presumption”?  The answer is far from clear.  Nor 
is the answer likely to come from this litigation, because the district 
court has now, after remand, dismissed Al Shimari on statute of 
limitations grounds.197
The phrase “touch and concern” has not previously appeared in 
reported ATS cases in the federal courts until recently.198  Thus, the 
phrase is an entirely new judicially applied gloss on the thirty-three 
words that make up the ATS.  What could touch and concern mean?  
The phrase itself comes from the law of real property, where it is a 
                                                          
197  Al Shimari, 2013 WL 1234177, vacated Shimari v. CACI Int’l Inc., 
2008 WL 7348184 (E.D. Va., Nov. 25, 2008).  In its original decision, 
subsequently reversed, the District Court dismissed the “[p]laintiffs’ claims 
to the extent that they rely upon ATS jurisdiction because tort claims against 
government contractor interrogators are too modern and too novel to satisfy 
the Sosa requirements for ATS jurisdiction.” 657 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. 
Va. 2009).  In a related case, the District Court in Maryland appeared to 
come to exactly the opposite conclusion, permitting the ATS claims against 
the contractors to go forward.  Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 
745–60 (D. Md. 2010). 
198  In recent years, the phrase has been used in opinions authored by 
Justice Ginsburg in a variety of contexts.  See, e.g., Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2565 n.7 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted) (noting that wrongful conduct may sufficiently touch and concern a 
whole class of persons where there are “‘common questions of law or fact’ 
between the claims of the lead plaintiff and the applicant class”); Kucana v. 
Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 248 (2010) (noting that a denial of a motion to reopen 
. . . touches and concerns only the question whether the alien’s claims have 
been accorded a reasonable hearing”); Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi 
Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 123 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that cases 
in which tax assessments burden off-reservation land “do not touch and 
concern . . . taxes formally imposed on nonmembers that nonetheless burden 
on-reservation tribal activity”); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 517–18 
(2002) (noting that the proof requirements of a pending case “do not touch or 
concern . . . whether resort to a prison grievance process must precede resort 
to a court”); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (noting that institutional constraints prohibit federalism from 
touching or concerning state law interpreted by state courts). 
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term of art derived from the common-law used to describe promises 
that limit the use of a particular parcel of land.199  “At common law, 
real covenants and equitable servitudes do not run with the land 
unless they touch and concern the land.”200  Perhaps the majority’s 
focus on territory—the real property aspect of legislative 
jurisdiction—provides a logical, if not compelling, connection to this 
concept of real property law.201  To fully understand how ill-chosen 
and infelicitous a phrase the Chief Justice’s opinion in Kiobel chose, 
however, we need not go any further than examining a recent 
explanation of how the phrase has caused innumerable problems in 
the area of law that gave it its birth: 
The touch and concern requirement has had a 
tumultuous history.  The requirement has endured 
decades of scholars’ failed attempts at articulating 
a definitive definition, test, or rationale for the 
requirement, and it has weathered severe criticism.  
The touch and concern requirement was first 
conceived in the English courts in Spencer’s Case 
and later explained in Congleton v. Pattison as a 
requirement that the covenant must “directly affect 
the nature, quality, or value of the thing demised, 
[or] the mode of occupying it.”  In 1914, Professor 
Harry Bigelow, in his article The Content of 
Covenants in Leases, rejected the Congleton test, 
declaring it “vague” and “question-begging,” and 
articulated the following test: a covenant touches 
and concerns the land if it “operate[s] either to 
make more valuable some of the rights, privileges, 
or powers possessed by the covenantee or to 
                                                          
199 See generally Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of 
Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261 (1982). 
200  Note, Touch and Concern, The Restatement (Third) of Property: 
Servitudes, and a Proposal, 122 HARV. L. REV. 938, 938 (2009) (footnote 
omitted); see Jeffrey E. Stake, Toward an Economic Understanding of Touch 
and Concern, 1988 DUKE L.J. 925, 925–32 (1988). 
201  See, e.g., Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Touching And Concerning 
Copyright: Real Property Reasoning In MDY Industries, Inc. v. Blizzard 
Entertainment, Inc., 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1063, 1065 (2011) (discussing 
an analogous example of how “the spirit—if not the exact terminology—
generation of servitude-like restrictions imposed by intellectual property 
owners”). 
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relieve him in whole or in part of some of his 
duties.”  Professor Bigelow’s test was later 
tweaked by Dean (later Judge) Charles Clark:  
If the promisor’s legal relations 
in respect to the land in question 
are lessened—his legal interest as 
owner rendered less valuable by 
the promise—the burden of the 
covenant touches or concerns 
that land; if the promisee’s legal 
relations in respect to that land 
are increased—his legal interest 
as owner rendered more valuable 
by the promise—the benefit of 
the covenant touches and 
concerns that land.   
Though the Bigelow–Clark test has been widely 
criticized as being circular, it remains an oft-quoted 
test because, despite many attempts, there has been 
no consensus on an alternative.202
The touch and concern phrase is so vapid, in fact, that Reporters 
eliminated it from the Restatement (Third) of Property.203  It is a 
shame that touch and concern has been revived in a completely 
different setting, perhaps ringing dimly in the minds of judges or 
their law clerks from long ago property classes, than the 
                                                          
202 Touch and Concern, The Restatement (Third) of Property: 
Servitudes, and a Proposal, supra, note 200, at 939 (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting CHARLES E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS 
WHICH “RUN WITH LAND” 97 (2d ed. 1947)). 
203  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (2000); see
Touch and Concern, The Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, and a 
Proposal, supra note 200, at 940–45.  But see Van Houweling, supra note 
201, at 1064–65 (arguing that applying the touch and concern concept in 
connection with the doctrine of exhaustion in transferring intellectual 
property rights “suggests that the reasoning underlying the touch and concern 
doctrine may be more useful in this new context than in the land context 
where it first arose”). 
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extraterritorial reach of the ATS—whether a dispute touches or 
concerns the territory of the United States—to sew anew analogous, 
and equally inefficient, seeds of confusion, opacity, and 
argumentation, thereby unwittingly creating a new set of transaction 
costs for ATS litigants.204  Indeed, the new touch and concern test 
may well suffer from the same problems that the Reporter of the 
Restatement (Third) of Real Property identified when he set out “to 
reweave the ancient strands of servitude law into a new, and 
presumably smoother, fabric,” and homed in on touch and concern as 
“[o]ne of the knotty strands destined for elimination or replacement . 
. . . [because] ‘it identifies neither the problems addressed nor the 
value choices that must be made in determining whether to apply 
it.’”205
                                                          
204  One commentator has observed that “[t]he only thing that is truly 
clear is that today, the Supreme Court has provided fodder for another 
decade or more of litigation and created more business for litigators” because 
“[c]ompanies and victims’ advocates will battle over when claims touch and 
concern the U.S. with sufficient force.”  Katie Redford, Commentary: Door 
Still Open for Human Rights Claims After Kiobel, SCOTUS BLOG (Apr. 17, 
2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/commentary-door-still-open-for-
human-rights-claims-after-kiobel/. 
205  Stake, supra note 200, at 926 (quoting Susan F. French, Servitudes 
Reform and the New Restatement of Property: Creation Doctrines and 
Structural Simplification, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 928, 931 (1988) (footnote 
omitted)).  At least one commentator has suggested that Kiobel may be a 
Pyrrhic victory for corporations because of the changes it is likely to bring to 
discovery in corporate ATS suits: 
Kiobel would be a Pyrrhic victory if, to dismiss ATS 
claims, corporate defendants must have their officers and 
directors sit for depositions to determine to what extent 
they contributed to human rights violations abroad.  
Some of these individuals might be located in the United 
States but also have formal or informal roles in the 
entities that are most connected to the alleged violations 
committed abroad.  It is not uncommon for there to be a 
great deal of overlap among the boards and management 
teams of a multinational corporation’s subsidiaries. 
Milan Markovic, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: Settlement, Discovery and 
Kiobel, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 24, 2013, 4:45 PM), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/24/kiobel-insta-symposium-settlement-
discovery-and-kiobel.  Another commentator has asked, “if mere corporate 
presence is not enough, what kind and how much territorial activity within 
the United States is enough?”, and has provided a “non-exhaustive list” of 
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Thus, there are a number of paradigms that were not directly 
addressed by the Court in deciding Kiobel on its particular litigation 
facts, which are left for future ATS litigation: 
(1) Can a foreign plaintiff sue a U.S. defendant for 
acts or omissions occurring wholly outside of 
the United State[s] that allegedly violate the 
law of nations?  [Does it make a difference 
whether the defendant is a: (a) citizen; (b) 
resident; (c) corporation headquartered in 
America; (d) corporation incorporated in 
America; or (e) a subsidiary of a foreign 
corporation in America?] 
. . . . 
(2) Can a foreign plaintiff sue a foreign defendant 
for acts or omissions occurring in part in the 
United States that lead to an injury in a foreign 
country that allegedly violates the law of 
nations? . . .  
  . . . .  
(3) Can a foreign plaintiff sue a U.S. defendant for 
acts or omissions occurring in part in the 
United States that lead to injury in a foreign 
country?206
                                                                                                                
“the types of activities that might be the subject of future litigation.”  Roger 
Alford, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: Degrees of Territoriality, OPINIO JURIS,
(Apr. 22, 2013, 9:56 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/22/kiobel-insta-
symposium-degrees-of-territoriality. 
206  Donald Childress, Kiobel Commentary: An ATS Answer with Many 
Questions (And the Possibility of a Brave New World of Transnational 
Litigation), SCOTUS BLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 5:03 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-an-ats-answer-
with-many-questions-and-the-possibility-of-a-brave-new-world-of-
transnational-litigation. 
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Because of the opacity of the touch and concern test, Professor 
Burt Neuborne of NYU foresees as much post-Kiobel litigation as 
there was pre-Kiobel:
[T]he Kiobel majority says little or nothing 
about how to decide ATS cases where a significant 
link to the territorial United States exists, either 
because the injured plaintiff is a United States 
national, the defendant is a United States resident, 
and/or a significant proportion of the operative 
facts took place within the United States.  The 
Breyer concurrence indicates that the ATS will 
apply in many such cases.  The Roberts majority is 
silent on whether one or more of such links will 
rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.  
The swing-vote Kennedy concurrence is 
purposefully vague on the issue.  So, much ATS 
litigation will continue, albeit in a narrower set of 
cases involving allegations of significant links to 
the territorial United States.  We can look forward 
to years of uncertainty, split decisions, and an 
eventual return trip to a reconstituted Court.207
Another commentator, however, sees opportunity in the way 
Chief Justice Roberts phrased the touch and concern test, reading 
into it the classic effects test 208  for determining the scope of 
extraterritorial application of a federal statute, articulated 209  by 
                                                          
207  Burt Neuborne, Some Quick Thoughts on Transnational Human 
Rights Litigation in American Courts After Kiobel, N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
ONLINE FORUM (Apr. 19, 2013), http://nyujilp.org/some-quick-thoughts-on-
transnational-human-rights-litigation-in-american-courts-after-kiobel.  
Professor Childress offers some specific predictions on hypotheticals similar 
to those posed by Professor Neuborne.  See Childress, supra note 206. 
208 See Joseph Rome, R.I.P. A.T.S.? How Much of the Alien Tort Statute 
Survives the Supreme Court’s Kiobel Decision?, N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
ONLINE FORUM (Apr. 17, 2013), http://nyujilp.org/r-i-p-a-t-s-how-much-of-
the-alien-tort-statute-survives-the-supreme-courts-kiobel-decision (noting 
that the Court’s decision that claims should “‘touch and concern the territory 
of the United States’” sounds familiar to “the old ‘effects’ test”). 
209 See U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); see 
also Jordan A. Dresnick et al., The United States as Global Cop: Defining 
the ‘Substantial Effects’ Test in U.S. Antitrust Enforcement in the Americas 
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Learned Hand when he and a Second Circuit panel were “Justices for 
a Day” because they sat in the stead of a Supreme Court which, 
because of recusals, could not muster a quorum.210  The effects test 
subjects companies carrying on business outside of the United States 
to federal law, such as antitrust law, if their business activity is 
intended to affect U.S. commerce, and if that activity is not de
minimis. 211   If so, “this could be an opportunity to reconcile the 
majority opinion with Breyer’s concurrence; perhaps if a ‘distinct 
American interest’ were at stake in a particular case, the Court would 
be satisfied that the presumption has been rebutted in that particular 
case,” particularly since “only [Justices] Alito and Thomas supported 
the notion that the offending conduct must occur on U.S. soil.”212
It would seem unlikely that the touch and concern language 
chosen by Chief Justice Roberts would evoke the effects test.  The 
Supreme Court extensively criticized and rejected it in Morrison,213
although this securities law case provided the very analytic 
foundation on which Chief Justice Roberts built his analysis for the 
Kiobel majority.  Furthermore, the effects test itself is just as murky, 
heavily criticized, 214  and poorly predictive of results 215  as the 
                                                                                                                
and Abroad, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 453, 467–68 (2009) (footnotes 
omitted). 
210   REASON AND IMAGINATION: THE SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE OF 
LEARNED HAND 247–48 (Constance Jordan ed., 2013). 
211  Nat’l Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass’n, 666 F.2d 6, 8–9 (2d 
Cir. 1981). 
212  Rome, supra note 208. 
213  Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878–81 
(2010). 
214 See id.; Donald J. Curotto, Extraterritorial Application of the 
Antitrust Laws and Retaliatory Legislation by Foreign Countries, 11 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 577 (1981).  In an often-cited opinion, the Ninth 
Circuit criticized the effects test as inadequate and proposed a soft, multi-
factored balancing test that, while extensively applied in the lower courts, 
still functions on an intensely factual, case-by-case basis.  Id. at 582–83 
(discussing Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 
1976)); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 
(1993) (following the Timberlane rejection of the effects test).  But see
Dresnick, supra note 209, at 467–68 & n.95 (characterizing Timberlane as a 
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property-law conception of touch and concern.  Indeed, that test is 
notorious for its morphing into an array of tests as courts applied 
it,216 so the invitation for courts to resort to it to interpret the touch 
and concern gloss on the ATS should be flatly declined.   
To understand the touch and concern language, the best hope is 
to return to the first causes of the statute itself,217 as Chief Justice 
Roberts did, in Kiobel.  Recalling the historical backdrop of the ATS 
will be critical in doing so.218  Although courts will be invited to find 
that the incorporation or headquartering of an MNE in America 
satisfies this standard, judges will need to be even more astute and 
vigilant than Sosa instructed them to be.  In particular, they will need 
to focus on three main things.  First, a court should ensure that it is 
not the defendant, but rather, the defendant’s improper conduct that 
                                                                                                                
modification of the effects test by “adding the element of international 
comity to the ‘effects test,’ thus creating a tripartite analysis”). 
215 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878–81; Austen Parrish, The Effects 
Test: Extraterritoriality's Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455 (2008); 
Austen L. Parrish, Morrison, the Effects Test, and the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality: A Reply to Professor Dodge, 105 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 399 (2011).  But see William S. Dodge, Morrison’s Effects Test, 40 
SW. L. REV. 687 (2011); William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality After Morrison, 105 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 396 
(2011). 
216  For a classic description of the problem, see Judge Becker’s opinion 
in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 
1187 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (describing the many variations of the effects test 
across jurisdictions). 
217  For an example of this scholarly method in action, see Eugene 
Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals 
about the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 155–
56 (2004). 
218  For the range of values, we may view collective the following: Sosa,
542 U.S. at 716–17 (discussing the 1784 Marbois affair, which encouraged 
the creation of the Judiciary Act, giving the Court original jurisdiction over 
diplomats); Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal 
Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183 (2004) 
(discussing how piracy provides the foundation for the ATS); Thomas H. 
Lee, The Safe–Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
830 (2006) (discussing how safe conduct inspired the ATS); see also Joseph 
Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 445 (1995) (asserting the capture of the 
enemy vessels as the only scenario in which the ATS applies).  Doe v. 
Nestle, S.A. 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1068 n.8 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
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touches and concerns the United States.  Second, a court must ensure 
that it is specifically the territory of the United States that is being 
touched and concerned, rather than the United States generically, or 
the United States’ interests abstractly.  Lastly, a court must ensure 
that the territory of the United States being touched and concerned is 
done so in a way that, unless a federal court forum is provided to the 
alien(s) seeking to sue, strongly puts at risk one of the core values—
neutrality, protection of diplomats, protection of aliens under safe 
conducts—in the ATS’s history.219
This, however, will not always be an easy task in the hands of 
the lower federal courts.  In a decision rendered two months before 
Kiobel, the Ninth Circuit reversed a federal district court’s ruling that 
had short-circuited an attempt by Japan’s whaling lobby 
(euphemistically named a “Research Institute”) to use the ATS as a 
sword to thwart an Oregon-based conservation society’s aggressive 
efforts to interfere with whaling.220  Writing for the Ninth Circuit 
panel, Chief Judge Kozinski had no hesitation to paint with a broad 
brush in analogizing the conservationists’ efforts to disrupt ocean 
whaling to piracy: 
You don't need a peg leg or an eye patch.  
When you ram ships; hurl glass containers of acid; 
drag metal-reinforced ropes in the water to damage 
propellers and rudders; launch smoke bombs and 
flares with hooks; and point high-powered lasers at 
other ships, you are, without a doubt, a pirate, no 
                                                          
219 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 
(2013). 
220  Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 
860 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (W.D. Wash. 2012), rev’d, 708 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 
2013).  Invoking § 1350 in this way presents innovative avenues for MNEs, 
complementary to the legislative lobbying discussed infra Part III.B, to 
protecting investments, both domestic and foreign, from private activism as 
well as from judicial disruption.  See Shell Offshore Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 
864 F. Supp. 2d 839 (D. Alaska 2012).  While Alstom would not likely be 
able to employ similar litigation tactics to dissuade activism against its FDI 
sites in Israel, such litigation might be useful were there to be activism. 
228                          SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF             [Vol. 9.2 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS
matter how high-minded you believe your purpose 
to be.221
While the analogy asserted here is not entirely persuasive,222 the 
slope of analogy that Judge Kozinski has started down, however, 
may prove even less persuasive and more slippery.223  Assigning 
eighteenth century roles to actors in twenty-first century events has 
superficial appeal that conceals the substantial potential for the 
drawing of inapposite analogies and the application of faulty 
inductive reasoning that lack intellectual and historical grounding.224
For example, there are those who have sought—and no doubt will 
renew their efforts—to use analogy to cast certain kinds of corporate 
FDI conduct as “piracy”225 as well as “ambassadorial.”226  Great care 
                                                          
221  Inst. of Cetacean Research, 708 F. 3d, at 1101.  While Judge Milan 
D. Smith dissented from the panel’s decision to order reassignment of the 
case to a new district judge upon remand, he concurred in the reinstatement 
of the whaler’s ATS claim and the panel’s prior decision in Inst. of Cetacean 
Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 702 F.3d 573 (9th Cir. 2012) 
to preliminarily enjoin the conversation group’s activities, because “[e]ven if 
one believes it is barbaric to harvest whales for any purpose at the beginning 
of the 21st century, as practiced by Cetacean, it is clearly permitted under 
international law.”  Id. at 1106 (Smith, J., concurring in part & dissenting in 
part). 
222   See generally the extensive discussion of the doctrinal 
underpinnings of international piracy law in Samuel Shnider, Universal 
Jurisdiction Over “Operation of a Pirate Ship”: The Legality of the Evolving 
Piracy Definition in Regional Prosecutions, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
473 (2013). 
223  For an example of this at work, see Martha Lovejoy, Note, From 
Aiding Pirates To Aiding Human Rights Abusers: Translating The 
Eighteenth-Century Paradigm Of The Law Of Nations For The Alien Tort 
Statute, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 241 (2009). 
224 See, e.g., Kontorovich, The Piracy Analagy, supra note 218, at 183; 
see also Dan Hunter, No Wilderness of Single Instances: Inductive Inference 
in Law, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365 (1998).  See generally Dan Hunter, Reason Is 
Too Large: Analogy And Precedent In Law, 50 EMORY L.J. 1197, 1206 
(2001) (comparing and contrasting analogy and inductive reasoning because 
“legal commentators have caused enormous problems by failing to explain 
how analogy differs from the related inference processes of induction and 
metaphor”).  
225  See Kontorovich, The Piracy Analagy, supra note 218, at 236–37; 
see, e.g., Jennifer J. Rho, Comment, Blackbeards Of The Twenty-First 
Century: Holding Cybercriminals Liable Under The Alien Tort Statute, 7 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 695, 703–18 (2007) (arguing that “piracy provides a 
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will need to be exercised lest such analogies once again threaten to 
distort the ATS in the very ways the Kiobel Court has tried to nip in 
the bud. 
2. WHAT IS A TORT FOR ATS PURPOSES?
Courts have largely failed to grapple with another challenging 
word—tort—that has been in every iteration of the statute since the 
Judiciary Act of 1789. 227   The decided cases often involve a 
misinterpretation of the significance of the phrase “for tort only.”228
                                                                                                                
remarkably good analogy to cybercrime”; ergo, cybercrime should be 
actionable as piracy under the ATS).  Such FDIs may not always be in 
infrastructure or commercial enterprises—it could very well be the supply of 
corporate personnel to whom U.S. foreign military operations are 
subcontracted.  See, e.g., Mark Mazetti, Pakistan’s Public Enemy:  How a 
Single Spy Helped Turn Pakistan Against the United States, N.Y. TIMES
SUNDAY MAG., Apr. 14, 2013, at MM30, available at http://www.ny 
times.com/2013/04/14/magazine/raymond-davis-pakistan.html; see also
Jenny S. Lam, Accountability for Private Military Contractors Under The 
Alien Tort Statute, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1459 (2009); cf. Ansel J. Halliburton, 
Pirates Versus Mercenaries: Purely Private Transnational Violence at the 
Margins of International Law, EXPRESSO, 2010, available at 
http://works.bepress.com/ansel_halliburton/1. 
226 Cf. Logan Michael Breed, Regulating Our 21st-Century 
Ambassadors: A New Approach To Corporate Liability For Human Rights 
Violations Abroad , 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 1005, 1006–07, 1013–15 (2001–
2002). 
227  The reader is referred to the 1878, 1911, and 1948 versions of the 
ATS, the product of re-codification rather than amendment, which are set 
forth in JENNIFER K. ELSEA, THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH VIEWS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS (Oct. 2, 2003), at 6–8, available at 
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/1864. 
228  See generally J.M. Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of 
Nations, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 445 (1994) (arguing that the 
phrase “tort only” was meant to cover prize claims involving damage or 
injury to property); William S. Dodge, Which Torts In Violation Of The Law 
Of Nations?, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 351 (2000–2001).  Writing 
in 2001 before the Supreme Court’s Sosa decision, Professor Dodge 
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Most have tended to virtually read the word tort out of the statute and 
to ignore the critical punctuation mark—that although not included in 
the handwritten Judiciary Act of 1789,229 was quickly interpolated by 
the federal judges in the 1790s discussing the ATS230—that separates 
                                                                                                                
observed that “[t]here are at least four possible standards courts might utilize 
to determine which torts in violation of the law of nations are actionable: 
The most expansive would be to read the Alien Tort 
Statute as authorizing the federal courts not just to apply 
customary international law established by existing state 
practice but to create new law, analogizing to Lincoln 
Mills v. Textile Workers.  The Filartiga court noted this 
possibility but did not need to adopt it, and no court has 
done so subsequently.  A second possibility would be to 
read the Alien Tort Statute, in accordance with its plain 
language, to extend to all torts in violation of the law of 
nations determined in the usual way—by state practice 
followed out of a sense of legal obligation.  This seems 
to be what Filartiga intended, although only one court 
has expressly adopted this reading.  A third and arguably 
narrower reading would limit suits under the Alien Tort 
Statute to those that are “universal, definable, and 
obligatory,” and a fourth reading would limit actionable 
torts to a still narrower category of those that violate jus 
cogens norms. 
Id. at 352-53 (footnotes omitted). 
229 See Transcript of Federal Judiciary Act (1789), available at http://w
ww.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=12&page=transcript.  Origi
nal images of the handwritten documents may be viewed at http://www.ourd
ocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=12#. 
230  See Judge Richard Peters in Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 
947–48 (D. Pa 1793), and Judge Thomas Bee in Bolchos v. Darrel, Bee 74, 3 
F. Cas. 810, No. 1607 (D.S.C. 1795).  In Bochos, Judge Bee observed: 
I was at first doubtful whether this court had jurisdiction, 
Darrel's seizure, under the mortgage, having been made 
on land.  But as the original cause arose at sea, every 
thing dependent on it is triable in the admiralty.  Cro. 
Eliz. 685, Yel. 135, Le Caux and Eden, and other cases 
are full to this effect.  If, indeed, I should refuse to take 
cognizance of the cause, there would be a failure of 
justice, for the court of common law of the state has 
already dismissed the cause as belonging to my 
jurisdiction in the admiralty.  Besides, as the 9th section 
of the judiciary act of congress [Act Sept. 24, 1789, 1 
Stat. 77] gives this court concurrent jurisdiction with the 
state courts and circuit court of the United States where 
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the words “tort only” from the modifier “in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.”  In contrast, in their 
discussion of the ATS, both Federal District Judge Richard Peters in 
1793 and Federal District Judge Thomas Bee in 1795 included a key 
mark of punctuation—the profound comma—between the concept of 
tort and the separate concept of a “violation of the law of nations.”231
While these judicial opinions did not center on that point, that two of 
President Washington’s original federal trial judges naturally read the 
comma into the statutory language certainly shows an understanding, 
and a recognition of the importance, of punctuation that has in 
modern ATS cases been entirely ignored.232 Effectively reading the 
                                                                                                                
an alien sues for a tort, in violation of the law of 
nations, or a treaty of the United States, I dismiss all 
doubt upon this point. 
3 F. Cas. at 810 (emphases added).  Similarly, Judge Peters had 
independently observed in Moxon:
Damages may be superadded, but a proceeding for a 
marine trespass in different, as it is entirely a suit for 
damages, and not for the thing itself.  Neither does this 
suit for a specific return of the property, appear to be 
included in the words of the judiciary act of the United 
States, giving cognizance to this court of ‘all causes 
where an alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the 
laws of nations, or a treaty of the United States.’  
Judiciary Act, § 9 [1 Stat. 76].  It cannot be called a suit 
for a tort only, when the property, as well as damages 
for the supposed trespass, are sought for. 
17 F. Cas. at  947–48 (emphases added).  For the identification of Richard 
Peters as the judge in Moxon, see WILLIAM R. CASTRO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE AGE OF FIGHTING SAIL 87–90 (U. So. Carolina 
Pr. 2006), and for the importance of Judge Peters to the development of 
American law during the early Republic, see, e.g., Joseph Whitla Stinson, 
Opinions of Richard Peters, 1781–1817, 70 U. PA. L. REV. 197 (1921–1922); 
Peter B. Presser, A Tale of Two Judges: Richard Peters, Samuel Chase, and
the Broken Promise of Federalist Jurisprudence, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 26 
(1978–1979). 
231 See Bolchos, 3 F. Cas. 810.  
232  Professors Bellia and Clark in a recent article have recognized the 
issue: 
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separate concept of tort out of the ATS, modern courts paraphrase the 
statute as referring to an “action for any violation of international 
law”233 or “for violation of standard international law norms that are
‘universal, definable, and obligatory.’”234  This misinterpretation is a 
                                                                                                                
Another possible reading, however, is that “only” 
modified “in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States” to emphasize that only those torts in 
violation of the law of nations fell within the jurisdiction 
that the ATS conferred.  A significant class of tort claims 
by aliens would not have involved law of nations 
violations, including claims by enemy aliens, claims for 
interference with real property rights, claims for private 
wrongs without force or violence (such as slander), or 
claims between aliens for injuries arising outside the US.  
By placing “only” before “violations of the law of 
nations,” Congress may have wished to emphasize that 
federal courts could not hear this broader range of tort 
claims under § 9.  Moreover, in other instances the 
drafters of the first Judiciary Act used the word “only” to 
modify a subsequent prepositional phrase.  A final 
possibility is that “only” modifies the language that 
appears both before and after it.  In any event, the 
meaning of the statute does not turn on whether “only” 
was meant to emphasize only torts (and not breaches of 
contract or debts) or only those torts in violation of the 
law of nations (and not other torts).  Under either 
reading, the statute conferred jurisdiction only over torts 
that also constituted law of nations violations. 
Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the 
Law Of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 518–19 (2011) (footnotes omitted).  
In downplaying its significance, however, they miss the precision with which 
Congress meant to communicate the intended scope of the ATS, thus 
resulting in the circular analyses plaguing ATS decisions today, and missing 
the critical parameters that the First Congress sought to place around this 
important class of federal-court subject matter jurisdiction, as the author 
explains at the conclusion of this subsection.  
233 See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(“[o]n its face, section 1350 requires the district courts to hear claims ‘by an 
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations.’ . . . We 
read the statute as requiring no more than an allegation of a violation of the 
law of nations in order to invoke section 1350.”). 
234 See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540 (N.D. Cal. 
1987); see also Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction 
over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 88 (1981). 
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judicial gloss that was made by Justice Souter in Sosa, but had its 
origins earlier in Filartiga.  In one of the first scholarly articles some 
thirty-five years ago that parsed § 1350, Professor Kenneth Randall 
correctly described how a reasonable person with legal training, but 
without an instrumentalist agenda, would process the language of the 
statute: 
In order to establish jurisdiction under the 
Alien Tort Statute, a plaintiff must first establish 
that his or her action is for a tort only.  Contrary to 
the assertions in many opinions and commentaries, 
this basic element of the statute does not refer to an 
“international tort.”  While international law may 
provide remedies for certain types of “civil 
wrongs,” the specific notion of a “tort,” at least in 
name, does not exist in the international legal 
system.  The “tort” element of the statute refers 
instead to a municipal tort under American law.  
An Anglo-American legal concept, torts were 
recognized as early as the eighteenth century.  
Torts derived from the action of trespass, the 
remedy for all “direct and immediate injuries . . .,” 
whether caused by intentional or negligent conduct.  
Since the term “torts” does not literally exist in 
international law, but did exist in eighteenth 
century America, it is logical to conclude that the 
statute requires plaintiff to establish a common law 
tort.  An examination of the possible origin of the 
statute supports the conclusion that the statute 
refers to a municipal tort.235
                                                          
235  Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law 
Claims: Inquiries Into The Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 
33–34 (1985–1986) (footnotes omitted).  As Dean Randall acknowledges, 
his view—with which the author is entire sympathy—was (and remains) a 
minority view; but although a minority view, it is also the correct view.  Id.
at 32–33.  As Dean Randall noted, this approach is the one suggested by 
Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren, expressing the “‘minority view’ that the statute 
requires a municipal tort under American law plus a violation of the law of 
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Unfortunately, as earlier observed, the courts which have 
rendered the leading decisions in the area have chosen to operate on a 
view of the statute that simply bears no reality to its words.  As Dean 
Randall observed over twenty-five years ago, “[m]any opinions 
simply do not discuss whether a tort has occurred under municipal 
law.”236  Disputes over whether the tort itself must be some kind of 
international law cause of action or arise from international law, or 
over whether § 1350 simply recognizes causes of action for 
violations of international law, have taken the scholarship and the 
judicial analyses so far from the text of the statute as to make the 
whole enterprise seem a study in surrealism—one in which 
ambiguity is “refined” out of what in fact is textual clarity.
Yet indeed, tort does have an independent and specific meaning, 
and one that is fully consonant with the understanding of leading 
lawyers of the early Republic.  As an initial matter, despite some 
speculation to the contrary,237 tort was a legal term of art that was in 
use during the time of the Judiciary Act’s drafting and in the legal 
discourse of the early Republic.  While Blackstone, the leading legal 
primer for colonial lawyers, did not make the assignation of tort
(apparently preferring instead the solidly Anglicized “private wrong” 
rather than the Law-French tort),238 the term was hardly novel among 
                                                                                                                
nations or a treaty,” as opposed to “‘majority view’” that drew, as in 
Filartiga, only upon international law to determine liability.  Id. at 37–38 
(quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 782 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)). 
236 Id. at 36 n.152. 
237  LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 261–64, 409–
27 (1973) (“All in all, tort law was not a highly developed field in 1776, or 
for a good many years thereafter.”); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780–1860, at 85–99, 201 (1977) 
(“Indeed, until the ideological triumph of the will theory of contracts after 
1825, jurists did not yet perceive any fundamental conflict between 
contractual and customary duties.”). 
238  See Michael L. Rustad, Review: A REVISIONIST HISTORY OF TORT 
LAW: FROM HOLMESIAN REALISM TO NEOCLASSICAL RATIONALISM, by Alan 
Calnan, 15 L. & POL. BOOK REV. 350, 352–53 (2005), available at
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/calnan505.htm; see 
also Robert W. Drane & David J. Neal, On Moral Justifications for the 
Tort/Crime Distinction, 68 CAL. L. REV. 398, 402 n.11 (1980) (citing 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2) (“Blackstone attempted to couch his 
definition as more than an appeal to authority by arguing that crime involves 
harm to public interests while tort involves only the interests of 
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American lawyers.  For example, a search of the Westlaw database 
that collects all reportable cases from earlier eras (called Allcases-
Old) for simply the term tort and a date restriction to cases decided 
before 1840 239  produces some 1,975 federal and state cases 
employing the word tort—an exceptional number of cases 
considering this was an era when case reporting was barely in its 
infancy and at best, done sporadically and ad hoc for most courts.240
The oldest of the reported cases to use the word tort (and to 
distinguish it from contract) is a decision from a colonial Maryland 
court that preceded the Judiciary Act by some fifty-five years.241  It 
again appears in this colonial court in 1756, this time used 
extensively both by the court, as well by counsel in the summary of 
their argument, which is focused on the common-law form of action 
                                                                                                                
individuals.”).  Perhaps even more illuminating of the fog Blackstone’s 
nascent concept of tort law, John F. Witt has observed: 
In his Commentaries [Blackstone] worked excruciatingly 
hard (and not always successfully) to trim the unruly 
brambles of the common law into the kind of carefully 
ordered rationality that characterized the civil law and 
natural law traditions.  As John Goldberg has recently 
observed, Blackstone sought to do just this for the 
smattering of common law actions that he grouped under 
the rubric of “torts or wrongs.” 
. . . . 
To the modern ear, Blackstone’s approach is at once 
foreign and familiar.  The motley assemblage of ancient 
writs can leave the reader feeling a little like Jeremy 
Bentham, who dismissed as ridiculous the entire 
Blackstonian enterprise of finding reason hidden deep 
within the common law’s historical nooks and crannies. 
John Fabian Witt, Contingency, Immanence, and Inevitability in the Law of 
Accidents, 1 J. TORT L., 1, 4–5 (2005) (footnotes omitted). 
239  The search terms are: tort & da(bef 1840). 
240  Jeffrey A. Van Detta, The Decline and Fall of the American Judicial 
Opinion, Part I: Back to the Future from the Roberts Court to Learned 
Hand—Context and Congruence, 12 BARRY L. REV. 53 (2009). 
241   Black v. Digges’ Ex’rs, 1 H. & McH. 153, (Provincial Court, 
Proprietary Province of Maryland, 1744). 
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known as trover242 and the tort of conversion that underlies it.243
Indeed, the court’s opinion cites to what appears to be some kind of 
treatise, entitled Law of Torts, for the proposition that “[i]n trover the 
conversion is the gist of the action.”244  Torts make an appearance in 
a 1779 case from colonial Virginia in which the term was, as it would 
be again in the Judiciary Act of 1789, used to describe the subject 
matter jurisdiction of a court:  
[t]he commissions of the crown gave the courts 
which were established a most ample jurisdiction 
over all maritime contracts, and over torts and 
injuries, as well in ports as upon the high seas; and 
acts of parliament enlarged, or rather recognized, 
this jurisdiction, by giving or confirming 
cognizance of all seizures for contraventions of the 
revenue laws.245
The earliest federal courts, organized under the Articles of 
Confederation, also seemed no strangers to the word torts in the 
sense familiar to us, and used the word with a comfort and easy 
familiarity that suggests it was well known and understood in the 
                                                          
242 F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: ALSO, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT
COMMON LAW: TWO COURSES OF LECTURES  (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. 
Whittaker eds., 1909) (“Select Writs—The Case Trover”), available at
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/maitland-formsofaction.asp (part of 
the Internet Medieval Sourcebook).  
243  Leach v. Slater, 1 H. & McH. 513, (Provincial Court, Proprietary 
Province of Maryland 1773). 
244 Id.  As the defendant’s attorney, one S. Chase, is reported having 
argued to the court: 
There has been a demand and refusal, within three years, 
therefore the act does not attach.  Trover is an action 
founded on a tort.  The defendant must have been guilty 
of some illegal act, to charge him with a conversion.  
The whole tort consists in the wrongful conversion.  1 
Burr. 31.  The right to purchase is lawful, consequently 
the user under that purchase is lawful.  Suppose one 
steals my horse and sells it, the purchaser is not guilty of 
a wrong, nor subject to an action, before a demand and 
refusal; if it were otherwise, a man might be made 
answerable for a tort against his own intent.   
Id.
245 In re First Case of the Judges, 4 Call 1, (Va. 1779) (emphasis 
added). 
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lawyers’ lexicon almost twenty years before the Judiciary Act of 
1789.246  The Superior Court of Connecticut used tort in 1786 to 
contradistinction to pleas sounding in contract, as did courts in 
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina.247 Tort
was common enough parlance that in a 1790 case, the Superior Court 
in Philadelphia could speak of common practices of juries 
deliberating in torts cases—a discussion that will resonate with an 
utmost contemporary ring with any active trial lawyer of the twenty-
first century: 
The first objection, as to the manner of the jury 
collecting the sense of its members, with regard to 
the quantum of damages, does not appear to us to 
be well founded, or at all similar to the case of 
casting lots for their verdict.  In torts and other 
cases, where there is no ascertained demand, it can 
seldom happen that jurymen will, at once, agree 
upon a precise sum to be given, in damages; there 
will necessarily arise a variety of opinions, and 
mutual concessions must be expected; a middle 
sum may, in many cases, be a good rule; and 
though, it is possible, this mode may sometimes be 
abused by a designing juryman, fixing upon an 
extravagantly high, or low sum, yet unless such 
abuse appears, the fraudulent design will not be 
presumed.248
                                                          
246 See, e.g., Keane v. The Gloucester, Bee 399, 2 U.S. 36, 39, 2 Dall. 
36, 39, 14 F.Cas. 163 (Fed. Ct. App. 1782) (“[t]he libellants do not seek a 
compensation for a wrong; they are not in pursuit of damages for a tort.”). 
247  Bradley v. Camp, 1 Kirby 77, 1 Am. Dec. 13 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
1787); accord Eastwick v. Hugg, 1 U.S. 222, 1 Dall. 222, (Pa. Com. Pl. 
1787); Middleton’s Ex’rs v. Robinson, 1 Bay 58, 1 S.C.L. 58 (Courts of 
Common Pleas and General Sessions of the Peace of South Carolina 1787); 
Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. 357, 1 Dall. 357 (Pa. 1787); Brown v. 
Belches, 1 Va. 9, 1 Wash. 9 (Va. 1791). 
248  Cowperthwaite v. Jones, 2 U.S. 55, 56, 2 Dall. 55, 56 (Pa. Com. Pl. 
Aug. 1790) (emphasis added).  We find the word tort in common usage in 
Virginia, too, as revealed by a 1790 case involving the tort of slander to title.  
Ross v. Pines, 3 Call 568, 7 Va. 568 (Va. 1790) (“With respect to the 
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By 1800, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had gone so far as 
to recognize that gross negligence by a maritime pilot, although 
licensed by the state, was actionable as the tort of negligence—and 
that court was perfectly comfortable with using the word negligence
as though it were part of the common legal parlance, just a decade 
after the Judiciary Act of 1789. 249   Indeed, we find in a South 
Carolina case (and a state statute discussed in that case) a list of 
causes of action denominated as torts to include “trespass, trover, 
detinue, slander, or assault and battery or other action, arising merely 
from tort . . . .”250
 Within this milieu, a federal district court in 1796 had 
occasion to cite to the ATS in support of its exercise of subject 
matter jurisdiction over a case brought by a sea captain claiming 
ownership of a group of enslaved individuals.251  Federal District 
Judge Thomas Bee (who, in this nascent era of court reporting as 
averred to above reported his own case decisions), like the many 
courts of this era surveyed above, used the term tort within the ATS 
just as naturally and comfortably as the numerous cases used the 
word in a wide variety of other legal contexts—and, obviously taking 
the familiarity of his audience into account, had no need to pause 
                                                                                                                
damages, the evidence does not show the amount; but, this being a tort, the 
jury was not bound by exact calculation.”  (emphasis added)); accord
Hoomes v. Kuhn, 4 Call 274, 8 Va. 274 (Va. 1791) (in a civil suit for assault 
and battery, the court observed that it “never interferes with the verdict in an 
action of tort, unless the sum found is excessive”).  Far from being 
exceptional, references to torts in a manner that suggested an assumption that 
the decision’s audiences are both comfortable and familiar occur in other 
contexts as well.  See, e.g., Shelton v. Shelton, 1 Va. 53, 1 Wash. 53 (Va. 
1791) (“2 Vern. 747, was a hard case in itself, and I believe would not at this 
day be so determined, under its particular circumstances.  But the rule there 
laid down seems a good general one, ‘that where goods in a house are 
devised, a voluntary removal of them in the testator’s life time, without tort 
or fraud, is a revocation.’”  (emphasis added)). 
249  See Bussy v. Donaldson, 4 U.S. 206, 4 Dall. 206, 1 L.Ed. 802 (Pa. 
1800). 
250  State v. Huntington, 1 Tread. 325, 3 Brev. 111, 5 S.C.L. 111, 6 
S.C.L. 325, (S.C. Const. Ct. App. 1813).   
251  Bolchos v. Darrel, Bee 74, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795).  Judge Bee 
described the nature of the action as follows:  “Captain Bolchos captured and 
brought into this port a Spanish prize; on board of which were these slaves, 
formerly mortgaged to Savage, whose agent, [Edward] Darrel, by virtue of 
Savage’s mortgage, seized and sold them.”  Id.
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over the term as if it would be exceptional, unique, or different than 
it was typically used as a feature of America’s municipal law.252
There is nothing “alien” about Congress’s use of the word tort in the 
Judiciary Act; it means nothing more, nor nothing less, than the term 
meant in the currency of legal language of the colonial and the early 
                                                          
252 Id.  Judge Bee ultimately determined that a U.S.–France treaty 
precluded the return of the enslaved persons to the party claiming ownership 
by mortgage:   
It is certain that the law of nations would adjudge neutral 
property, thus circumstanced, to be restored to its neutral 
owner; but the 14th article of the treaty with France 
alters that law, by stipulating that the property of friends 
found on board the vessels of an enemy shall be 
forfeited.  Let these negroes, or the money arising from 
the sale, be delivered to the libellant.  
Id. at 811.  It is a bitter irony that the first time the ATS appears in reported 
decisions was in a case in which it was being invoked by slaveholders in aid 
of an alleged property right—a generation after Lord Mansfield’s decision in 
R v. Knowles, ex parte Somersett (1772) 20 State Tr 1, declaring slavery to 
be against the law of England and declaring that no one claimed to be a slave 
could be forcibly removed from England.  Id.  (“no master ever was allowed 
here to take a slave by force to be sold abroad because he had deserted from 
his service, or for any other reason whatever; we cannot say the cause set 
forth by this return is allowed or approved of by the laws of this kingdom, 
therefore the man must be discharged.”).  See Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Requiem 
For A Heavyweight, 67 ALB. L. REV. 965, 992 (citing R. KENT NEWMYER,
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC
368 (1985)) (noting that in the similar case of L’Amistad, Justice Story 
hewed closely to the legal linguistics of property law in freeing slaves 
escaped from Spanish claimants, viewing the issue before him “‘not [as] 
whether slavery in general was good, bad, moral, or legal but whether certain 
Spaniards owned certain Africans.’”).  Though clearly a man limited by his 
times, Judge Bee was nonetheless a remarkable jurist of the early Republic 
period, serving as the Federal District Judge in South Carolina for twenty-
two years.  See Thomas M. Stubbs, South Carolina’s Federal Justices and 
Judges, 8 S.C.L.Q. 403, 407 (1955–1956); see also Honorable Thomas Bee,
SINGLETONFAMILY.ORG http://www.singletonfamily.org/getperson.php?pers 
onID=I275635&tree=1 (last visited May 21, 2013) (noting that Judge Bee 
hosted President Washington at Bee’s Church Street home during a 1791 
visit to Charleston, and that President Washington had appointed Bee to the 
federal judgeship the year before). 
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Republic era.253  As Professors Bellia and Clark observe in their 
recent article elucidating the ATS within the context of “the law of 
nations” as it was understood in the eighteenth century: 
§ 14 of the Judiciary Act [of 1789] authorized 
federal courts to issue common law writs that “may 
be necessary for the exercise of their respective 
jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and 
usages of law.”  The First Congress soon thereafter 
provided in the Process Act of 1789 that “the forms 
of writs and executions . . . in the circuit and 
district courts, in suits at common law, shall be the 
same in each state respectively as are now used or 
allowed in the supreme courts of the same.”  
Although the Sosa Court correctly concluded that 
federal courts would employ the common law 
forms of action in ATS cases, the Court was 
apparently unaware that Congress had expressly 
directed federal courts to do so in these statutes.  
Thus, when Congress conferred jurisdiction upon 
federal courts to hear alien claims “for a tort only 
in violation of the law of nations or treaty of the 
United States,” it fully expected them to recognize 
and employ the common law causes of action then 
in use.254
What makes a tort one that also violates the law of nations is the 
character of the actors—such as a diplomat as the victim of a tort or 
the circumstances of its commission—such as the failure to protect 
an alien or her property while in American territory, i.e., the safe-
                                                          
253  For a differing viewpoint that states that it reaches an expansive 
interpretation that is nonetheless more faithful to the intent of Congress in 
adopting the Judiciary Act, see William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of 
the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the “Originalists”, 19 HASTINGS INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 221 (1996).  Without elaborating this footnote into a 
separate law review article of its own, the author simply notes here that, as 
reflected throughout this article, he disagrees with a number of Professor 
Dodge’s inferences, which he sees as inferences that, while drawn from 
eighteenth century materials, are drawn with a twentieth century perspective 
that creates cognitive dissonance. 
254  Bellia & Clark, supra note 232, at 545. 
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conduct theory of the ATS.255  Read in this way, the statute entirely 
avoids the problems expressed in a July 1789 letter from Edmund 
Pendleton256 to James Madison (that scholars only recently seem to 
                                                          
255  Thomas D. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 830 (2006); Bellia & Clark, supra note 232, at 540–45.  
As Professors Bellia and Clark observe, the statute  
was designed to redress ordinary torts committed by 
private US citizens against aliens.  The reason was 
simple: any intentional common law tort committed with 
force by a US citizen against the person or property of an 
alien constituted a violation of the law of nations and 
imposed an obligation on the United States to redress the 
injury or become responsible to the alien’s nation.  Thus, 
it was the basic party alignment—rather than some 
specific characteristic of the underlying intentional tort—
that triggered jurisdiction under the ATS. 
Id. at 542–43.  See also M. Anderson Berry, Whether Foreigner or Alien: A 
New Look at the Original Language of the Alien Tort Statute, 27 BERKELEY 
J. INT’L LAW. 316, 320–22 (2009) (arguing that the House emendation of 
“foreigner” from the Senate Bill to “alien” in the Judiciary Act as passed 
evidences an even further narrowing of the scope of the ATS to apply: 
“Considering Article III of the Constitution and the related provisions in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, along with the late eighteenth century legal, 
international, and general uses and definitions of “alien” and “foreigner”—in 
conjunction with relevant changes that occurred from the Senate’s 
handwritten draft of the judicial bill through subsequent codifications of 
relevant sections of the Judiciary Act of 1789—it is fair to say that an 
understanding of what Congress intended by the deceptively simple change 
from “foreigner” to “alien” was a narrowing of the ATS; making it available 
to “aliens” but not to “foreigners,” . . . in other words, making it available 
only to residents of the United States.”). 
256  While perhaps not as well known as the other Founders, Pendleton 
served through the cursus honorum of public service in the Revolutionary 
period and the early Republic, holding the offices, among others, of Member 
of the Virginia Committee of Revisors (with Thomas Jefferson), President of 
the Constitutional Ratifying Convention in Virginia, President of Virginia’s 
Committee of Public Safety (equivalent of Governor), and President (Chief 
Justice) of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.  See Wesley J. Campbell, 
Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1104, 1131 
(2012); David A. Erhart, “I Am In Control Here”: Constitutional And 
Practical Questions Regarding Presidential Succession, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L.
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have brought to the table, so to speak, in the discussion of the ATS’s 
original meaning): 
[W]hat is meant by a Tort?  Is it 
intended to include suits for the Recovery 
of debts, or on breach of Contracts, as a 
reference to the laws of Nations & Federal 
treaties seems to indicate; or does it only 
embrace Personal wrongs, according to 
[its] usual legal meaning, or violations of 
Personal or Official privilege of 
foreigners?  [I]n the last case it will 
probably be unexceptionable, in the 
former, very inconvenient.257
Looking at the ATS from a non-anachronistic viewpoint (i.e., 
from the viewpoint of contemporaries such as Judges Richard Peters 
and Thomas Bee and Congressman Edmund Pendleton) would 
greatly facilitate—and simplify—its application.  First, it would 
remove forms of liability based on negligence or absolute fault that 
would have been exotic, hybrid, and untenable to eighteenth century 
legal minds, which some courts have nonetheless imposed. 258
Second, it would end the elusive hunt set off by Sosa’s assumption 
that courts have a limited common law power to recognize new 
                                                                                                                
REV. 323, 336 n.115 (2013); William G. Merkel, A Founding Father on 
Trial: Jefferson’s Rights Talk and the Problem of Slavery During the 
Revolutionary Period, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 595, 603 n.20 (2012); Benjamin 
H. Barton, An Article I Theory of the Inherent Powers of the Federal Courts,
61 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 23 (2011); Michael J. Klarman, The Founding 
Revisited, 125 HARV. L. REV. 544, 570 n.153 (2011) (book review). 
257  Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (July 3, 1789), in
4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 1789–1800, 444, 446 (Maeva Marcus & James R. Perry eds., 1992), 
quoted in Bellia & Clark, supra note 232, at 518 n.352; also in Curtis A. 
Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 621 
(2002). 
258 See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009), and note 
especially the very strong dissent, 562 F.3d at 191, 194–95 (Wesley, J., 
dissenting) (“Instead of following and applying our framework, the majority 
substitutes in its place a compelling narrative,” employing “several sources 
that it believes demonstrate a customary norm against medical 
experimentation by non-state entities and weaves them together to reach its 
conclusion.”). 
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claims “based on the present-day law of nations” so long as they 
“rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized 
world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 
18th-century paradigms.” 259   Third, it would eliminate the “state 
actor” requirement that Sosa read into the ATS, 260  which is 
confusing, ahistorical, and has led to a tortured jurisprudence as ATS 
plaintiffs have tried to plead around it using “aiding and abetting” 
allegations.261
3. CAN A CORPORATION BE A PROPER ATS DEFENDANT?
Although the Second Circuit’s rationale in Kiobel—that 
corporations cannot be proper defendants in ATS corporations 
because “customary international law has steadfastly rejected the 
notion of corporate liability for international crimes, and no 
international tribunal has ever held a corporation liable for a violation 
of the law of nations”262—was both unprecedented263 and created the 
circuit split on which the Supreme Court relied on granting certiorari 
in the first place, the court did not decide that issue.264  The extensive 
                                                          
259 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004). 
260 See, e.g., Michael Giuseppe Congiu, From Rights to Remedies: The 
Alien Tort Claims Act, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the State Action 
Requirement, 2 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 427 (2005–2006). 
261 See, e.g., Michael Garvey, Comment, Corporate Aiding and 
Abetting Liability under the Alien Tort Statute: A Legislative Prerogative, 29 
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 381 (2009); see also James Morrisey, Presbyterian 
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.: Aiding and Abetting Liability 
under the Alien Tort Statute, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 144 (2011). 
262  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010), 
aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
263  Geoffrey Pariza, Genocide, Inc.: Corporate Immunity to Violations 
of International Law after Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 8 LOY. U. CHI.
INT’L L. REV. 229, 247 (2010–2011) (observing that “Kiobel marks a 
dramatic departure from the consensus among U.S. courts”). 
264  The Second Circuit stands alone in its view of per se exemption of 
corporations from the ATS.  Compare Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 
LLC, 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 
671 F.3d 736, 748–49  (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), vacated and remanded on 
other grounds, Rio Tinto PLC v. Sarei, NO. 11-649, 2013 WL 1704704 
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briefing by the parties, by amici, by the Solicitor General on behalf 
of the United States, and the oral argument held in February 2012 all 
went for naught.  It might very well seem nothing short of amazing—
indeed, appalling—that the Court appeared to have ducked the very 
issue on which the case was decided by the Second Circuit.  
Corporations have filed numerous motions to dismiss on the basis of 
the Second Circuit panel’s holding in Kiobel,265 and the outcome of 
those motions—indeed, the precedential effect of the Kiobel panel 
decision in the Second Circuit itself, where a large portion of ATS 
cases have been filed—remains unsettled, going on two and a half 
years after the Kiobel panel filed its maverick decision in October 
2010. 
The corporate liability issue,266 however, is a faux issue—one 
that, frankly, some Second Circuit judges, seemingly in frustration 
                                                                                                                
(U.S. Apr. 22, 2013); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11(D.C. Cir. 
2011); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008); 
Beanal v. Freeport–McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 163 (5th Cir.1999); 
Krishanthi v. Rajaratnam, No. 09–CV–05395, 2011 WL 2607108 (D.N.J. 
June 11, 2011).  See Kristin L. Leveille, Debate Two Hundred Years in the 
Making: Corporate Liability and the Presumption against Extraterritoriality 
under the Alien Tort Statute, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 653 (2012). 
265 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Karnes, Comment, Pirates Incorporated?:
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. and the Uncertain State of Corporate 
Liability for Human Rights Violations Under the Alien Tort Statute, 60 
BUFFALO L. REV. 823 (2012);  Pariza, supra note 263, at 253 n.231 (citing 
Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., No. 10 Civ 5646(JSR), 2010 WL 4967827 at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint alleging Chevron had 
aided Sadam Hussein commit human rights abuses because corporations 
cannot be liable for violations of international law)); see also Aziz v. Alcolac 
Inc., 2009 cv 00869, appeal docketed, No. 10-1908 (4th Cir. Dec. 8, 2010) 
(requesting dismissal on the grounds that corporations cannot be liable for 
violations of international law under the ATS); Flomo v. Firestone Natural 
Rubber Co., 744 F. Supp. 2d 810, 818 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (dismissing Liberian 
children’s claims of child labor, holding that corporate liability is not a rule 
of customary international law); Viera v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1:09-cv-0495-
RLY-DML, 2010 WL 3893791 at *5 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2010) (dismissing 
Brazilian residents’ claims of environmental contamination because ATS 
action may not be maintained against corporate defendant), aff’d on other 
grounds, 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011). 
266  Jonathan Drimmer, Resurrection Ecology and The Evolution Of The 
Corporate Alien Tort Movement, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 989 (2012); Lorelle 
Londis, Corporation Face of the Alien Tort Claims Act: How an Old Statute 
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with the inability of the Circuit to tame the corporate campaigns 
being waged using the ATS as the tool and the Southern District of 
New York as the workshop, 267  produced as if out of thin air. 268
While the Second Circuit opinion in Kiobel expended great energy 
on the contemporary debate269 over corporate liability for tort, neither 
Kiobel, nor Sosa for that matter, bother to look at a far more 
significant question, one most pertinent to the question of 
interpreting § 1350: Did American law recognize that a corporation 
had the juridical personality to be a proper defendant for a tort claim 
in a civil court of general jurisdiction?
The status of a variety of civil practice concepts and rules during 
the early Republic is challenging to discern.  Simultaneously, the 
country was passing from colonial status through revolution and war 
to an emergent independent nation.  At the same time, a distinct 
American legal system and experimental philosophy of law were 
arising and reifying.  The English Common Law was, 
simultaneously, employed as the foundation for the new legal order 
while at the same time being constrained, and in some quarters, even 
reviled, as a badge of colonial servitude.  These political and legal 
                                                                                                                
Mandates a New Understanding of Global Interdependence, 57 ME. L. REV.
141 (2005). 
267 See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116–17 (Cabranes, J.).  Judge Cabranes 
barely suppressed his apparent view that the ATS is little more than a 
demand for extortion followed by a press conference.  See id.  Corporate 
counsels have expressed even less generous views.  See, e.g., Andrew J. 
Pincus & Kevin Ranlett, Class Action Trends—U.S. Supreme Court—
Supreme Court Holds That Alien Tort Statute Doesn’t Apply 
Extraterritorially, MAYER-BROWN CLASS DEFENSE: CUTTING-EDGE ISSUES 
IN CLASS-ACTION LAW & POLICY, Apr. 17, 2013, 
http://www.classdefenseblog.com/2013/04/17/supreme-court-holds-that-
alien-tort-statute-doesnt-apply-extraterritorially/.  
268  Judge Cabranes took some umbrage at a similar suggestion made by 
Judge Pierre Leval, who concurred in the judgment but strongly dissented 
from the entirety of Judge Cabranes’s corporate liability analysis.  Kiobel, 
621 F.3d at 122 n.24.  Other commentators have observed that “Judge 
Leval’s lengthy concurrence is more of a scathing dissent insofar as it 
completely rejects the majority’s rationale.”  Pariza, supra note 259, at 241.  
269  See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A 
Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001). 
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changes were also accompanied by economic transformation.270  In 
no area was this more dynamic than in the origins of corporate form 
and corporate doctrine in American law.  As Morton Horowitz has 
observed, “[a]s late as 1780, colonial legislatures had conferred 
charters on only seven business corporations, and a decade later the 
number had increased to but forty.  However, in the last ten years of 
the eighteenth century, 295 additional corporate charters were 
granted.”271  Against this expanding milieu, the activities of these 
early corporations began to create conflict with other citizens who 
claimed injury as a result.  Among these injuries were various torts.  
Case law in this era is sparse, for the practices regarding the 
publication of court decisions had not taken hold, and the willingness 
to make financial commitments to such an enterprise had not yet 
taken the powerful hold they would in the second half of the 
nineteenth century.272  Yet, the court decisions accessible from the 
early Republic show clear support for corporate entity liability for 
tort.   
Riddle v. Proprietors of Merrimack River Locks and Canals273
provides an early example.  The corporate entity responsible for the 
construction and operation of a canal contended that a corporation 
was not a proper defendant in a boat owner’s claim for damages due 
to negligence (at the time called “trespass on the case”) in the 
construction and operation of the canal.  Citing English precedent 
from no less an authority than Lord Mansfield in Mayor of Lynn v. 
                                                          
270  The foregoing passage sprang full-formed from the author’s head, 
somewhat like the goddess Athena is said to have sprung from the head of 
Zeus, as the product of much reading and reflection since he first wrote on 
legal matters of the Colonial Era (Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Comment,
Compelling Governmental Interest Jurisprudence of the Burger Court:  A 
New Perspective on Roe v. Wade, 50 ALB. L. REV. 675 (1986)) and is 
perhaps symptomatic of a tendency in the author, brought to his attention by 
the late Dean John E. Ryan (1938–2008), to be “Van Detta on everything.” 
However, support for these ideas may generally be found in Douglas Arner, 
Development of the American Law of Corporations to 1832, 55 SMU L. REV.
23, 43-50 (2002). 
271 MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 
1780–1860, at 112 (1977) (citing J.S. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 24 (1917)). 
272  Van Detta, The Decline and Fall of the American Judicial Opinion, 
Part I, supra note 240, at 68–69 & n.80 (discussing the early history of case 
reporting practices). 
273  7 Mass. 169, 1810 WL 1012 (Mass. 1810). 
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Turner, the court rejected the entity’s arguments: “By this decision it 
is settled that case will lie against a corporation for neglect of a 
corporate duty, by which the plaintiff suffers.” 274   Similar early 
decisions came from courts in New Hampshire and New York.275
                                                          
274  Id. at 12 (citing Cowp. 86).   
275  Looking retrospectively, the Connecticut Supreme Court collected 
the following early authorities in an 1867 decision on the question of 
corporate liability for negligence: 
But when a corporation is charged with the performance 
of some public duty, as a condition, express or implied, 
upon which it holds its corporate powers; when a grant is 
made to a corporation of some special power or privilege 
at its request, out of which public duties grow; and when 
some special duty is imposed upon a corporation not 
belonging to it under the general law with its consent; in 
these and like cases, if the corporation is guilty of 
negligence in the discharge of such duty, thereby causing 
injury to another, it is liable to an action in favor of the 
party injured.  The Mayor of Lynn v. Turner, Cowper, 
86; Henly v. The Mayor of Lyme, 5 Bingham, 91; 
Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. Hamp., 284; Riddle v. 
Proprietors of Locks and Canals, 7 Mass., 187; Bigelow 
v. Randolph, 14 Gray, 543; Conrad v. Village of Ithaca, 
16 N. York, 158; Weet v. Trustees of the Village of 
Brockport, 16 N. York, 161. 
Jones v. City of New Haven, 34 Conn. 1, 8 (1867).  Obviously, the extent of 
corporate liability was to grow further, and to evolve past some of the 
formalistic distinctions that these earlier courts made about the 
circumstances under which a corporation could be held liable for negligence.  
This evolution started in the early Republic, with cases like Riddle, where 
courts began the process of moving away from the “model . . . [based on] the 
eighteenth century conception of a municipal corporation . . . .”  Horowitz, 
supra note 271, at 113.  Those seeking to exploit the benefits of the corporate 
form while shedding burdens were as assiduous in that era in that pursuit as 
their twenty-first century heirs; this is well-illustrated by Professor Horowitz: 
For a time, the corporation continued to occupy a 
twilight zone in the eyes of the law, sometimes 
conceived of as a public instrumentality, at other times 
regarded as a private entity.  While they sought to 
emphasize their recently acknowledged private nature 
when claiming constitutional protection of corporate 
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property, corporation continued to underline their public 
service functions in order to claim both the power of 
eminent domain and freedom from competition.  
Attempting to take advantage of the eighteenth century 
notion that public instrumentalities were protected from 
competition, corporations continued to argue both that 
their charters were grants of exclusive property interests 
and that economic rivalry was, in effect, a private law 
nuisance to property. 
Id. at 114.  Other early cases holding corporate entities liable to tort 
claimants include Weld v. Proprietors of Side Booms in Androscoggin River, 
6 Greenl. 93, 93, 6 Me. 93, 99, 1829 WL 291, *5 (Me. May Term 1829); 
Chesnut Hill & Springhouse Turnpike Co. v. Rutter, 4 Serg. & Rawle 6, 8 
Am. Dec. 675, McCready v. Philadelphia Guardians of the Poor, 9 Serg. & 
Rawle 94, 11 Am. Dec. 667, 1822 WL 1992 (Pa. 1822) (holding that the 
actions of trover and trespass for mesne profits lie against guardians of the 
poor who had been incorporated by act of the state assembly); Goshen & 
Sharon Turnpike Co. v. Sears 7 Conn. 86 (1829) (“[O]wners of public roads 
were always bound to repair them, and liable for damages occasioned by 
their neglect, as already shewn.  Corporations are artificial persons, and, for 
certain purposes, are considered as natural ones; e.g. they have been 
denominated occupiers of land, deemed inhabitants of cities, &c. and bound 
to repair bridges ratione tenuroe suoe terrarum.  They have sued, and have 
been sued, as citizens.”); see also Adams v. Wiscasset Bank, 1 Greenl. 361, 
1 Me. 361, 1821 WL 290 (Me.), 10 Am. Dec. 88 (1821) (finding 
corporations answerable to suit, citing authorities where the suit against the 
corporate defendant sounded in tort, but without specifically stating whether 
the suit sub judice sounded in tort); Lyman v. White River Bridge Co., 2 Aik. 
255, 16 Am. Dec. 205, 1827 WL 1380 (Vt. 1827).  In White, the Vermont 
Supreme Court provided some very clear-minded reasoning, reflective of 
what obviously was a strong current in American law flowing from the 
Republic’s birth: 
This case, and the others referred to, are entirely 
decisive, that a corporation, as such, may be sued in an 
action on the case for a tort. 
 But it is said, that, admitting that a corporation is 
liable in an action on the case for a tort, yet it cannot 
commit a trespass, or be answerable in that form of 
action.  But if an action on the case will lie against a 
corporation for a tort, there seems to be no good reason 
why trespass will not also lie.  The distinction between 
the two actions is not, whether the act complained of was 
accompanied with force, or whether there was an intent 
to do the injury; but whether the injury was the direct 
and immediate effect of the act complained of, or was 
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The federal courts of the early Republic, in cases such as the 1827 
federal circuit decision in Fowle v. Corporation of Alexandria, also 
appear to have taken cognizance of Riddle and its general principle 
of corporate liability for negligence, although continuing to treat 
“public” corporations more leniently than private ones.276
                                                                                                                
the collateral consequence of some act previously done.  
If a corporation is liable in case for consequential 
damages, proceeding from an act authorized by them, 
they may, and ought to be liable in trespass, for an 
immediate or direct injury, arising from an act authorized 
by them, or done by their command.  Indeed, there seems 
to be no difference, either on principle, or on technical 
grounds, as to the liability of a corporation, in actions of 
the case ex delicto, and actions of trespass. 
Lyman v. White River Bridge Co., 2 Aik. 255, 16 Am. Dec. 205, 1827 WL 
1380 (Vt. 1827).  Some courts, while recognizing corporate tort liability, 
excepted certain tort claims based on personal assault, battery, and trespass.  
See, e.g., Orr v. Bank of U.S., 1822 WL 4, *5, 1 Ohio 36, 43, 13 Am. Dec. 
588, 588, 1 Hammond 36, 36 (Ohio Apr. Term 1822).  The reasoning for 
decisions such as Orr was explained seventeen years later by the same court: 
The whole reasoning proceeds upon the inconsistency of 
suing a corporation in a form of action which 
presupposes the injury to have been committed with 
force and arms, and is, therefore, equally applicable to 
trespass upon the person and upon reality.  It is true the 
objection may be denominated a technical one; but even 
a technical rule, after it has become a general one, should 
for that reason alone be preserved, unless manifest 
inconvenience would be the consequence.  But here none 
such can result.  The individual members of the 
corporation would be liable in their personal capacity, if 
the circumstances of the case would warrant it. 
Foote v. City of Cincinatti, 9 Ohio 31, 33–34 (1839).  
276  Fowle v. Common Council of Alexandria, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 398, 
409–10 (U.S. 1830), aff’g, 3 Cranch C.C. 70, 9 F. Cas. 606, 3 D.C. 70, No. 
4993 (C.C.D. Dist. Col. Apr. Term 1827).  The case involved allegations that 
the municipal corporation had not required the statutory bond for a particular 
auctioneer, who failed to remit to the plaintiff the monies earned from 
auctioning goods for plaintiff, and who turned out to be entirely insolvent.  
The bond requirement was intended to provide a measure of compensatory 
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Any doubts about the state of the law must be resolved in favor 
of a general understanding that private corporations were held liable 
for torts, and the support comes from no less an authority than Chief 
Justice Marshall, writing in an appeal from the federal circuit 
decision in Fowle:
The common council has granted a license to carry 
on the trade of an auctioneer, which the law did not 
empower that body to grant.  Is the town 
responsible for the losses sustained by individuals 
from the fraudulent conduct of the auctioneer?  He 
is not the officer or agent of the corporation, but is 
understood to act for himself as entirely as a tavern 
keeper, or any other person who may carry on any 
business under a license from the corporate body.  
Is a municipal corporation, established for the 
general purposes of government, with limited 
legislative powers, liable for losses consequent on 
its having misconstrued the extent of its powers, in 
granting a license which it had no authority to 
grant, without taking that security for the conduct 
of the person obtaining the license, which its own 
ordinances had been supposed to require, and 
which might protect those who transacted business 
with the persons acting under the license?  We find 
no case in which this principle has been affirmed.  
That corporations are bound by their contracts 
is admitted; that money corporations, or those 
carrying on business for themselves, are liable for 
torts is well settled: but that a legislative 
corporation, established as a part of the 
government of the country, is liable for losses 
sustained by a non-feasance, by an omission of the 
corporate body to observe a law of its own, in 
which no penalty is provided, is a principle for 
which we can find no precedent.277
                                                                                                                
insurance to consignors, such as plaintiff, who were injured by an 
auctioneer’s misfeasance or nonfeasance. 
277 Fowle, 28 U.S. at 409–10 (emphasis added).  The distinction being 
drawn is between public corporations, “such as towns and societies,” versus 
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Thus, in the mind of one of the contemporaries politically and 
professionally connected to the drafters of the Judiciary Act of 
1789,278 which included the ATS, it was well settled “[t]hat money 
corporations, or those carrying on business for themselves, are liable 
for torts.”279
                                                                                                                
money corporations, which were the privately organized corporations for 
profit with which we are familiar today, as is evident from the explanation 
offered by Justice Ingersoll of the Supreme Court of Errors in Connecticut, 
in a case in which a money corporation’s power was challenged to enact “a 
by-law, duly made and passed by said company, on the 20th day of 
September, 1810 . . . providing, that at all future meetings of said company, 
‘the vote should be determined by the majority of the shares, which each 
vote should represent, either as his own property, or as attorney for other 
persons.”  State ex rel. Kilbourn v. Tudor, 5 Day 329, 1812 WL 131 (Conn.), 
5 Am. Dec. 162, at *3, *4–*5 (Conn. 1812) (noting that private, “money” 
corporations have the powers of judicial persons). 
278  John Marshall was serving in the Virginia House of Burgesses at the 
time, although he had been a delegate to Virginia’s ratification convention.  
The Committee in Philadelphia impressed to draft the Judiciary Act included 
Marshall’s fellow Virginia politician, Richard Henry Lee, as well as 
Ellsworth, Paterson, McClay, Strong, Basset, Few, and Wingate.  They were 
to “‘comprise a Committee, to bring in a bill for organizing the Judiciary of 
the United States.’”  Henry J. Bourguignon, The Federal Key To The 
Judiciary Act Of 1789, 46 S.C. L. REV. 647, 667 (1995). 
279   In an 1839 decision, Justice Bates of the Supreme Court of 
Delaware made the most well-written, thoughtful, and scholarly survey of 
the law of corporate liability for tort, as it was at the dawn of the Republic, as 
it had developed since that time, and as it was developing into the 
foreseeable future:  “it is much more reasonable to say that where a 
corporation is authorized by law to make a road, if any injury is done in the 
course of making that road by the persons employed under its authority, it 
shall be responsible in the same manner that an individual is responsible for 
the acts of his servants touching his business,” and that “there is no solid 
ground for a distinction between contracts and torts.”  Whiteman v. 
Wilmington & S.R. Co, 2 Harr. 514, 2 Del. 514, 1839 WL 172, at *5–*6 
(Del. Super. Ct. 1839).  Justice Bates rejected the corporation’s advocacy of 
a liability exemption, presciently observing that “[t]here is certainly nothing 
in reason or justice to entitle them to the exemption claimed.  Numerous as 
they have become, and constantly multiplying in the midst of us as they are, 
it would be unjust to society, as well as unreasonable in itself, to suffer them 
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This history—coupled with a proper interpretation of the ATS 
that treats “tort” and “violation of the law of nations” as separate 
elements—dispenses with the entirely fallacious reasoning provided 
in Judge Cabranes’ majority opinion for the Second Circuit panel in 
Kiobel.  Judge Leval’s elaborate critique of Judge Cabranes’ majority 
opinion is a most worthy one280—but, as he is wont to do, Judge 
Richard Posner boiled the many pages of Leval’s arguments down to 
a very straightforward set of propositions in an opinion for his circuit 
soundly and emphatically rejecting Judge Cabranes’ reasoning: 
The outlier is the split decision in Kiobel . 
. ., which indeed held that because 
corporations have never been prosecuted, 
whether criminally or civilly, for violating 
customary international law, there can’t 
be said to be a principle of customary 
international law that binds a corporation. 
The factual premise of the majority 
opinion in the Kiobel case is incorrect.  At 
the end of the Second World War the 
allied powers dissolved German 
corporations that had assisted the Nazi 
war effort, along with Nazi government 
and party organizations—and did so on 
the authority of customary international 
law. . . . The second of these [dissolution 
orders] found that I.G. Farben (the 
German chemical cartel) had “knowingly 
and prominently engaged in building up 
and maintaining the German war 
potential,” and it ordered the seizure of all 
its assets and that some of them be made 
“available for reparations.” 
And suppose no corporation had ever been 
punished for violating customary international law.  
                                                                                                                
to escape the consequences of direct injuries inflicted upon citizens by their 
agents in the prosecution of their business.”  Id.
280  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 154–88 (Leval, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
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There is always a first time for litigation to enforce 
a norm; there has to be.281
Judge Posner then proceeded to pose a thought-provoking question to 
which the Kiobel majority had seemed oblivious: 
We have to consider why corporations have 
rarely been prosecuted criminally or civilly for 
violating customary international law; maybe 
there’s a compelling reason.  But it seems not; it 
seems rather that the paucity of cases reflects a 
desire to keep liability, whether personal or 
institutional, for such violations within tight 
bounds by confining it to abhorrent conduct—the 
kind of conduct that invites criminal sanctions.  It 
would have seemed tepid to charge the Nazi war 
criminals with battery, wrongful death, false 
imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, fraud, conversion, trespass, medical 
malpractice, or other torts.  And it was natural in 
light of the perceived effect of the Nuremberg trials 
on German and international opinion concerning 
the type of practices in which Hitler’s government 
had engaged that a tradition would develop of 
punishing violations of customary international law 
by means of national or international criminal 
proceedings; it was a way of underscoring the 
gravity of violating customary international law.282
Judge Posner then illuminated several other points to bring his 
concise analysis full-circle, noting that “[t]he Alien Tort Statute, 
moreover, is civil, and corporate tort liability is common around the 
world,” and thus,  
[i]f a corporation complicit in Nazi war crimes 
could be punished criminally for violating 
customary international law, as we believe it could 
                                                          
281  Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th
Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). 
282 Id. at 1018. 
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be, then a fortiori if the board of directors of a 
corporation directs the corporation’s managers to 
commit war crimes, engage in piracy, abuse 
ambassadors, or use slave labor, the corporation 
can be civilly liable.283
The Supreme Court in Kiobel missed an opportunity to resolve 
the issue that brought the case to the Court in the first place, by 
simply citing, even in a footnote, Judge Posner’s reasoning with 
approval.  Of course, Judge Posner’s reasoning is persuasive of its 
own accord and does not need the sanction of a Supreme Court 
majority to establish its correctness.  Considering how closely the 
Second Circuit was divided on the plaintiffs-appellants’ en banc 
rehearing petition and that the Second Circuit prior to Kiobel had 
shown no difficulty with corporate liability under the ATS,284 one 
can only hope that going forward, the circuit will abandon the ill-
starred reasoning of the Kiobel panel and will choose no longer to 
follow it as circuit law, both in light of its outlier status and the 
evident disdain with which all nine Justices treated it by assuming 
corporate liability sub silentio in all four opinions they filed in Kiobel 
and by feeling no need to state the obvious—that Judge Cabranes 
was, as Judge Posner so politely put it, “incorrect.” 
4. LINGERING ISSUES FOR FORUM NON CONVENIENS, POLITICAL 
QUESTION DOCTRINE, ACT-OF-STATE DOCTRINE, EXHAUSTION OF 
LOCAL REMEDIES IN ATS SUITS—AND THE COUP DE GRÂCE OF 
FEDERAL PLEADING IN THE TWOMBLY-IQBAL AGE
Alstom and other MNEs are unlikely to face a Kiobel-like ATS 
suit over FDI after the Supreme Court has put to rest the notion of 
such “foreign-cubed” lawsuits.  However, E.U.-based MNEs might 
very well see ATS suits in scenarios in which the ATS claims might 
be said to “touch and concern the territory of the United States.”  
Such ATS suits would then shift the focus once again to the 
intractable and perennial procedural issues that are of unique 
uncertainty and complexity in ATS cases.  While some 
commentators have criticized the use of procedural dismissals in 
                                                          
283 Id. at 1019–21 (citations omitted). 
284 E.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 91–92 (2d 
Cir. 2000); see Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 174 (2d Cir.2009). 
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ATS cases,285 the procedural issues are not phantoms, but rather, are 
quite substantial in the context of any transnational litigation, 
especially those involving FDIs generally and even more 
specifically, FDIs that require substantial corporate cooperation and 
coordination with the host country’s government.  Among these 
unresolved issues are whether ATS claims require prudential 
exhaustion,286 are particularly vulnerable to forum non conveniens 
dismissals,287 raise non-judiciable political questions,288 are barred by 
the act-of-state doctrine, 289  require state-action to be proven; 290
whether the ATS statute of limitations should be “borrowed” from 
the ten-year period adopted under the TVPA; 291  and whether the 
executive branch should be invited to submit statements of interest in 
                                                          
285  Rosaleen T. O’Gara, The Use Of Procedural Dismissals Under The 
Alien Tort Statute, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 797 (2010). 
286  Ron A. Ghatan, The Alien Tort Statute and Prudential Exhaustion,
96 CORNELL L. REV. 1273 (2011). 
287   Nicholas A. Fromherz, A Call for Stricter Appellate Review of 
Decisions on Forum Non Conveniens, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUDIES L. REV.
527 (2012); P.J. Kee, Expanding the Duties of the Vigilant Doorkeeper: ATS 
Litigation and the Inapplicability of the Act of State Doctrine and Forum 
Non Conveniens, 83 TUL. L. REV. 495 (2009); Matthw R. Skolnik, Forum 
Non Conveniens Doctrine In Alien Tort Claims Act Cases: A Shell Of Its 
Former Self After Wiwa, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 187 (2002); Aric K. Short, 
Is the Alien Tort Statute Sacrosanct—Retaining Forum Non Conveniens in 
Human Rights Litigation , 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1001 (2000–2001). 
288  See, e.g., Amy Endicott, The Judicial Answer: Treatment of the 
Political Question Doctrine in Alien Tort Claims, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
537 (2010); Deborah Azar, Simplifying the Prophecy of Justiciability in 
Cases Concerning Foreign Affairs: A Political Act of State Question, 9 RICH.
J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 471 (2010). 
289   Samuel W. Bettwy, Subject Matter Jurisdiction And Foreign 
Governments: Act Of State, Sovereign Immunity, And The Alien Tort Statute,
80 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 221 (1986). 
290  Michael Barsa & David Dana, Three Obstacles to the Promotion of 
Corporate Social Responsibility by Means of the Alien Tort Claims Act: The 
Sosa Court's Incoherent Conception of the Law of Nations, the Purposive 
Action Requirement for Aiding and Abetting, and the State Action 
Requirement for Primary Liability, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 79 (2010). 
291   Alka Pradhan, The Statute of Limitations for Alien Torts: A 
Reexamination After Kiobel, 21 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 229 (2011). 
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every case and, if so, whether the federal courts should defer to 
them.292
The pleading regime inaugurated by the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 293  and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal294  imposes a “plausibility-pleading standard”—“[i]n reality,” 
Professor Arthur Miller observes, “a form of fact pleading by another 
name” 295 —requiring trial judges “to evaluate the strength of the 
factual ‘showing’ of each claim for relief and thus determine whether 
it should proceed.”296  This regime, now often known in colloquial 
brevity as Twiqbal,297 has spelled particular trouble for ATS cases,298
which are long on allegations but short on critical facts.299  Although 
                                                          
292  Margarita S. Clarens, Deference, Human Rights and the Federal 
Courts: The Role of the Executive in Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 7 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 415 (2007).  Compare Derek Baxter, Protecting The 
Power Of The Judiciary: Why The Use Of State Department “Statements Of 
Interest” In Alien Tort Statute Litigation Runs Afoul Of Separation Of 
Powers Concerns, 37 RUTGERS U. L.J.  807 (2006), with Brian C. Free, 
Awaiting Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.: Advocating The Cautious Use Of 
Executive Opinions In Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation, 12 PAC. RIM L. &
POL’Y J. 467 (2003). 
293  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
294  556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
295  Arthur R. Miller, From Conley To Twombly To Iqbal: A Double 
Play On The Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 20 (2010). 
296 Id. at 23. 
297  RHJ Med. Ctr., Inc. v. City of Dubois, 754 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730 
(W.D. Pa. 2010) (noting that Twombly and Iqbal are commonly referred to 
collectively as Twiqbal). 
298  James E. von der Heydt, Ripple Effects: The Unintended Change To 
Jurisdictional Pleading Standards After Iqbal, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 799,
834–35 (2012) (citing Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260–
61 (11th Cir. 2009)) (“The conspiracy allegations in Sinaltrainal invite 
comparisons with Iqbal itself, and its holding can be defended as another 
instance of identifying plaintiff’s failure to plead plausible facts adequate to 
activate a federal statute.”); Jordan D. Shepherd, Note, When Sosa Meets 
Iqbal: Plausibility Pleading in Human Rights Litigation, 95 MINN. L. REV.
2318 (2011); Civil Procedure–Pleading Requirements–Eleventh Circuit 
Dismisses Alien Tort Statute Claims Against Coca-Cola Under Iqbal’s 
Plausibility Pleading Standard, 123 HARV. L. REV. 580 (2009) (discussing 
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009)). 
299  Jean-Marie Simon, The Alien Torts Claims Act:  Justice Or Show 
Trials?, 11 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 4, 31-32 (1993). The difficulty is well 
illustrated in a recent federal district court decision applying Iqbal to ATS 
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some courts and commentators have urged that Twiqbal shouldn’t be 
rigorously applied to what they would characterize as jurisdictional 
pleading, the far more prevalent view subjects ATS claims to the 
rigors of Twiqbal, and many complaints are found wanting.  For 
example, even in Kiobel, the corporate liability and extraterritoriality 
issues were ultimately unnecessary to the decision of the case, for 
even Judge Leval, who of all the judges reviewing Kiobel was the 
most amicably disposed to the plaintiffs’ case, performed a 
                                                                                                                
claims in a case where Iraqi nationals filed a five-count complaint against 
eleven business entities, and one individual who allegedly owned and 
operated one of entities, alleging that Iraqi nationals were killed or seriously 
injured by defendants while defendants provided security services for United 
States government: 
[P]laintiffs must allege facts in their complaints that give 
rise to a plausible entitlement to relief for claims alleging 
war crimes pursuant to the ATS. In other words, the facts 
alleged in the complaint, assumed to be true, must create 
a plausible inference that each of the elements required
to state a claim for war crimes under the ATS is met.  
Thus, in order to prevail on defendants’ motions, the 
complaints must state facts that would allow a trier of 
fact plausibly to infer that defendant Prince (i) 
intentionally (ii) killed or inflicted serious bodily harm 
(iii) on innocent civilians (iv) during an armed conflict 
and (v) in the context of and in association with that 
armed conflict.  Plaintiffs have failed to meet this burden 
as to the ATS war crimes claims in each of the five 
cases. 
In re XE Services Alien Tort Litigation, 665 F. Supp. 2d 569, 589–90 (E.D. 
Va. 2009) (citation omitted) (emphases added); accord Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 
658 F.3d 388, 401–02 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding lack of factual particularity in 
complaint attempting to plead that chemical manufacturer violated ATS by 
selling thiodiglycol (TDG) to Iraqi government, which then used TDG to 
manufacture mustard gas to attack members of ethnic minority group); 
Weisskopf v. United Jewish Appeal-Fed’n of Jewish Philanthropies of N.Y., 
Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 912 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (finding that “there are no 
nonconclusory allegations that Defendants knew that Israelis were allegedly 
violating Plaintiff’s human rights and that Defendants intended to further 
those violations” and “[a]bsent well-pled allegations that Defendants 
intended to further a primary violation of the law of nations, Plaintiff’s ATS 
claims must be dismissed.”). 
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devastating Twiqbal analysis of the complaint and would, like every 
other judge who has looked at this course, dismiss it.  “When read 
together,” Judge Leval wrote,  
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 
Inc., and Iqbal establish a requirement that, for a 
complaint to properly allege a defendant's 
complicity in human rights abuses perpetrated by 
officials of a foreign government, it must plead 
specific facts supporting a reasonable inference 
that the defendant acted with a purpose of bringing 
about the abuses.300   
The challenge posed for putative ATS plaintiffs is daunting,301 and 
likely to continue to be the coup de grâce even to ATS cases that 
survive the other perils in the procedural gauntlet.302
                                                          
300  Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111, 188–89 (Leval, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citing Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 
Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir.2009)). 
301   See, e.g, Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1156 (In a case 
brought under the ATS by Relatives of victims killed during time of severe 
civil unrest in Bolivia against that country’s former president and former 
minister of defense, holding that  “[t]he Complaint in this case has all of the 
flaws against which Iqbal warned.”).  Congress has witnessed some stirrings 
around legislatively abrogating Iqbal, see Benjamin J. Williams, Case 
Comment, Civil Procedure—Pleading: The United States Supreme Court 
Revisits The Pleading Standard Under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
Making Surviving A Motion To Dismiss More Difficult—Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), 86 N.D. L. REV. 383, 402–03 (2009) (discussing 
Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009), 
introduced by Senator Specter).  Its lead sponsor, however, Senator Arlein 
Specter, lost a 2010 Senate re-election bid in the primaries, and passed away 
in 2011.  Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Arlen Specter, Pennsylvania Senator, Is Dead 
at 82, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2012, at A22.  The bill was not enacted in the 
2009 or 2010 Congressional sessions, and appears to have returned to 
Committee, not to again emerge.  See Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 
2010, S. 4054 (111th), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/1 
11/s4054; see also Michael R. Huston, Note, Pleading with Congress to 
Resist the Urge to Overrule Twombly and Iqbal, 109 MICH. L. REV. 415 
(2010).  Other efforts were to be directed at the Rules Advisory Committee.  
See Williams, supra note 301, at 403–05.  Because of the transactional costs 
involved and the priority of other issues, it is very unlikely that there will be 
legislation or a new federal rule to abrogate Twiqbal. See Paul Stancil, 
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5. NEW LIMITATIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN ATS CASES OVER FOREIGN MNES
THROUGH THEIR U.S. SUBSIDIARIES: THE SUPREME COURT GRANTS 
DIAMLERCHRYSLER’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI FROM THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT’S BAUMAN DECISION
The Supreme Court is poised to recognize another significant 
procedural limitation on ATS suits.  Having granted certiorari in 
DaimlerChrysler, A.G. v. Bauman,303 the Court is likely to take the 
next step on the path it hewed in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
                                                                                                                
Congressional Silence and the Statutory Interpretation Game, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1251, 1318–24 (2013).  
302  As Professor Miller describes the impact of Twiqbal:
Moreover, why were Twombly and Iqbal necessary?  The 
1986 summary judgment trilogy had made that motion a 
powerful pretrial terminator, especially when coupled 
with judicial control over the pretrial process.  For a 
quarter century, successive amendments to the Federal 
Rules had impressed limits on the extent of discovery, 
established mandatory disclosure, and narrowed the 
scope of what matters could be inquired into under the 
discovery rules.  For years *53 before Twombly and 
Iqbal, the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal rate had been rising.  
Judicial gatekeeping seemed to be working.  The 
Supreme Court’s coup de grace simply was not needed. 
Arthur R. Miller, supra note 295, at 52–53 (footnotes omitted); see Amanda 
Sue Nichols, Note, Alien Tort Statute Accomplice Liability Cases: Should 
Courts Apply the Plausibility Pleading Standard of Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177, 2221–25 (2008) (arguing that “ATS 
accomplice liability cases deal with similar types of claims and defendants as 
the Supreme Court envisioned when it established the plausibility standard, 
and thus it is legally consistent to apply the plausibility standard to ATS 
accomplice liability claims.”); see also Jeffrey M. Sweeney, Corporate 
Aiding And Abetting Under The Alien Tort Statute: A Proposal For 
Evaluating The Facial Plausibility Of A Claim, 56 LOY. L. REV. 1037, 1040–
41, 1058–69 (2010) (proposing standards by which courts can apply Twiqbal 
to ATS claims). 
303  Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011), 
cert. granted, 2013 WL 1704716 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2013). 
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S.A. v. Brown 304  of limiting exorbitant exercises of personal 
jurisdiction over foreign-based MNEs through their American 
subsidiaries.  While the court used Brown to answer the question, 
whether “foreign subsidiaries of a United States parent corporation 
amenable to suit in state court on claims unrelated to any activity of 
the subsidiaries in the forum State,”305 the Court will use Bauman to 
answer negatively the question whether a foreign parent corporation 
will have the subsidiary’s U.S.-contacts attributed to it as the basis 
for exercising general personal jurisdiction.  The Court decided some 
twenty-five years ago that service on the U.S. subsidiary of a foreign 
parent can be sufficient to satisfy the notice requirement for personal 
jurisdiction;306 that does not imply that the U.S. subsidiary’s contacts 
with the U.S. are sufficient to establish a basis for personal 
jurisdiction. 
Although Daimler AG is a German public stock company that 
does not manufacture or sell products, own property, or employ 
workers in the United States, and maintains a separate corporate 
identity from its subsidiaries,  
the Ninth Circuit nevertheless held that 
DaimlerChrysler, A.G., is subject to general 
personal jurisdiction in California—and can 
therefore be sued in the State for alleged human-
rights violations committed in Argentina by an 
Argentine subsidiary against Argentine residents—
because it has a different, indirect subsidiary that 
distributes Daimler AG-manufactured vehicles in 
California.307
As, among other things, an ATS case, Bauman represents a 
particularly important and especially expansive personal jurisdiction 
exercised through an implied agency theory.308  It is the paradigm for 
                                                          
304  131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
305 Id. at 2850. 
306 See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 
(1988). 
307  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, No. 
11-965 (Feb. 6, 2012). 
308  644 F.3d at 920.  The other relevant legal test in these scenarios—
the “alter-ego” test—clearly did not apply given the scrupulousness with 
which the parent and subsidiary observed their separate corporate identities.  
See id.
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triangulating (some might say, “bootstrapping”) extraterritorial 
personal jurisdiction in ATS cases.  That triangulation seeks to use 
the relationships of a foreign (e.g., E.U.) -based parent corporation to 
subsidiaries in a host country and to American subsidiaries to create 
a basis for hailing the parent into a U.S. court.  In this case, the 
triangulation seeks to use the American subsidiary to hail the 
German parent before the U.S. federal courts to defend claims  that a 
second subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz Argentina, “collaborated with 
state security forces to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill the Argentine 
workers and labor activists Argentina’s ‘Dirty War’”—a war which 
“began in 1976 when the military overthrew the government of 
President Isabel Peron and set up a military dictatorship.” 309   A 
unanimous Ninth Circuit panel held that 
In light of [the parent corporation’s] pervasive 
contacts with the forum state through [its 
Michigan-based, North American subsidiary], 
including the extensive business operations of that 
subsidiary, the interest of California in adjudicating 
important questions of human rights, our 
substantial doubt as to the adequacy of Argentina 
as an alternative forum, and the various issues 
discussed above with respect to Germany, we hold 
that [the parent] “has not met its burden of 
presenting a compelling case that the exercise of 
jurisdiction would not comport with fair play and 
substantial justice.”310
Federal courts in six of the circuits have rejected this 
jurisdictional logic.311  The Ninth Circuit itself narrowly declined 
                                                          
309  644 F.3d at 911–12 & n.3. 
310 Id. at 930. 
311 See Singh v. Daimler, AG, 902 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (E.D. Mich. 
2012) (discussing the disagreement and rejecting the Bauman agency 
approach); see, e.g., Epps v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 327 F.3d 642, 648–
49 (8th Cir. 2003); Dalton v. R & W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1363 (5th 
Cir. 1990); Estate of Thomson v. Toyota Motor Corp. Worldwide, 545 F.3d 
357, 362–63 (6th Cir. 2008); IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 
136 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J.); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, 
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rehearing, prompting seven circuit judges to dissent. 312 Brown
augurs the resolution of the issue in Bauman,313 which is likely to 
compliment Kiobel as another milestone in scaling back the long arm 
of American law’s span. 
B. IS THERE ANY HUMAN DIGNITY IN PURSUING HUMAN RIGHTS
CLAIMS THROUGH ATS LITIGATION THAT IS MARKED OVERWHELMINGLY 
BY THE ABSENCE OF ENFORCEABLE JUDGMENTS HOLDING ANY 
MALEFACTOR TO ACCOUNT? THE WARRANT OF CONGRESSIONAL 
ACTION
Judge Roger Robb’s observation in Tel-Oren serves more 
broadly as an appropriate epitaph to the insoluble problems of ATS 
litigation as it has been conceptualized since 1980—resulting in 
much litigation but little by way of finding of liability and virtually 
nothing by way of enforcement of the few liabilities found: “To grant 
the initial access in the face of an overwhelming probability of 
frustration of the trial process as we know it is an unwise step.”314
Can there be any dignity for victims of outrages that violate the 
law of nations through a statute primarily employed “more to draw 
attention to a political cause than to seek redress in U.S. courts”?315
Can there be any justice when precious few individuals or 
corporations accused of a spectrum of abhorrent conduct are ever 
actually adjudicated liable after a full trial,316 let alone compelled to 
                                                                                                                
N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 62–63 (4th Cir.1993); Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 
216 F.3d 1286, 1293–94 (11th Cir. 2000). 
312  Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 
2011) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of petition for en banc reh’g). 
313 Id. at 775–76, n.1. 
314  Tel-Oren v. PLO, 726 F.2d 774, 824 (Robb, J., concurring); see, 
e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society, and 
Corporate Responsibility, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 971 (2004). 
315  Simon, supra note 299.  
316  As Simon very emphatically pointed out, “since plaintiffs bringing 
lawsuits under section 1350 assume that a defendant will not appear in court 
and that a default judgment will be entered, the option of bringing 
unsubstantiated claims is even more appealing,” because “[p]laintiffs’ 
attorneys, knowing with some assurance that they will never be called upon 
to defend or support such allegations, have nothing to lose by including them 
in the complaint.”  Id. at 71.  Simon also observed a striking selectivity in 
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pay the penalties and to make restitution to their victims?  As an 
astute student commentator observed twenty years ago: 
[D]espite an understandable desire to redress 
terrible and often massive human rights violations, 
neither evidentiary standards, forum issues, nor 
questions of fairness have ever been raised as to the 
propriety of forcing foreign defendants to litigate 
uniquely testimonial and witness-based issues in 
U.S. courts.  Somehow the tragic nature of 
plaintiffs' claims implies that such questions are 
irrelevant.  The presumption seems to be that such 
lawsuits should go forward on political and moral 
grounds alone.  For plaintiffs’ attorneys who 
pursue it, the Alien Tort Statute has also become an 
unabashed beacon of political correctness.317
Yet, as the student commentator noted, we should “ask whether 
such cases should be filed at all, given the dearth of evidence they 
present,” 318  and the fact that “both the ability to obtain personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant and the potential media value are 
determinative of who will be served with a section 1350 lawsuit.”319
It bears worth pausing here to emphasize that the purpose of this 
aspect of an FDI analysis is not to defend corporate misconduct.  
Complicity of MNEs in the murder, torture, enslavement, wrongful 
detention, and other criminal abuses of human beings, e.g., “ethnic 
cleansing, genocide, torture” and other human rights violations, is 
serious, and intolerable. 320   Corporate social responsibility is a 
                                                                                                                
those ATS suits chosen to be filed in U.S. courts, seemingly one to exempt 
“politically leftist governments.”  Id. at 78 (footnotes omitted). 
317 Id. at 4. 
318 Id. at 31 (elaborating that “plaintiffs’ lawyers routinely file lawsuits 
devoid of any rudimentary adherence to evidentiary standards,” and rely on 
evidence that “contain[s]  hearsay and double hearsay problems.”). 
319  Id. at 32. 
320 See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 40, at 1146; see also Ronen 
Shamir, Between Self-Regulation And The Alien Tort Claims Act: On The 
Contested Concept Of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 635 (2004) (arguing that from the “perspective of a C[orporate] 
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modern, and overdue, movement 321  that gives MNEs the 
opportunities, as well as the incentives, to self-police and to 
participate in the formulation of a legal regime to effectively regulate 
MNE conduct,322 and to the extent MNEs fail to do so, gives home- 
and host-state governments the standards by which to legislate 
compliance.323  But such regulation should be more predictable and 
                                                                                                                
S[ocial] R[esponsibility] field that exists above and beyond any concrete 
judicial outcome, the career of the [Alien Tort Statute] cases, by forcing the 
issue of corporations and human rights into the open, already shapes 
corporate behavior because it forces corporations to reflect upon, if not to 
institutionalize, human rights-related issues”). 
321 See, e.g., Donald J. Kochan, Legal Mechanization of Corporate 
Social Responsibility Through Alien Tort Statute Litigation: A Response to 
Professor Branson with Some Supplemental Thoughts, 9 SANTA CLARA J.
INT’L L. 251, 254 (2011) (“The corporate social responsibility discussion 
raises three principal issues about how a moral corporation lives its life: how 
a corporation chooses its self-interest versus the interests of others, when and 
how it should help others if control decisions may harm the shareholder 
owners, and how far the corporation must affirmatively go to help right the 
perceived wrongs in the world in which it operates.”). 
322 See, e.g., Norbert Horn, International Rules for Multinational 
Enterprises: The ICC, OECD, and ILO Initiatives 30 AM. U. L. REV. 923 
(1980–1981); A.A. Fatouros,  On the Implementation of International Codes 
of Conduct: An Analysis of Future Experience, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 941 
(1980–1981); Richard D. Kauzlarich, The Review of the 1976 OECD 
Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 30 
AM. U. L. REV. 1009 (1980–1981).  But see Timothy W. Stanley, 
International Codes of Conduct for MNC's: A Skeptical View of the Process,
30 AM. U. L. REV. 973 (1980–1981). 
323  A leading model is the Guidelines for MNEs that the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development issued originally in 1976.  
Daniel Plaine, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 11 INT’L L.
339, 339–41 (1977); Jernej Letnar ?erni?, Corporate Responsibility for 
Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, 3 HANSE L. REV. 77 (2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1317263; see also Ashley L. Santner, A Soft Law 
Mechanism For Corporate Responsibility: How The Updated OECD 
Guidelines For Multinational Enterprises Promote Business For The Future,
43 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 375, 376–77 & nn.4–5 (2008).  For a detailed 
discussion of how forty-two OECD nations, including the United States and 
France, have implemented the Guidelines by establishing National Contact 
Points, see Leyla Davarnejad, In The Shadow Of Soft Law: The Handling Of 
Corporate Social Responsibility Disputes Under The OECD Guidelines For 
Multinational Enterprises, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 351 (2011); Christopher N. 
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clearly stated than the common law-style case adjudication that 
courts have attempted under the ATS, particularly where that 
adjudication occurs in the courts of a country other than that where 
the MNE’s conduct, or the effects of the MNE’s conduct, 
transpired. 324   A legislative process, like the one that led to 
Congress’s enactment of the TVPA, 325  allows for a considerably 
more nuanced and holistic assessment of the wide range of relevant 
economic and foreign relations factors implicated in such law-
making than courts can even approach in case-by-case 
adjudication.326  The subjects to which courts have been asked to 
                                                                                                                
Francoise, A Critical Assessment of the United States’ Implementation of the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 223 (2007); see also Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, U.S. 
Dep’t of State, OECD: U.S. National Contact Point,
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/oecd/usncp/us/index.htm.   In addition, the 
governments of developed nations can encourage developing-country 
governments to regulate more responsibly within their own borders by using 
the existing network of international trade-statuses and international trade 
treaties as a system of pressures and rewards for reform.  See, e.g., Ian 
Urbina, Unions Press To End Special Trade Status For Bangladesh, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2013, at B1 (“After several deadly factory disasters in 
Bangladesh — including the collapse of an eight-story garment factory last 
month that left at least 1,127 people dead — labor advocates are stepping up 
pressure on the Obama administration, calling for it to convey its disapproval 
of working conditions in the country by revoking its special trade status.”) 
324  Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 40, at 1147 (noting importance of 
goal to “eliminate[e] . . . distorting economic effect by ensuring that all firms 
are subject to the same standard of liability for torts committed in a particular 
place”); see also Jack L. Goldsmith III, Note, Interest Analysis Applied To 
Corporations:  The Unprincipled Use Of A Choice Of Law Method, 98 YALE 
L.J. 597 (1989). 
325  Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 
Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)). 
326 See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
472–73 (6th ed. 2003) (explaining the general rule of mandatory exhaustion: 
“A claim will not be admissible on the international plane unless the 
individual alien or corporation concerned has exhausted the legal remedies 
available to him in the state which is alleged to be the author of the injury.  
This is a rule which is justified by practical and political considerations. . . 
.”).  Compare Ghatan, supra note 282, at 1274–75, 1292–93, 1297–1300 
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extend the ATS are far better committed to “a modern Congress that 
ma[kes] clear its desire that the federal courts police the behavior of 
foreign individuals and governments” in a statute that “embod[ies] a 
legislative judgment that is” both “current” and “clear.” 327
Moreover, the American people, through their elected 
representatives, should be given the opportunity to be heard on 
whether, and to what extent, they want U.S. courts opened to ATS 
litigation, rather than leaving the matter entirely to the preferences of 
federal judges and other “litigation elites.”328  While recent attempts 
at such legislation have gone nowhere,329 the Supreme Court’s 2013 
decision in Kiobel should rekindle an effort for which scholars called 
for a generation ago, 330  and continue to call for today. 331   Thus, 
                                                                                                                
(recommending the that the reach of the ATS be limited by requiring 
prudential exhaustion of local remedies “in which there is a weak nexus to 
the United States” and “alleged violation of norms that are not Peremptory,” 
which “could greatly reduce the number of claims available to plaintiffs 
under the ATS”), with Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1225–26, 
1235–36 (9th Cir. 2007) (Bybee, J., dissenting) (arguing that international 
law requires exhaustion of local remedies as a condition to bringing an 
international cause of action in an American tribunal, and domestic law 
should require it), vacated en banc on other grounds, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
327   Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 813 (Bork, J., concurring); see John B. 
Bellinger III, Enforcing Human Rights In U.S. Courts And Abroad: The 
Alien Tort Statute And Other Approaches, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 5–6 
(2009). 
328  Judith Kimerling, Oil, Contact, And Conservation In The Amazon: 
Indigenous Huaorani, Chevron, And Yasuni, 24 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 43, 97–98 (2013). 
329  See, e.g., Mariani, supra note 158, at 1384 & n.1 (2008) (citing S. 
1874, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 1870, 109th Cong. Rec. S11433-S11436 (Oct. 
17, 2005)); Petty, supra note 167, at 185, 217–19 (2009); Lucien J. Dhooge, 
A Modest Proposal to Amend the Alien Tort Statute to Provide Guidance to 
Transnational Corporations, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 119 (2007); 
see also Roger Alford, What is Feinstein Thinking in Amending the ATS?, 
OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 22, 2005, 10:45 AM), http://lawofnations.blogsp 
ot.com/2005/10/what-is-feinstein-thinking-in-amending.html; Roger Alford, 
Feinstein Withdraws ATS Amendment, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 26, 2005, 8:05 
AM), http://lawofnations.blogspot.com/20 05/10/feinstein-withdraws-ats-
amendment.html. 
330 See, e.g., Kenneth C. Randall, Further Inquiries Into The Alien Tort 
Statute And A Recommendation, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 473, 511–32 
(1986). 
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MNEs, such as Alstom, should embrace the opportunity to this 
debate and contribute meaningfully to it,332 for a domestication of the 
ATS in Kiobel will not pretermit the need for the kinds of claims 
found in ATS cases to be addressed.  Any evaluation of Alstom’s 
risk posed by its FDIs in Israel—whether the Jerusalem Light Rail 
Project in the West Bank Occupied Territories or a hypothesized 
wind-energy project in the disputed Golan Heights—should include a 
discussion of the larger question whether Alstom will seek to 
influence the policy and laws of its host nations, as well as its home 
state through participation in political and legislative processes and 
in litigation over the scope of laws that may impact Alstom’s present 
and future business strategies.333
However, candor requires observing that Congress cannot be 
hoped to enact ATS amendments anytime soon when it cannot even 
confirm sufficient numbers of judges to the very federal courts that 
are to hear cases under an amended statute.334  Thus, it is becoming 
                                                                                                                
331 See Brittany A. Shugart, Relieving The Vigilant Doorkeeper: 
Legislative Revision Of The Alien Tort Statute In The Wake Of Judicial 
Lawmaking, 22 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOCIAL JUSTICE 91 (2012); Tyler G. 
Banks, Note, Corporate Liability Under The Alien Tort Statute: The Second 
Circuit’s Misstep Around General Principles Of Law In Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 227, 279 (2012); Garvey, 
supra note 261. 
332 See, e.g., Lauren A. Dellinger, Corporate Social Responsibility: A 
Multifaceted Tool to Avoid Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation While 
Simultaneously Building a Better Business Reputation, 40 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 
55 (2009). 
333  For example, several MNEs seek to influence the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s rulings on extraterritoriality, as well as corporate amenability, in 
Kiobel.  Brief for BP America et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2012 WL 392536, at 
*1–*2 (Feb. 3, 2012). 
334 See, e.g., Editorial, Courts Without Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 
2013, at SR10 (“Of 856 federal district and circuit court seats, 85 are 
unfilled—a 10 percent vacancy rate” with “[m]ore than a third of the 
vacancies hav[ing] been declared ‘judicial emergencies’ based on court 
workloads and the length of time the seats have been empty.”); Geoffrey W. 
Peters, G.O.P. Delays on Nominees Raise Tension, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 
268                          SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF             [Vol. 9.2 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS
more common for MNEs to take the lead in establishing the kinds of 
industry standards and protocols that may prevent the kinds of 
tragedies that give rise to ATS litigation, an approach most recently 
exemplified by the agreement of “several of the world’s largest 
apparel companies . . . to a landmark plan to help pay for fire safety 
and building improvements” in the wake of the deaths of 1100 
workers when a garment factory in Bangladesh collapsed in April 
2013.335  An MNE like Alstom, who has so much at risk in FDIs, 
should take the lead in establishing practices and compliance 
programs that minimize the kinds of risks that will grow into ATS 
claims if they eventuate.336
III. KIOBEL AS A PYRRHIC VICTORY? THE EXAMPLE OF 
CHEVRON’S DECISION TO DEFEND ENVIRONMENTAL TORT 
LITIGATION IN ECUADOR INSTEAD OF MANHATTAN; OR, THE 
ROAD TO CHEVRON CORP. V. NARANJO
Some commentators on Kiobel have asserted that corporate 
counsel are everywhere celebrating the demise of “foreign-cubed” 
                                                                                                                
2013, at A1;  Carl Hulse, Blocked Bids to Fill Judgeships Stir New Fight on 
Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2013, at A1. 
335  Steven Greenhouse & Jim Yardley, Global Retailers Join Safety 
Plan For Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2013, at A1. 
336  For an excellent discussion of this approach, see David Scheffer 
&Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of 
Corporate Liability under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a 
Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 334, 
334–35, 396–97 (2011) (arguing that “[t]he ultimate goal should be to make 
social and human rights issues an integral part of a corporation's business 
strategy in order to benefit the company and its stakeholders”); see also 
David Shea Bettwy The Human Rights And Wrongs Of Foreign Direct 
Investment: Addressing The Need For An Analytical Framework, 11 RICH. J.
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 239 (2011) (advocating that “because FDI can result in 
positive, though not automatic, human rights impacts, international efforts to 
develop universal codes of corporate social responsibility should be 
complemented by efforts to develop a methodology for objectively gauging 
and predicting impacts of FDI on human rights”); Han, supra note 62 
(advocating that China’s MNEs be mindful in planning FDIs of the risks of 
ATS suits and make strategic plans to avoid creating the liabilities in the first 
place). 
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ATS suits. 337  Yet, having “freed” themselves from an American 
federal courtroom, is there really cause even for optimism—let alone 
jubilation—among corporate counsel and corporate boards at MNEs?  
One might very well think that—until the cautionary tale of another 
MNE, Chevron (which got exactly what it demanded when Judge Jed 
Rakoff liberated the corporation from an American courtroom but 
demanded from the corporation a written agreement “to being sued 
on these claims (or their Ecuadorian equivalents) in Ecuador, to 
accept service of process in Ecuador, and to waive for 60 days after 
the date of this dismissal any statute of limitations-based defenses 
that may have matured since the filing of the instant Complaints” ),338
is considered, compared, and contrasted. 
Ecuador provided the setting where Texaco and Gulf Oil, years 
before Chevron absorbed them, were busy exploring for and 
exploiting the oil deposits their geologists had identified in Ecuador’s 
Amazon rainforest.339  In 1992, Ecuador brought an end to the leases 
that permitted exploration and exploitation, and a full panoply of 
international dispute resolution arose.340  Ecuador—more precisely, 
the Superior Court of Justice of Nueva Loja (Lago Agrio) and the 
Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbios—also provided the setting 
for the court proceedings to which Chevron agreed in return for the 
forum non conveniens dismissal in New York, which have become 
                                                          
337 See, e.g., Julian Ku, SCOTUS Votes 9-0 that Corporations Cannot 
Be Sued Under ATS for Extraterritorial Acts Without U.S. Interest At Stake,
OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 17, 2013, 11:52 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/1 
7/scotus-votes-9-0-that-corporations-cannot-be-sued-under-ats-for-
extraterritorial-acts-without-u-s-interest-at-stake/. 
338  Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); 
see Van Detta, Justice Restored, supra note 3, at 94–102 (2003) (discussing 
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated and 
remanded sub nom; Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1998), forum 
non conveniens motion again granted on remand, 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001)).   
339  Kimerling, supra note 328.  
340  Jason Burke, Defining Investor Confidence: Avoiding Interpretive 
Uncertainty in Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, 34 B.C. INT’L COMP. L. REV. 463 
(2011). 
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known as the Lago Agrio Litigation.341  As one journalist wrote of 
the litigation: 
By the time the judge, Nicolás Zambrano, 
issued his decision [in the suit that the Ecuadorian 
plaintiffs had originally tried to file in New York 
but whose choice of forum was ousted by 
Chervon’s invocation of forum non conveniens], 
the case had been going on for eighteen years.  It 
had outlasted jurists on two continents.  Zambrano 
was the sixth judge to preside in Ecuador; one 
federal judge in New York had died before he 
could rule on the case.  The litigation even 
outlasted Texaco: in 2001, the company was 
subsumed by Chevron, which inherited the lawsuit.  
The dispute is now considered one of the nastiest 
legal contests in memory, a spectacle almost as 
ugly as the pollution that prompted it.342
The judgment was for $9.5 billion, and in addition, Judge 
Zambrano 343  ordered Chevron to issue within two weeks of the 
judgment’s entry an apology to the Ecuadorian people whose 
environment, families, and persons were harmed by Texaco’s 
activities in Ecuador—or face a doubling of the judgment to $19 
billion.344  Chevron issued no apology.345  That Chevron appears not 
                                                          
341   For a recently published overview discussing the Lago Agrio 
Litigation and the various Ecuadorian courts and proceedings involved in the 
determination, see Kimerling, supra note 328, at 73–79 & n. 74.  For 
Chevron’s side of the story, see http://www.chevron.com/ecuador/.  For the 
plaintiffs’ side of the story, see http://chevrontoxico.com/. 
342  Keefe, supra note 17. 
343  Lawrence Hurley, Judge at Heart of Landmark Oil Pollution Case 
Unfazed by Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2011, http://www.nytim 
es.com/gwire/2011/05/17/17greenwire-judge-at-heart-of-landmark-oil-
pollution-case-89753.html?pagewanted =all.  
344  Simon Romero & Clifford Krauss, Ecuador Judge Orders Chevron 
to Pay $9 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/02/15/world/americas/15ecuador.html; Luis Angel Saavedra, Chevron 
Trying to Avoid Historic Ecuador Verdict, NOTIEN, Mar. 24, 2011, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1928/12370.  
345 Chevron Wins Halt to $18 Billion Judgment in Ecuador Pollution 
Case, ENV’T NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 7, 2011, http://www.ens-newswire. 
com/ens/mar2011/2011-03-07-02.html.  
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to have grasped, or at least to have dismissively disregarded, the 
motivators, attitudes, and perspectives of the Ecuadorian 
stakeholders, has been eloquently elucidated elsewhere. 346   For 
present purposes, it suffices to observe that Chevron instead mounted 
a multi-forum, multi-front campaign against the integrity of the 
Ecuadorian courts, the Ecuadorians’ counsel,347 and the Ecuadorian 
proceeding. 348   As the plaintiffs’ lawyers considered strategically 
where to seek enforcement of the judgment,349 Chevron unleashed a 
                                                          
346  Theodore MacDonald, Amazonian Indigenous Views on the State: A 
Place for Corporate Social Responsibility?, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
REV. 439 (2010).  Other perspectives on the Ecuador litigation emerge from 
viewing it through the three-principle framework established by John 
Ruggie, Special Representative to the U.N. Secretary General, who 
introduced them in a report to the U.N. Human Rights Council.  See Chris 
Jochnik & Nina Rabaeus, Business and Human Rights Revitalized: A New 
UN Framework Meets Texaco in the Amazon, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
REV. 413, 420–21 (2010). 
347  Jonathan Stempel, Chevron Grills U.S. Lawyer In $19 Bln Ecuador 
Pollution Case, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS &
INSIGHT, Apr. 16, 2013, http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/New_Yor
k/News/2013/04_-_April/Chevron_grills_U_S__lawyer_in_$19_bln 
_Ecuador_pollution_case/ (discussing Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 11 Civ 
.0691 LAK, (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).  Published opinions in the ongoing case 
include Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 840 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); In 
re Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd sub nom., 
Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2011); In re Chevron 
Corp., 736 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Chevron Corp., 749 F. 
Supp. 2d 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 141 
(S.D.N.Y.2 010), aff'd sub nom., Lago Agrio v. Chevron Corp., 409 F. App’x 
393 (2d Cir. 2010); Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Donziger I”) (granting preliminary injunction); Chevron 
Corp. v. Donziger, 800 F. Supp. 2d 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)  (“Donziger II”) 
(granting separate trial and expedited discovery on claim for declaratory 
judgment).  
348 See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, The Chevron-Ecuador Dispute, 
Forum Non Conveniens, and the Problem of Ex Ante Inadequacy, 1 
FORDHAM J. COMPLEX LITG. (forthcoming), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2245889.  
349  To date, lawyers for the plaintiffs have filed judgment enforcement 
proceedings against Chevron in three different countries: Canada, Brazil, and 
Argentina.  Kimerling, supra note 328, at 96–97 & nn.153–55.  On May 1, 
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heavy barrage of litigation on two fronts: “a lawsuit against the 
plaintiffs and their lawyers in federal court in New York, and an 
arbitration proceeding against Ecuador in The Hague,” and each of 
the cases is  “based on allegations of fraud and other misconduct by 
the Lago Agrio plaintiffs’ legal team, allegations of improper 
collusion between representatives of the plaintiffs and Ecuadorian 
government officials, and allegations of systemic failures in the 
administration of justice in Ecuador.”350  The arbitration proceeded 
under a U.S.–Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT),351 and it 
has yielded an interim award “directing Ecuador to ‘take all measures 
at its disposal to suspend or cause to be suspended the enforcement 
or recognition within or without Ecuador of any judgment’ against 
Chevron in the Lago Agrio lawsuit, pending further order by the 
panel,”352 to which the Lago Agrio court has declined to follow, 
because “under Ecuadorian law, based on international commitments 
and constitutional law—the obligations of the state pursuant to 
                                                                                                                
2013, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice denied enforcement against 
assets of Chevron’s Canadian subsidiaries on the grounds of their separate 
corporate identities.  Linda Nguyen, Ontario Judge Dismisses $19B Ecuador 
Environmental Judgment Against Chevron, THE CANADIAN PRESS, May 1, 
2013, http://ca.news.yahoo.com/ontario-judge-dismisses-19b-ecuador-
environmental-judgment-against-235357906.html.  By contrast, an Argentine 
judge froze Chevron’s local assets pending the outcome of judgment 
enforcement proceedings, Emily Schmall, Argentina: Chevron’s Assets Are 
Frozen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at A9, a ruling affirmed by an Argentine 
appeals court, Guido Nejamkis, Argentine Court Upholds Freeze On 
Chevron Assets, REUTERS, Jan. 30, 2013, http://www.reuters.co 
m/article/2013/01/30/us-chevron-argentina-idUSBRE90T1AI20130130, 
which has prompted Chevron to threaten pulling out of a major joint-venture 
with Argentina’s recently renationalized state oil monopoly, Yacimientos 
Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF).  See Argentina: YPF Boss Hits Out At Chevron 
Embargo Order, LA NACION (ARG.), Mar. 28, 2013, 2013 WLNR 8124719.  
Meanwhile, Chevron has sought leave to join in its New York lawsuit the 
Washington, D.C. firm that is leading efforts to enforce the judgment.  See
Mark Singleton, Chevron Responds To Legal Attacks By Washington Law 
Firm Patton Boggs With Allegations Of Malicious Prosecution, Fraud And 
Deceit, INT’L BUS. TIMES NEWS, May 14, 2013, 2013 WLNR 11822182. 
350  Kimerling, supra note 328, at 77–78 (footnote omitted). 
351  Bilateral Investment Treaty with the Republic of Ecuador, U.S.–
Ecuador, Aug. 27, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-15.  For a discussion of the 
role and impact of BITs and Free Trade Agreements on FDI decisions, see
Van Detta, supra note15, at 36–43. 
352  Kimerling, supra note 324, at 82-84 & nn.113–21. 
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human rights norms take precedence over international commercial 
obligations and the authority of an arbitral panel,” and “the most 
recent arbitral order directing the court to take all ‘necessary 
measures’ to prevent enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment 
conflicted with the court’s obligation, as part of the State, to 
guarantee effective judicial remedies.’”353
Then there is Chevron’s New York litigation against plaintiffs’ 
counsel.  Before describing that litigation, a moment’s pause is 
worthwhile to reflect that one must consider the effect on all 
economic aspects of a company’s sustenance and growth when there 
is pending litigation and considerable uncertainty about the size of 
potentially massive exposure—a problem that Chevron has faced for 
many years since it acquired Gulf and Texaco.354  The litigation has 
been filled with the same kinds of tactics and urgency to disengage 
the MNE from the American courtroom—and the resulting, 
unexpected, and potentially catastrophic challenges of litigation in 
Ecuador.355
Chevron seeks to diffuse investor concern through an aggressive 
RICO-based lawsuit in the Southern District of New York,356 and to 
“turn” American courts “against” the Ecuadorian plaintiffs.357  The 
strategy has succeeded in stalling efforts to enforce the judgment 
outside of Ecuador—which the plaintiffs must, since Chevron no 
                                                          
353  Id. at 85. 
354  Jason Burke, Defining Investor Confidence: Avoiding Interpretive 
Uncertainty in Chevron Corp. v Ecuador, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
463 (2011). 
355  Donald K Anton, Public International Law and International Civil 
Litigation: From Ecuador to the United States and Back (Twice)–Chevron v. 
Donziger (Nov. 15, 2011) (forthcoming), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1960251.  
356  Lawrence Hurley, Chevron’s RICO Lawsuit in Pollution Case Part 
of Wider Legal Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.c 
om/gwire/2011/02/02/02greenwire-chevrons-rico-lawsuit-in-pollution-case-
part-o-68778.html.  
357 Id. (“The lawsuit fits squarely within Chevron's strategy of seeking 
to turn U.S. courts against the plaintiffs.”).  
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longer has assets in the country358—but it may be doing as much 
harm with the investing public as good, as amply evidenced by 
respected media coverage of Chevron’s RICO litigation: 
An environmental case that has pitted Chevron 
against Ecuadorean Amazon villagers for two 
decades has taken another bizarre twist, with an 
American consulting firm now recanting research 
favorable to the villagers’ claims of pollution in 
remote tracts of jungle. 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he plaintiffs claim that Chevron 
pressured Stratus to retract its assessment in 
exchange for dismissal of legal claims in a 
countersuit filed by Chevron made against the 
firm—claims that could have pushed the consulting 
business into bankruptcy. 
“Stratus deeply regrets its involvement in the 
Ecuador litigation,” the firm said.  It remains 
unclear whether this development with Stratus will 
have much impact on Chevron’s appeals, because 
the judge also based his ruling on other 
environmental assessments.  The judge ruled that 
back in the 1970s, Texaco had left an 
environmental mess in oil drilling operations while 
operating as a partner with the Ecuadorean state oil 
company, and that Chevron, which bought Texaco 
in 2001, must apologize for and was liable for the 
damage. 
. . . . 
Chevron has been playing hardball for at least 
four years.  The company produced video 
recordings from pens and watches wired with 
bugging devices that suggested a bribery scheme 
surrounding the proceedings and involving a judge 
                                                          
358  Professor Kimerling gives a very thorough and well-documented 
account of Chevron’s New York litigation.  See Kimerling, supra note 328, 
at 85–98.  
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hearing the case.  An American behind the secret 
recordings was a convicted drug trafficker. 
But the oil company appeared to gain the 
upper hand three years ago when it won a legal bid 
to secure the outtakes from a documentary about 
the case, “Crude,” in which Mr. Donziger was 
shown describing the need to pressure a 
Ecuadorean judge and boasting of meetings with 
Ecuadorean officials. 
In a sworn statement filed in an American 
court, Alberto Guerra, an Ecuadorean judge who 
heard the Chevron case in 2003 and 2004, accused 
Nicolas Zambrano, the judge who issued the $18 
billion verdict against Chevron, of taking a 
$500,000 bribe from the plaintiffs.  Mr. Zambrano 
denied the charge, and in his own affidavit, said 
that Mr. Guerra had told him that Chevron would 
offer him $1 million in return for a favorable 
judgment. 
Chevron has denied offering any bribes.359
Even Businessweek—a publication generally sympathetic to 
Chevron’s allegations of impropriety in Ecuador’s courts—has 
observed: 
So the case, which began two decades ago, 
continues.  Unable to enforce their $19 billion 
judgment in Ecuador, where Chevron has no assets 
to speak of, the plaintiffs are trying to get courts in 
Argentina, Brazil, and Canada to allow the seizure 
of company assets in those countries.  Chevron is 
fighting those ancillary suits tooth and nail. 
Meanwhile in New York, the company has 
sued Donziger and his Ecuadorian clients under the 
                                                          
359  Clifford Krauss, Consultant Recants in Chevron Pollution Case in 
Ecuador, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04 
/13/business/research-recanted-in-oil-pollution-case-in-ecuador.html.  
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U.S. civil racketeering law.  A trial is scheduled for 
October.  More strangeness doubtless will ensue.  
At some point, it would be nice if, apart from the 
haze of judicial mayhem in Ecuador, the rogue oil 
on the ground got cleaned up.360
Meanwhile, Chevron’s own tactics may eventually boomerang—as 
with the Ecuadorian Judge who has accused Judge Zambrano of 
bribery and complicity in taking his findings from ex parte writings 
of the Ecuadorian plaintiffs’ counsel: 
Kent Robertson, a spokesman for Chevron, 
acknowledged in an interview that the company 
has paid Guerra and has promised to pay him more.  
Chevron paid the former Ecuadorian judge $38,000 
“for information,” some of which was stored on 
cell phones and computer drives, Robertson said.  
The company has helped Guerra and four members 
of his family move from Ecuador to the U.S., and 
has promised to provide the former jurist and his 
relatives with $12,000 a month for housing and 
other living expenses for the next two years, 
Robertson added.  Chevron has also told Guerra 
that it will pay for health insurance for the family 
and for legal representation, should Guerra need it.  
“Guerra asked to come to the United States out of 
concern for his safety and the safety of his family,” 
Robertson said.  “We agreed to help.”361
What should our takeaway be from Chevron’s experience to 
date?  “For now,” Professor Judith Kimerling recently observed,  
this new chapter in the litigation appears to be 
shifting much of the focus of the legal and political 
contest from allegations about Texaco’s 
misconduct to allegations of misconduct by the 
lawyers and activists who manage the Lago Agrio 
                                                          
360  Paul M. Barrett, Judicial Mayhem In Chevron’s Pollution Case,
BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 5, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-
04-05/judicial-mayhem-in-chevrons-pollution-case.  
361  Paul Barrett, Payoffs To Ex-Judge Are Latest Twist In Chevron 
Case, BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 28, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/articl 
es/2013-01-28/payoffs-to-ex-judge-are-latest-twist-in-chevron-case.  
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case, and from concern about the rights of the 
affected communities to the rights of Chevron.362
Meanwhile, as the author of the Businessweek article observed, 
“[t]wo things are clear amid the swirl of novelistic characters, 
character assassination, and betrayal”—“[f]irst, the legal skirmishing 
shows no sign of relenting anytime soon”; and “[s]econd, while the 
lawyers do battle around the world, many thousands of farmers and 
indigenous Indians in the Ecuadorian rainforest continue to live in 
close proximity to oil contamination.”363
                                                          
362  Kimerling, supra note 328, at 97.  Lessons abound for putative 
plaintiffs’ counsel in high-profile, FDI-based cases, too, including:  Don’t 
have a film crew follow you around for some 600 hours of raw footage to 
make a documentary about your clients’ case, and thereby waive the 
attorney-client privilege to your entire “litigation files and hard drives” after 
the MNE successfully subpoenas the outtakes of the film from the 
filmmaker, revealing quite a few things which you’d wish you’d never said 
or done.  See Kimerling, supra note 328, at 87–89.  
363 Id.  However, the plaintiffs and Mr. Donziger may well be 
overwhelmed in the corporate equivalent of the “surge strategy” employed 
by the United States in the Afghanistan Conflict.  Attorney Donziger’s own 
attorneys are seeking to withdraw from defending him in Chevron’s RICO 
litigation set for trial next fall, due to, among other things, estimated 
attorneys’ fees of $5 million for Mr. Donziger alone, extensive and 
expensive pre-trial discovery taken by Chevron whose costs the federal 
district court judge apparently has ordered to be shared equally between 
Chevron and Mr. Donziger (along with two of his Ecuadorian clients), and 
the firepower of Chevron’s own legal team, which is alleged to be composed 
of 2000 legal professionals at 60 law firms, including 114 Gibson, Dunn & 
Crutcher attorneys alone.  See Donziger & Associates, Bias of Federal Judge 
and Chevron’s Abusive Tactics Prompt Law Firm to Withdraw from Ecuador 
Case, CSRWIRE, May 3, 2013, http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases 
/35574-Bias-of-Federal-Judge-and-Chevron-s-Abusive-Tactics-Prompt-Law-
Firm-to-Withdraw-from-Ecuador-Case.  Many of the assertions of the self-
serving news release are repeated in the Memorandum in Support of the 
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, filed May 3, 2013, in Chevron Corporation 
v. Donziger, Case No. 11–CV–0691 (LAK) (U.S. Dist. Ct. S.D.N.Y.) 
(Document No. 1100).  The author has never seen a law firm file a pleading 
quite like that Memorandum.  If even half of its allegations are proven true, 
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CONCLUSION
For the E.U.-based MNE, the opportunities presented by FDIs in 
the energy sector remain powerfully attractive, and no amount of risk 
as perceived ex ante is likely to be judged as of greater weight than 
the promising allure of future market advantage, yet-to-be realized 
profits that seem within the corporate grasp, and the opportunity to 
boldly go where no other MNE has gone before—or to go where 
many MNEs have tried and failed, but with the assurance that this 
time, things will be different.  The complex and contradictory history 
of E.U.-based MNEs trying repeatedly to find sustainable 
partnerships with the Russian Federation to explore and exploit 
Siberian natural gas and oil reserves, for example, encapsulates all of 
these experiences.364
Similarly, the experiences of Chevron in Ecuador’s courts and 
Royal Dutch Petroleum in America’s courts—where the fallout of 
high-risk FDIs in the energy sector has been the subject of decades of 
ongoing litigation—demonstrate the vicissitudes that come of the use 
                                                                                                                
the Second Circuit will have a very interesting time sorting through the 
proceedings if there is an appeal. 
364  Compare, e.g., BP To Buy Back $8bn In Shares After Russian Sale, 
BBC NEWS, Mar. 22, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
21893040?print=true, Angel Gonzalez, BP Executive Expects Rosneft Stake 
to Yield Partnerships in Russia, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130506-707889.html, and Russian 
Energy Twilight For BP In Russia, THE ECONOMIST, June 9, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21556629, with Sakhalin Island: Journey to 
Extreme Oil, BLOOMBERGBUSINESWEEK MAGAZINE, May 14, 2006, 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-05-14/sakhalin-island-journey-
to-extreme-oil, John Stepek, Royal Dutch Shell's trouble with Russia,
MONEYWEEK, Oct. 8, 2007, http://www.moneyweek.com/investments/stock-
markets/royal-dutch-shells-trouble-with-russia, Andrew E. Kramer, Maps 
and Mythmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2005/12/01/business/01maps.html, Neela Banerjee, From Russia, With 
Bankruptcy: A High Cost for BP Amoco’s Investment in an Oil Concern,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08 
/13/business/russia-with-bankruptcy-high-cost-for-bp-amoco-s-investment-
oil-concern.html, and Richard W. Stevenson, Oil Companies Tread Warily 
Into Russia’s Decrepit Fields, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1993, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/26/business/oil-companies-tread-warily-
into-russia-s-decrepit-fields.html.
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of civil litigation as the weapon of choice by those who have no other 
access to what they perceive as a leveled playing field with an MNE.  
Chevron hoped to end environmental tort litigation it inherited from 
Texaco by getting out of the U.S. federal courts on what the 
corporation thought to be an empty promise to show up for litigation 
in the courts of Ecuador.  Chevron won that battle, only to lose the 
war to a $19 billion judgment from a local court that was derided by 
the company; and the American courts, when the Ecuadorian 
proceedings started a decade ago in Lago Agrio—which was a 
decade after the plaintiffs first brought their case to the federal court 
in New York365:
That one of the biggest oil pollution trials in 
recent years is taking place here, in a honky-tonk 
border town known for its poverty and violence, 
was never really expected.  The judicial system 
here is poor and archaic, based on 17th-century 
French law.  This week, lawyers for the plaintiffs 
                                                          
365  Getting to the Ecuadorian court system was a crusade for Chevron-
Texaco: 
 In November 1993, a lawsuit on behalf of residents 
of the rain forest area known as Oriente was initiated in a 
federal court in New York, close to Texaco’s 
international headquarters in Westchester County.  The 
suit charges that Texaco dumped millions of gallons of 
toxic waste into hundreds of unlined open pits and from 
there into estuaries and rivers, thus exposing residents to 
disease-causing pollutants. The plaintiffs seek a thorough 
cleanup of the area, an assessment of the long-term 
health effects of the contamination and damage 
compensation that may exceed $1 billion. 
 Despite being sued on its own home turf, 
ChevronTexaco fought fiercely to have the case 
dismissed.  After more than 10 years of litigation on this 
jurisdictional issue alone, a federal appeals court finally 
ruled that “reasons of convenience” pointed to the 
jurisdiction of a rural Ecuadorean court. 
César Chelala & Alejandro M. Garro, Ecuador: Taking An Oil Giant To Task 
Over Rain Forest Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2004, http://www.nyti 
mes.com/2004/01/13/opinion/13iht-edcesar_ed3_.html. 
280                          SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF             [Vol. 9.2 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS
simply presented the judge with a list of witnesses 
who should be called.366
Similarly, as an editorialist wrote in 1999: 
Ecuador's courts cannot handle the case or 
enforce a judgment.  Ecuador does not admit class-
action suits, has no experience with cases like this 
one and relegates all environmental disputes to an 
administrative tribunal, where the largest fine has 
been a few thousand dollars. This case belongs in 
an American court, where the contesting claims 
can be fairly weighed.367
Yet, Ecuador rose to the challenge—the provincial court 
marshaled 100,000 pages of evidence and wrote a decision imposing 
a devastating liability on Chevron—which had given up the layers of 
procedural safeguards developed over decades of international civil 
litigation in U.S. courts on the chance that neither the plaintiffs nor 
the Ecuadorian courts could actually try the case.368
Chevron’s choice has proven unwise—particularly in light of 
how well Royal Dutch Shell has done in its U.S. federal court 
litigation—and Chevron, along with its shareholders worldwide, will 
pay the price, whether the milder (but not insubstantial) millions of 
dollars for attorneys’ fees, or the more painful execution of a multi-
billion dollar judgment. 
In an altogether polar opposite experience, Royal Dutch 
Petroleum has been fighting cases arising out of its ill-starred 
                                                          
366  Juan Forero, Texaco Goes on Trial in Ecuador Pollution Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/23/business/texaco-
goes-on-trial-in-ecuador-pollution-case.html. 
367 Texaco and Ecuador, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1999, http://www.n 
ytimes.com/1999/02/19/opinion/texaco-and-ecuador.html.  
368  One wonders whether lawyers and corporate executives involved in 
formulating and implementing the forum non conveniens strategy have the 
introspection to reflect on District Judge Jed Rakoff’s observation, in 
granting their motion after years of asserting the argument to get out of U.S. 
courts, that “the notion that a New York federal jury is better equipped than 
an Ecuadorian judge to apply Ecuadorian law to Spanish-language testimony 
and documents relating to 30 years’ of activities by an Ecuador-sponsored 
Consortium in an Amazonian rain forest is preposterous.”  Aguinda v. 
Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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Nigerian FDI for nearly two decades in the federal courts of the 
United States, having settled one on the courthouse steps for nearly 
$16 million—the equivalent of a mere interest service payment on 
the $16 billion judgment from which Chevron is currently struggling 
to extricate itself—and having won another, outright, in the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Kiobel decision.  Now, the face of FDI litigation in 
U.S. courts will be remade, as one of the most risk-creating litigation 
strategies in the American arsenal—the ATS lawsuit—can no longer 
fuel the corporate doomsday scenarios pitched a decade ago in hues 
worthy of a Maurice Sendak set design for a Tim Burton horror 
film.369  With a stroke of the judicial pen, Chief Justice John Roberts 
and a unanimous Supreme Court in Kiobel opened the metaphorical 
blinds to admit the morning sun so that the MNEs, and their insurers, 
feverishly haunted by such visions, could awake and see that the 
nightmare was— largely—but a childish dream. 
In between these wide-ranging and ambitious FDI projects that 
resulted in similarly wide-ranging and ambitious litigation, a E.U.-
based MNE undertaking a modest infrastructure FDI by building a 
modern wind farm to generate electricity on Israel’s Golan Heights 
faces proportionally similar risks—heightened by the risks of 
regional conflicts boiling over into war, exposure to terrorism, the 
possibility of litigation in third states, and the animadversion of 
substantial segments of the international community arrayed against 
Israel’s territorial claims in the occupied territories.   
In this article, we have walked in the shoes of a variety of 
constituents to such an FDI—individuals with varying interests; 
nations with competing interests; lawyers and judges in common law 
and civil law court systems; diplomats, negotiators and implementers 
of international trade treaties; and insurers of political and other FDI 
risks.  By tracing through these steps—bounded by the real FDI and 
litigation experiences of Royal Dutch Petroleum and Chevron, and 
the hypothesized FDI experience of Alstom in Israel—we have 
woven a tapestry of perspective, insight, experience, and informed 
speculation that will serve us as participants, no matter what the 
capacity, in future FDI scenarios of the global economy.  The end of 
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this journey invites us to begin another, as the permutations of 
triumphs and tribulations of FDI in the modern network of legal 
protections and liabilities can never be exhausted, but can be 
navigated within the parameters that studies such as this one help to 
establish.  Indeed, on May 14, 2013, wind-energy made headlines in 
media reports that “[m]ore than 573,000 birds are killed by the 
country’s wind farms each year, including 83,000 hunting birds such 
as hawks, falcons and eagles,” while at the same time,  “wind power, 
a pollution-free energy intended to ease global warming, is a 
cornerstone of President Barack Obama’s energy plan,” with “a $1 
billion-a-year tax break to the industry that has nearly doubled the 
amount of wind power in his first term”; but at the political cost of 
creating the perceptions that “like the oil industry under President 
George W. Bush, lobbyists and executives have used their favored 
status to help steer U.S. energy policy,” and that the supposedly 
“green industry [has been] allowed to do not-so-green things,” such 
as “kill[ing] protected species with impunity and conceal[ing] the 
environmental consequences of sprawling wind farms.”370
One might be forgiven if this latest example of unintended 
consequences conjures to mind a paraphrase of the signature 
observation of Roseanne Roseannadanna, the late Gilda Radner’s 
fictional characterization of an urban sage, that “[i]f it’s not one 
thing, it’s always another!”371
                                                          
370  Dina Cappiello, AP Impact: Wind Farms Get Pass On Eagle Deaths,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 14, 2013, http://www.usnews.com/ 
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